Коганицкий Григорий. The "Hand-Bell Method"

THE "HAND-BELLS METHOD"

http://samlib.ru/k/koganickij_g_a/bell_method.shtml - russ

The "Hand-Bell Method" (samlib.ru) - engl

or in the attached PDF file

Continuation of topics -

PART THREE_B_2 OVERCOMING THE INSIDE CONTINENTAL LOCAL ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE

http://samlib.ru/k/koganickij_g_a/overcominginside.shtml;

http://samlib.ru/k/koganickij_g_a/along_spiral.shtml

PART THREE_B -- OVERCOMING MULTILEVEL MISSILE DEFENSE USING THE VIRTUAL MIRROR METHOD

http://samlib.ru/editors/k/koganickij_g_a/virtual.shtml

-- PARTNERSHIP IN MUTUAL HATRED OF TWO FASCIST STRUCTURES - http://samlib.ru/k/koganickij_g_a/inmutual.shtml

-- GENERALIZING TOPIC - IMPACT TACTICAL GROUPS[16]

Generals are always prepared to fight the last war.

Words from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill

-- Introduction - Conclusions from Iran-Israel Cheek Puffing

The conclusions from the Iran-Israel conflict are interesting not because of the results of the confrontation between these two countries.

What happened was simply a political puffing out of the cheeks of two ideological formations formation that don't have adequate and good manners and, most importantly, did not have a prepared strategy of action in the event of a real conflict.

Iran struck, collecting all of its most outdated and apparently decommissioned weapons in such a demonstrative manner that all that was missing were track beacons and glamorous inscriptions on missiles and drones.

According to Reuters, Iran informed Turkey (a NATO member) in advance about the planned operation against Israel.

In turn, the United States, through Turkey, conveyed to Iran that any of its actions must be "within certain limits."

Well, and, accordingly, they transmitted information about planed attack to Israel

Israel was not ready not only for a real war, but even for such an anecdotal turn of events.

Judging by what happened, he did not have adequate for such a situation: radio countermeasures systems; it completely doesn't have early warning systems and doesn't have defense strategy for such a massive attack.

The entire Israeli "wooden dome" was initially suitable only for intercepting homemade low-speed missiles of partisan formations that were not capable of performing a "breakthrough maneuver".

What is Israel's answering strike?

I looked with interest at the photographs, which showed two decoy antennas destroyed by Israeli missiles (at least two such decoy antennas accompany each Russian air defense complex).

The Israeli retaliatory strike was a complete failure - the missile was not able to distinguish the air defense antenna system from dummy or snare-antennas.

But, on the other hand, what was a puff of cheeks and a declaration in a mysterious voice, like that whore's, from the lane - "... wasn't our retaliatory strike too cruel!?".

In repelling of the attack, all hope was on the overseas uncle and his well-promoted, albeit obsolete, weapons.

Especially considering that the missiles and drones, before entering the affected area (and I have an assumption that only Israeli radars were the target of the strikes) passed over the coverage areas of American bases and aircraft carrier groups, and it were either partially destroyed or to relative it's were given guidance, escorted, and the exchanging of information to Israel in real time, for to ensure the operation of the defective Israeli air defense (as I wrote above, Israeli air defense systems are simplified copies of American ones and their command lines are compatible).

Well, in this time, even obsolete weapons against a massive but polite political demonstration, using weapons destined for decommissioning, worked quite well.

And tomorrow, when a real aeroballistic strike will be launched using, at a minimum, radio countermeasures to neutralize the bases of the "overseas uncle"?

What if, not "at a minimum", and the uncle decides that the costs and his own losses of personnel and equipment in defending such a too ambiguous and inconvenient "ally" have become too great and do not justify the financial and political benefits!?

It is obvious that politicians of countries interested in the "overseas uncle" have forgotten the statement of the late Kissinger: "Being a friend of the United States is much more dangerous than being an enemy of the United States.".

A good example of this is the Ukrainian-Russian war, during which the United States not only betrayed Ukraine SEVERAL TIMES, but is now trying to cut off pieces of it in order to organize a politically advantageous sale for the countries directly participating in this war, in War, in which US was provoked these hostile countries to the senseless the massacre and is now trying to completely break morally and bankrupt they.

But let's get back to the military component.

How (as ONE of the options) can such an attack be organized as cheaply and effectively as possible if the task was to return Zionist Israel to the times of tents and goat herders?

At first, let's look at the basis of Israel's air defense - the "iron dome" system.

Strictly speaking, this "wooden dome" is not an Israeli development. Either "uncle" gave it to Israel, or (most likely) Israel was copied it illegally.

Why "wooden dome"?

And this is an American complex with missiles, simplified analogues of Block1B/RIM_116 missiles, which was castrated, to reduce the cost by three to four times.

The complex Block1B/RIM_116

The declared average cost of a unit (possibly, it is cost of one equipped by missiles the launch module) is $998,000 or more.

What is "iron dome"

The announced price of one battery (including radars and control systems) "iron dome" is stated, according to various estimates, depending on the configuration from 50 to 170 million dollars... (taking into account the psychology of the Israelis and the peculiarity of their propaganda - most likely from 20 to 60 million dollars).

The declared price of one rocket (and here it is very interesting) is from 40 to 80 thousand dollars or more, depending on its functionality.

It is despite of fact that the cost of the original Block1B rocket can reach up to half a million dollars.

And further, even more interesting -

(C) "On March 19, 2013, Time magazine, citing the developers of the Iron Dome, reported that Israel had managed to significantly reduce the price of interceptor missiles - to several thousand dollars.

The main reduction in cost was achieved due to the rocket's sensors, the decrease in functionality of which is compensated by information received from radars on the ground (this is exactly the information that was transmitted by the "good uncle" - my comment).

Radar of "early warning"

American radars, presumably for target selection and tracking

Radars, through the ballistic, calculation center of the base and satellites, transmit information to the command center of the "wooden dome" and it transmits commands to the interceptor missile (it means direct radio command control, poorly protected from radio countermeasures - my note), and only when it gets close with a target, its own interception system is activated" (end C)

That is, exactly what I call "castration" was done - the rocket was, in order to reduce the cost of production, degraded to the level of a radio command rocket of the 60s.

It is enough to break the chain - "US base <-> command center of the "wooden dome"" - and at least 70% of the effectiveness of interceptor missiles is lost.

Moreover, at the same time, in order to reduce the cost of the missile and increase the weight of the warhead, they abandoned the cooling of the infrared matrix (which reduces its sensitivity by 3-5 times - my note) and reduced the weight/duration of the powder cartridge, depriving the missile of the ability to fully maneuver.

By such a missile-interseptor can be intercepted low maneuverability and low speed homemade missiles only.

If we add to this the fact that Israel uses for the Iron Dome, MAINLY only short-range radars and is forced to install all command systems directly, near the border, then we can state that Israel does not have a sufficiently efficient air defense and, if not direct US intervention in the conflict, most of even these Iranian missile demonstrators would not have been shot down

So, how Iran, used on KNOW-HOW, described in previous chapters, can be organized a low-budget and completely humane air attack on the enemy.

That is, "How can such an attack be organized as cheaply and effectively as possible and, without repeating the genocide that the Zionists carried out in Gaza, return Israel to the days of tents and goat herders?"

Moreover, to do this is precisely by the MAXIMUM CHEAPEST method, while maintaining sufficient efficiency.

//"if a project's expected outcome is properly formulated, "that factor to give a possibility of finding a way to solve problems of that project"

As I already wrote above and provided a map of the region, the real enemy is not the flawed Israeli air defense, which, at best, is capable of shooting down a Palestinian Kasym or Katyusha.

The real enemy in an Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel is the chain of air defense of American military bases located between Israel and Iran.

How does such a system, consisting of American military bases and Israeli border air defense, work?

The air defense of American military bases detects Iranian strike weapons that go through their work areas and carry out selecting of targets. It shoots down heavy aero ballistics targets and traces small items, transmitting information about them directly to the Israeli air defense, which has from 10 to 30 minutes (depending on the speed of the target) to capture it and from 2 to 5 minutes to destroy it.

The air defense of these US bases is based on a modern elementary base, but by technical solutions from the 70s.

However, against Iranian forces, the level of technical solutions of which is based on equally outdated Russian technologies, this is quite enough... if not one BIG "BUT".

Firstly, in the cost and limited number of air defense missiles of these US bases (it was not for nothing that I emphasized above - you need to strike by missiles which are as CHEAP as possible).

That is, it is necessary to force the air defense of these bases to use missiles costing at least hundreds of thousands of dollars in order to shoot down something attacking, of unlimited quantity, costing a hundred dollars.

Secondly, systems related to radio countermeasures (both attacking and target identification systems) in the United States, which was initially focused on aggression against a technically weak enemy and always have been funded on a residual basis.

From the first two points follows -

Thirdly - If you suppress or disorient the radar system of these US military bases, Israeli air defense will not be able to cope with a MASSIVE attack when are disrupted both target designation and coordination with long-range and aviation radars of US bases.

-- WHAT SHOULD YOU DO FIRST WHEN ORGANIZING AND EXECUTING SUCH AN ATTACK?

It is necessary with usage of the cheapest as possible means, AT A MINIMUM, to suppress and disorient the air defense of these bases, including the "friend or foe" aviation systems. (It is impossible by definition to use any type of aircraft during active air defense operations without a workable "friend or foe" system).

What can you initially basis on!?

There is one very specific landscape and climatic feature of this region -

Firstly, in this zone there is a constant circular movement of winds, on varying height.

Secondly, this zone has a fairly stable and predictable wind rose for each altitude.

Wind map at an altitude of Sea level.

Wind map at an altitude of 1500 meters.

For the region represented on these wind maps, radio countermeasures balloons, which has partly control by altitude and launched from two points - the Mediterranean coast and from the territory of Iran, will for a long time at an altitude of 100-300 meters make circular circulations between the territory of Israel and the borders of Iran.

As a result, the attack aerostats, controlled from the ground and capable selecting of a flight's altitude and will be practically invisible to Israeli detection equipment and will move into Israeli territory at a speed of 20-60 km/h.

I have already described the use of landscape-climatic features of the wind rose and limited controllable shock balloons to carry out a mass attack - Part Four - Flight Banshee _engl.

This option differs only in that the attack follows a more complex pattern (more attacks' waves) and are used not two, but three types of aerostats.

The first two types of aerostats are described in detail in the article - Part Four - Flight Banshee _engl

The third type of aerostat, designed to create a continuous radio interference zone of covering; disruption of operational information transmission channels and continuous flare spotting of air defense systems of US bases - is a complicated version of the first aerostat.

Three more similar cylinders are attached to the vertically located main ballon of the first type balloon, which, due to the distributed load, occupy a horizontal position.

Aerodynamic pockets are glued to the dome ends of the additional cylinders.

As result of that under the influence of wind flow, the entire bunch of cylinders rotates in the air in a horizontal plane. Depending on the speed of the wind flow, the rotation speed of the bundle ranges from 10 to 30 rpm.

Several high-strength threads 100-150 m long are attached to each auxiliary cylinder, on which sections of different lengths of metalized micron film are welded.

Under the influence of centrifugal force and wind flow, the threads open up, and the entire system takes on the appearance of a snowflake.

The threads rotate in a turbulent flow and, if they are hit by a Doppler radar beam, it gives continuous reflect-oscillations, forming multiple spurious marks of high-speed targets.

For pulsed radar, almost of all ranges used in air defense, such a snowflake creates a zone of high absorption and radio shadow.

In principle, it is possible to try shoot at HUNDREDS of such snowflakes, each costing between 100-200 dollars, but to hit it by a missile worth hundreds of thousands of dollars is very difficult - the snowflake is transparent and cold, and its AVERAGE radio shadow occupies 53,000 m2.

At the base of the vertical cylindrical balloon, on its axis of rotation, a generator rotor with a power of approximately 300-500 watts is attached.

The generator housing is stabilized in the horizontal plane by a high-speed rotation gyroscope.

The generator provides power for: height control; radio command module and repeater super-regenerator.

The cruise missile is described in detail in the article - Overcoming the inside continental local anti-missile defense

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS AND HOW SHOULD BE A MASSIVE ATTACK CARRIED OUT?

Organizing such an attack is, to a large extent, overcoming and destroying what Israel considers an "iron dome", and I consider a "wooden imitation of air defense".

The difference between real air defense and its wooden imitation is highlighted above in this article by red font.

Let me summarize again - (C) "If you suppress or disorient the radar system of these US military bases, Israeli air defense will not be able to cope with a MASSED enemy attack if both target designation and its coordination of actions by ground's radars of long-range and by airborne radars of US bases will be disrupted."

That is, the obligatory, preparatory stage of the attack is suppression and radio counteraction to the radar systems of US bases (as result of that Israeli air defense will become weak-sighted, with a strictly limited time for decision-making).

ATTACK EXECUTION ORDER

As I wrote above, the attack is not carryed out spontaneously.

The choice of a specific time interval for an attack depends on weather conditions, or, more precisely, on the specific and predicted direction of the winds.

The main goal is that at the initial stage of the attack, this will be approximately (depending on the wind speed) a time interval of 20-30 hours, by an attack carried out from the Mediterranean through Israeli territory and an attack from Iran or satellite countries towards Israel, to force Israel prematurely activate all air defense systems (forcing teams of radar stations to work for a long time in an unlimited mode) and ensure complete suppression of air defense in the wind pocket, above the area of American bases, including blocking friend-or-foe systems.

From the Mediterranean Sea, it is estimated that 300-400 aerostats per day can launched from standard sea containers.

According to my estimate, each container can carry up to a hundred one-balloon aerostats or 30-50 four-balloon aerostats and carry out in a semi-automatic mode, that they are filled with helium/hydrogen and launched.

The usage for attack, from this direction, disk aerostats carrying a cruise missile as given the complexity of highly professional programming (flight mission input) of drone command modules is not rational, since it is too difficult to do in bulk carrier conditions.

Two-thirds of these balloons can be maximum cheapest devices with minimal automation (according to my assumptions, their cost, together with the cost of lifting gas, will be approximately 100-150 dollars each) and that will be carrying a simple repeater for an air defense suppression and a graphite charge in manner "cotton candy".

Single aerostats will perform their task on Israeli territory, descending to initiate a graphite bomb, when it sensor indicates a magnetic field or radar radiation.

As I wrote above, they should force Israel to prematurely activate all air defense systems (forcing the teams of radar stations and the "iron dome" to work for a long time in an unlimited mode).

The rest are four-balloon aerostats. They do not have a graphite charge, but carry a "shadow snowflake" and a more advanced module for both radio countermeasures and control.

Their task, starting both from the Mediterranean coast and from the territory of Iran and its partners, is to enter the "wind pocket" between Israel and Iran and, moving there in a circular circulation mode, ensure complete radio suppression of all American bases, depriving Israel of the possibility of long-range detection and for American bases capabilities for detecting and destroying tactical missiles and medium-range attack drones.

The next stage is an attack from the territory of Iran and its partners by disk balloons carrying a cruise missile.

Depending on the political decision, either only Israeli air defense radars are destroyed, or, at the same time, air defense radars of American bases.

The final blow, after destroying all levels of air defense, is delivered in two stages - first, with heavy aeroballistics missiles, against underground bunkers and nuclear, military and industrial facilities, and then, a massive strike by usage of unmanned, low-speed drones is carried out against energy and industrial facilities of any level.

Israel, as a modern, industrial country, will cease to exist after such an attack.

As you can see, human losses, especially of civilians, will be practically minimized, well, except for those Israeli politicians who will be commit suicide.

But, I don't believe in the possibility of their suicide - for such an extreme action you need to have at least the beginnings of pride and conscience, and in Israel, in politics, there are only

(arrogant swindlers)

In more detail and "in a modern version," that is, without taking into account the "laws of war" and ethical principles, by usage of a massive strike by missile systems and other things stated in the IMPACT TACTICAL GROUPS monograph it will be described as the strategic simulation "Death of the US"

Last week, after I put the article "The Bells Method" (samlib.ru) in Russian on my page and was wondering whether it was worth translating it into English and starting mailings, my secondary computer was attacked and I had to install new Windows.

I don't store anything important on it, it's just a device for working in the Internet, but time and some personal information were lost.

Up to this point, I had carried out self-censored and refused to cooperate with non-governmental organizations.

After this, I will apparently give up self-censorship and, if such an attack is repeated, I will also begin business contacts and with non-governmental organizations.

CLARIFICATIONS FOR USAGE OF THE "BELLS METHOD"

-- CREATION OF A CONTINUOUS FIELD OF INTERFERENCE AND RADIO COUNTERMEASURES

As I wrote above, each type of aerostat is capable to perform a certain radio countermeasures mode.

The simplest, single-balloon aerostat, which has a low level of energy generation, carries four simple, broadband, super-regenerative transducers that cover the main range of enemy radar stations.

/I hope that even the thieving idiots from Lockheed Martin know what a "super regenerative transducer" is/

The working range of transducers is set either before startup, or, in a more complex version, can be changed by a coded command.

Transducers have non-linear AGC. The transducer's response radiation level when detecting the side lobe the radar antenna must be higher than the response radiation level when detecting the main lobe of antenna of this radar.

When exposed to radiation from the radar antenna, the transducer is excited and generates a pulse/packet of pulses at this radar frequency, and this pulse packet appears both when exposed to radiation from the main lobe; and under the influence of radiation from the side lobes; and under the influence of secondary radiation from the operation of radio countermeasures modules of other balloons, any type.

Since the AGC of modules is nonlinear, and super-regenerative receivers are unstable by definition, hundreds of packets of their pulses only partially repeat both each other and the radar signal and their selection by a computer in real time is unlikely.

The four-balloon aerostat which has a more complex design and a higher level of energy supply, carries a carbon fiber "snowflake" and a radio countermeasures module that , in general terms repeating the module of a single-balloon aerostat.

The principle of operation of a rotating "snowflake" does not require additional explanation for specialists.

Clarification for "specialists" from the US - This is the simplest device for creating a passive radio shadow that hides real objects behind it from detection.

The operating frequency and type of suppressed radar stations do not matter.

The heavy, disc-shaped aerostat, capable of carrying an attack drone, has an absorbing anti-radar coating and two types of antennas - circular radiation antennas directly connected to the super-regenerative transducers and several directional antennas which repeats the signal from the super-regenerative transducers through amplifying klystrons and, due to the rotation of the balloons, introduce into the "interference field" , additional periodic information instability .

Detection, direction finding and guidance of air defense missiles at emitting aerostats is complicated by repeated repetition of their signals in the "interference field".

In addition, as I wrote earlier, air defense systems, using missiles, each of which costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, will have to contend with HUNDREDS aerostats of radio countermeasure, each of which costs, at most, a hundred dollars.

I carry out mailings the articles into these addresses

Ministry of Defense	research organizations of Ministry of Defense
Canada - information@forces.gc.ca https://buyandsell.gc.ca/contact-us	DND.IDEaS-IDEeS.MDN@forces.gc.ca
the British Ministry of Defense no email address	centralenquiries@dstl.gov.uk AuroraProviderNetwork@QinetiQ.com https://www.qinetiq.com/en/contact-us
Ministry of Defense of Iran info@mfa.gov.ir	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Iran https://www.iranwatch.org/contact int@irost.ir
Ministry of Defense of China mod@mod.gov.cn	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of China heidi.mcgregor@ithaka.org https://support.publishers.jstor.org/hc/en-us/requests/new?ticket_form_id=360003403994
Ministry of Defense of Poland kontakt@mon.gov.pl	The National Centre for Research and Development (NCRD, Polish) info@ncbr.gov.pl https://www.gov.pl/web/ncbr-en/information-point
Ministry of Defense of Sweden exp-hkv@mil.se	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Sweden registrator@foi.se
Ministry of Defense of Norway postmottak@fd.dep.no	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Norway info@ffi.no hanne.bjork@ffi.no firmapost@ffi.no runderland@mil.no *blocked*
Ministry of Defense of Finland kirjaamo.plm@gov.fi registratorskontoret.fsm@gov.fi	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Finland registry.plm@gov.fi
Ministry of Defense of India indiaportal@gov.in	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of India ws-dst@gov.in
Washington no email address	contact@nti.org DARPA - https://contact.darpa.mil/ Lockheed Martin - community.relations@lmco.com
Ministry of Defense of United Pakistan datacenter.mlc@gmail.com	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Pakistan issra@ndu.edu.pk
Ministry of Defense of South Africa pgvdb@sanavy.co.za Senior Staff Officer info@dod.mil.za secdef@dod.mil.za Director-General: Sonto Kudjoe, Ms	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of South Africa no email address
Ministry of Defense Italy udc@postacert.difesa.it	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Italy udc@gabmin.difesa.it segrecapo.sm@casd.difesa.it
Ministry of Defense of North Korea dpr.korea@verizon.net admou@mil.gov.ua ???
Ministry of South Korea webmaster@pmo.go.kr ???
Ministry Saudi Arabia hostmaster@moda.gov.sa	research organizations of Ministry of Defense of Saudi Arabia https://www.psdsarc.org.sa/about-us/ ????
Institute for the Study of War isw@understandingwar.org press@understandingwar.org

After the attack on my computer, I decided to carry out additional mailings

A country and organization	The persons
British politician and broadcaster	Nigel Paul Farage farage@gbnews.uk
US Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee	Mike Turner ... has no public contact
US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy	-- DR. JOHN F. PLUMB Contact (spaceforce.mil)
US senator of New York State	Chuck Schumer Message Chuck \| Senator Chuck Schumer of New York (senate.gov) has no public contact
US from the State of South Carolina	Jim Clyburn ... has no public contact
US Democrat from Minnesota	Ilhan Omar Address Lookup \| Representative Ilhan Omar (house.gov) Newsletter Subscribe \| Representative Ilhan Omar (house.gov) ... has no public contact
US Democrat from Ohio	Shontel Brown Address Lookup \| Representative Shontel Brown (house.gov) ... has no public contact Newsletter Subscribe \| Representative Shontel Brown (house.gov) ... has no public contact
US Los Angeles Republican	Mike Johnson Contact Form \| U.S. Congressman Mike Johnson (house.gov) ... has no public contact Contact Representatives - Mike Johnson has no public contact
US Democrat from New York	Hakeem Jeffries Email Me - Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (house.gov) Contact \| Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries (house.gov) has no public contact
US Democrat from Georgia	Senator Raphael Warnock Contact Form Reverend Raphael Warnock (senate.gov) has no public contact
US Democratic Senator from Connecticut	Senator Richard Blumenthal Write to Senator Blumenthal \| U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (senate.gov) has no public contact
CEO of FakeReporter	Achiya Schatz info@uknif.org https://www.nif.org/about/contact/

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Аннотация: The conclusions from the Iran-Israel conflict are interesting not because of the results of the confrontation between these two countries. What happened was simply a political puffing out of the cheeks of two ideological formations formation that don"t have adequate and good manners and, most importantly, did not have a prepared strategy of action in the event of a real conflict.

Коганицкий Григорий : другие произведения.

The "Hand-Bell Method"