Regions and Countries The main geographical regions are indicated in the Table of Contents on p. iii. An alphabetical list, showing where each country entry is to be found, is on p. 2, following these Notes. To the extent that national variations permit, each country entry (with the exception of those for some smaller countries) is arranged in a standard form: general information about population, military service, total military manpower strength, Gross National Product (GNP) and the current defence budget is followed by separate sections on the main armed services (army, navy, air force), each of which contains, where the information is available, sub-sections on reserves and, where relevant, on deployment.
Defence Pacts and Agreements A short description of multilateral and bilateral pacts and military aid agreements introduces each of the main regional sections of the study. Defence assistance given under less formal arrangements is also noted. Agreements which cover only economic aid are not included.
Defence Expenditure and Gross National Product Figures for defence expenditure are the latest available and are exclusive of military aid. GNP figures given are usually at market prices. In addition to the estimates of current defence expenditure and GNP in the individual country entries, information on the principal countries covered, for this year and previous years, is collected in tables at the end of the volume, as shown in the Table of Contents. Because estimates of defence expenditure and GNP have been amended in the case of certain countries, figures will not in all cases be directly comparable with those in previous editions of The Military Balance. Where a $ sign appears it refers, unless otherwise stated, to United States dollars. The term billion equals 1,000 million.
Currency Conversion Rates In order to make comparison easier, national currency figures have been converted into United States dollars at the rate prevailing on 1July 1972, generally as reported to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Exceptions are the Soviet Union GNP which has been arrived at on the basis explained in The Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 10-12, and certain East European countries which are not members of the IMF, where the conversion rates used are those described by Professor Benoit and Dr. Lubell in Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). In all cases, the conversion rates used are included in the country entry or made clear in the relevant table but may not always be applicable to commercial transactions.
Manpower The manpower figures given are, unless otherwise stated, those of regular forces. An indication of the size of militia, reserve and para-military forces is also included in the country entry where appropriate. Paramilitary forces are here taken to be forces whose equipment and training goes beyond that required for civil police duties and whose constitution and control suggest that they may be usable in support, or in lieu, of regular forces.
Equipment In general and unless otherwise stated, equipment figures in the country entries cover only equipment available with operational units. Except where the contrary is made clear, naval vessels of less than 100 tons structural displacement have been excluded. The term 'combat aircraft* used in the country entries comprises only bomber, fighter-bomber, strike, interceptor, reconnaissance, counter-insurgency and armed trainer aircraft (i.e. aircraft normally equipped and configured to deliver ordnance). Basic technical details of the nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles, artillery and aircraft) available to NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are given in Table 1 on pp. 65-69. Details of the world's main tanks are in Table 5 on p. 74. Where the term 'mile' is used when indicating the range or radius of weapon systems it means a statute mile.
Strength of Military Formations The table below gives the average establishment strength of the major military formations used in the text. The figures should be treated as approximate, since military organization is flexible and formations may be reinforced or reduced.
a Army divisions only; a Marine Corps division has 19,000 men.
b Strength of a regiment, which is the equivalent formation in the Soviet and Chinese command structure. (The term 'regiment' is however often employed, particularly in European countries, to describe a battalion-size unit, and it is so used in The Military Balance.)
Divisional strengths cover organic units only and exclude support units or services outside the divisional structure. Warsaw Pact formations and squadrons have strengths similar to those of the Soviet Union. NATO formations and squadrons not included in the table have similar totals to those of Germany unless otherwise mentioned in the text. Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have tended to adopt American military organization, while Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore generally follow British practice.
Arms Transfers Major arms supply agreements identified as being made during the year which ended on 1July 1972 are listed, under geographical regions, in Table 6 on pp. 75-80. Because the actual transfer of arms may take place outside that year, an indication is also given there of expected delivery dates.
Abbreviations A list of the abbreviations used in the text is on p. viii, immediately following these Notes. For the convenience of the reader, certain important abbreviations are explained again when first used.
ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ ДЛЯ ЧИТАТЕЛЕЙ Регионы и страны Основные географические регионы указаны в оглавлении на стр. iii. Алфавитный список, показывающий, где находится каждая страна, находится на стр. 2, после этих Примечаний. Сведения о каждой стране (за исключением небольших стран) осуществляется в стандартной форме: общие сведения о численности населения, военной службы, общей численности военных, валового национального продукта (ВНП) и нынешний оборонный бюджет. Далее следуют отдельные разделы по основным вооруженным силам (армия, флот, ВВС), каждый из которых содержит, если эта информация доступна, подразделы: численность и, когда это уместно, развертывание.
Оборонительные союзы и соглашений Краткое описание многосторонних и двусторонних пактов и соглашений о военной помощи представляет каждый из основных региональных разделов исследования. Помощь в обороне с менее формальными механизмами тоже отмечена. Соглашения, которые охватывают только экономическую помощь, не включены.
Расходы на Оборону и Валовой Национальный Продукт Данные о расходах на оборону являются самыми последними и не включают военную помощь. Данные о ВНП обычно приводятся по рыночным ценам. В дополнение к оценкам текущих расходов на оборону и ВНП по отдельным странам информация об основных странах за этот год и предыдущие годы выкладывается в таблицах в конце Тома, как это показано в таблице содержания. Поскольку в случае некоторых стран в смету расходов на оборону и ВНП были внесены поправки, цифры не во всех случаях будут прямо сопоставимы с данными предыдущих изданий военного баланса. Там, где появляется знак $, он относится, если не указано иное, к долларам США. Термин миллиард равен 1000 миллионам.
Курсы конвертации валют Для облегчения сопоставления данные в национальной валюте были пересчитаны в доллары США по курсу, действовавшему на 1 июля 1972 года, как правило, как сообщалось Международном Валютным Фондом (МВФ). Исключения это ВНП Советского Союза, который был получен на основе, объясненной в The Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 10-12, и некоторых восточноевропейских стран, которые не являются членами МВФ, где используются коэффициенты пересчета, описанные профессором Бенуа и доктором Любеллом в Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). Во всех случаях используемые коэффициенты пересчета включаются в запись по стране или четко указываются в соответствующей таблице, но не всегда могут применяться к коммерческим операциям.
Личный состав Приведенные данные о численности личного состава, если не указано иное, относятся к регулярным силам. В соответствующих случаях указывается также численность ополченцев, резервных и полувоенных сил. Под военизированными формированиями здесь понимаются силы, оснащение и подготовка которых выходят за рамки обязанностей гражданской полиции и Конституция и контроль которых позволяют предположить, что они могут использоваться для поддержки регулярных сил или в их составе.
Вооружение В целом, если не указано иное, данные о вооружении по странам включают только вооружение, имеющееся в оперативных подразделениях. За исключением случаев, когда четко указывается обратное, исключаются военно-морские суда водоизмещением менее 100 тонн. Термин боевые самолеты подразумевает только бомбардировщики, истребители-бомбардировщики, штурмовики, перехватчики, разведывательных, противоповстанческие и военные учебные самолеты (т. е. самолеты, как правило, укомплектованы, и назначены, чтобы доставить боеприпасы). Основные технические данные о средствах доставки ядерного оружия (ракеты, артиллерия и самолеты), имеющихся в распоряжении стран NATO и Варшавского договора, приведены в таблице 1 на стр. 65-69. Подробная информация об основных танках мира приведена в таблице 5 на стр. 74. Термин "миля" используется при указании дальности или радиуса действия систем, означает уставную милю.
Численность воинских формирований В таблице ниже приводится средняя численность основных воинских формирований, использованных в тексте. Цифры следует рассматривать как приблизительные, поскольку военная организация является гибкой и формирования могут быть усилены или сокращены.
Силы дивизий включают только органические подразделения и исключают вспомогательные подразделения или службы за пределами структуры дивизий. Формирования и эскадрильи Варшавского договора имеют силы, аналогичные Советскому Союзу. Составы и эскадрильи NATO, не включенные в таблицу, имеют общие показатели, аналогичные показателям Германии, если в тексте не указано иное. Иран, Пакистан, Филиппины, Таиланд, Япония, Южная Корея и Тайвань, как правило, принимают американскую военную организацию, в то время как Австралия, Новая Зеландия, Малайзия и Сингапур в целом следуют британской практике.
Поставки оружия Основные соглашения о поставках оружия, заключенные в течение года, закончившегося 1 июля 1972 года, перечислены в разделе "географические регионы" в таблице 6 на стр. 75-80. Поскольку фактическая передача оружия может иметь место и за пределами этого года, в нем также указываются ожидаемые сроки поставки.
Сокращения Список сокращений, используемых в тексте, приведен на стр. viii, сразу после этих Примечаний. Для удобства читателя некоторые важные аббревиатуры поясняются еще раз при первом использовании.
Despite progress towards the mutual regulation of their strategic relationship, the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union continue to be oriented principally towards each other. China, not having yet demonstrated any operational nuclear capability of substance, is still a subsidiary concern. Thus, while the strategic forces of the super-powers have potential ancillary uses, in terms of deterring lesser nuclear-weapon states or limiting damage in case of nuclear war, their fundamental purpose remains one of reciprocal, second-strike deterrence.
The American-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have yielded formal agreements, signed on 26 May 1972 during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, which affect both anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and offensive strategic missiles. (The agreements, with the 'balance' which they reflect, are analysed in Appendix I on pp. 83-86.) Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has continued to overhaul the United States in terms of strategic missile launchers, while the United States has continued to pull further ahead in terms of separable warheads and deliverable weapons. On land, some 1,530 Soviet ICBM are now operational, with about another 90 under active construction, as compared with 1,054 ICBM on the American side. At sea, about 560 Soviet SLBM are operational and about 245 under construction, compared to 656 American SLBM.
SALT agreements aside, the momentum of the Soviet ICBM programme has slackened considerably since the 1968-70 period. Some work on new ICBM silos has continued, reports persist of a new and larger ICBM (which might begin to succeed the SS-9 by about 1974-75) and there may have been some deployment of three-warhead MRV clusters on both SS-9 and SS-11 missiles. But deployment of both 'heavy' SS-9 and 'light' SS-11 and SS-13 ICBM has levelled off, and no flight test of a true Soviet MIRV system has yet been detected. At sea, however, the Soviet Union has continued to build Y-class ballistic-missile submarines at a rate of about eight a year, and has apparently begun to include a number designed to fire 12 missiles, rather than 16, possibly in preparation for conversion to the larger, 3,000-mile range SS-N-8 SLBM which she has been testing.
The American missile programme, on land and at sea, has concentrated rather on improving force survivability and increasing the number of warheads deliverable on separate targets. The exchange of Minuteman 1 and Polaris missiles for newer systems with MIRV continues to move towards the target of 550 Minuteman 3 ICBM launchers (with up to 1,650 warheads) and 496 Poseidon SLBM launchers (with up to 4,960 warheads). At the same time, increased funding ($977 million in 1972-73) has been requested for the proposed Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS), now christened Trident, which might begin to take over the role of Polaris and Poseidon from 1978.
The American Administration is also seeking an increased appropriation for the development of the new B-1 strategic bomber, which could begin by about 1978 to replace some of the 455 B-52s and 76 FB-111s now in service. Meanwhile, production of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), intended to enhance the capability of the existing bomber force as well as to equip the B-l, is in full swing. Against this, development of new Soviet bombers appears to be limited to prototype testing of the Backfire variable-geometry aircraft, whose limited range seems to restrict its utility as a potential successor to the 140 aging, long-range Soviet bombers in current service. Conversely, the United States has continued to reduce her air defence forces, which now include less than 600 interceptor aircraft and about 800 SAM launchers, while the Soviet Union has both maintained and modernized her comparable forces, consisting of 3,000 interceptors and some 10,000 SAM launchers. The active manpower strength of American armed forces, now 2.4 million, has also continued to decline. In addition, further withdrawals from Vietnam and Korea have led to a greater overall concentration within the continental United States. In contrast, Soviet manpower strength has remained unaltered at about 3.4 million. Only in surface naval forces have the two countries clearly been following parallel paths, with each continuing to reduce ship numbers in order to achieve higher quality and modernization.
Соединенные Штаты и Советский Союз
Несмотря на прогресс в деле взаимного регулирования их стратегических отношений, ядерные силы Соединенных Штатов и Советского Союза по-прежнему ориентированы главным образом друг против друга. Китай, который еще не продемонстрировал какого-либо оперативного ядерного потенциала по существу, по-прежнему является дополнительной проблемой. Таким образом, в то время как стратегические силы сверхдержав имеют потенциальное вспомогательное применение, с точки зрения сдерживания меньших государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, или ограничения ущерба в случае ядерной войны, их основная цель по-прежнему заключается в взаимном сдерживании вторым ударом.
Американо-советские переговоры по ограничению стратегических вооружений (ОСВ) привели к заключению официальных соглашений, подписанных 26 мая 1972 года во время визита президента Никсона в Москву, которые затрагивают как системы противоракетной обороны (ПРО), так и наступательные стратегические ракеты. (Соглашения с "балансом", который они отражают, анализируются в добавлении I на стр. 83-86.) Между тем Советский Союз продолжал опережать Соединенные Штаты в плане числа стратегических ракетных пусковых установок, в то время как Соединенные Штаты продолжали продвигаться вперед в плане разделяемых боеголовок и доставляемого оружия. На суше в настоящее время действует около 1530 советских МБР, еще около 90 находятся в стадии активного строительства по сравнению с 1054 МБР с американской стороны. В море эксплуатируется около 560 советских БРПЛ и около 245 строятся по сравнению с 656 американскими БРПЛ.
Несмотря на соглашения по ОСВ, темпы советской программы МБР значительно замедлились с 1968-70 годов. Работы на новыми МБР продолжаются, постоянно поступают сообщения о большой межконтинентальной баллистической ракете (чтобы заменить SS-9 примерно в 1974-75) возможно были три боеголовки на ракетах SS-9 и SS-11. Но развертывание как "тяжелых" SS-9, так и "легких" SS-11 и МБР SS-13 выровнялось, и летных испытаний настоящей советской системы РГЧ ИН пока не обнаружено. На море, однако, Советский Союз продолжал строить подводные лодки с баллистическими ракетами Y-класса темпом около восьми в год и, по-видимому, начал включать в себя число, предназначенное для стрельбы 12 ракетами, а не 16, возможно, в рамках подготовки к переходу на большую, 3000-мильную дальность SS-N-8 БРПЛ, которая испытана.
Американская ракетная программа на суше и на море сосредоточена скорее на повышении живучести сил и увеличении числа боеголовок, доставляемых по отдельным целям. Обмен ракет Minuteman 1 и Polaris на более новые системы с MIRV продолжает двигаться к цели 550 пусковых установок МБР Minuteman 3 (до 1650 боеголовками) и 496 пусковых установок SLBM Poseidon (с до 4960 боеголовками). В то же время испрашивается увеличение финансирования (977 млн. долл.США в 1972-1973 годах) предлагаемого подводного ракетного комплекса большой дальности (ULMS), который в настоящее время называется Trident и который может начать играть роль Polaris и Poseidon с 1978 года.
Американская администрация добивается увеличения ассигнований на развитие нового стратегического бомбардировщика B-1, который может начаться около 1978 чтобы заменить некоторые из 455 B-52 и 76 в FB-111s которые сейчас на вооружении. Между тем, полным ходом идет производство ударной ракеты малой дальности (SRAM), предназначенной для повышения потенциала существующих бомбардировочных сил, а также для оснащения B-1. Против этого, разработка новых советских бомбардировщиков, как представляется, ограничивается испытания прототипа Backfire самолета с изменяемой геометрией крыла, чей ограниченный диапазон, как представляется, ограничивает его полезность в качестве потенциального преемника 140 старых, дальних советских бомбардировщиков. И наоборот, Соединенные Штаты продолжали сокращать свои силы противовоздушной обороны, которые в настоящее время включают менее 600 самолетов-перехватчиков и около 800 пусковых установок ЗРК, в то время как Советский Союз поддерживал и модернизировал свои сопоставимые силы, состоящие из 3000 перехватчиков и около 10 000 пусковых установок ЗРК. Активная численности американских вооруженных сил, сейчас 2,4 миллиона, также продолжает снижаться. Кроме того, дальнейший вывод войск из Вьетнама и Кореи привел к повышению общей концентрации в континентальной части Соединенных Штатов. В отличие от них Советские силы осталась неизменными на уровне около 3,4 миллиона. Только в надводных военно-морских силах две страны четко следуют параллельным путям, при этом каждая из них продолжает сокращать количество кораблей для достижения более высокого качества и модернизации.
THE UNTIED STATES
Population: 210,000,000.
Military service: selective service for two years.*
(*1July 1973 has been set as the target date for zero draft calls, making service thereafter voluntary.)
Total armed forces: 2,391,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1,072.9 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: $83.4 billion. (New obligational authority, expected outlay is $76.5 billion.)
Strategic Forces: (Manpower is included in Army, Navy and Air Force totals.)
(A) OFFENSIVE :ї ICBM: 1,054 (Strategic Air Command (SAC))
300 Minuteman 1.
500 Minuteman 2.
200 Minuteman 3.
54 Titan 2. SLBM: 656 in 41 SSBN (US Navy)
10 SSBN each with 16 Poseidon.
23 SSBN each with 16 Polaris A3.
8 SSBN each with 16 Polaris A2. Aircraft: (SAC)
Bombers: 522
67 FB-111A in 4 squadrons.
150 B-52D/F in 10 squadrons.
240 B-52G/H in 16 squadrons. ||
Bombers in active storage or reserve include 9 FB-111A, 22 B-52D/F and 43 B-52 G/H.
Tankers: 390 KC-135A in 38 squadrons, plus 130 in reserve.
(*About 200 B-52 (all types), and 130 KC-135 are currently assigned to duty in South-East Asia.)
Strategic Reconnaissance: SR-71A; 2 squadrons.
(B) DEFENSIVE
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) - HQ Colorado Springs-is a joint American Canadian organization.
American forces under NORAD are Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) and Army Air Defense Command (ARAD-COM)
(combined strength 80,000). Aircraft (excluding Canadian) :
Interceptors: 593
(i) Regular: 9 squadrons with F-106.
(ii) Air National Guard: 5 squadrons with F-101; 11 squadrons with F-102; 2 squadrons with F-106.
AEW aircraft: 3 squadrons with EC-121. SAM: 839
(i) Regular: 21 Nike-Hercules batteries; 5 Bomarc B batteries.
(ii) Army National Guard: 27 Nike-Hercules batteries. Radar and tracking stations: (i) Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: 33 stations, roughly along the 70R N parallel;
(ii) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS): stations in Alaska, Greenland and England;
(iii) Pinetree Line: 23 stations in central Canada;
(iv) Over-the-Horizon, Forward-scatter (OTH): radar system capable of detecting, but not tracking, ICBM very early in flight;
(v) 474N: SLBM detection and warning net of 7 stations on the East, Gulf and West coasts of the United States;
long-range radars have been added to the East coast net;
(vi) USAF Space track and USN SPASUR systems, Space Defense Center, satellite tracking, identification and cataloguing control;
(vii) Back-Up Interceptor Control (BUIC): system for air defence command and control;
(viii) Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system for co-ordinating all surveillance and tracking of objects in North American airspace; 14 locations; combined with BUIC.
Army: 861,000.
3 armoured divisions.
1 cavalry division.
4 mechanized infantry divisions.
3 infantry divisions.
1 airborne division.
1 airportable division.
2 independent infantry brigades.
1 independent airborne brigade.
5 armoured cavalry regiments.
5 special forces groups.
30 SSM batteries with Honest John, Pershing, Sergeant SSM; (Lance is being introduced to replace Honest John and Sergeant).
M-48, M-60 and M-60A1E2 med tks; M-551 Sheridan lt tks with Shillelagh ATGW;
M-107 175mm SP guns; M-109 155mm and M-110 203mm SP hows; TOW ATGW;
Vulcan 20mm AA arty system; Redeye, Chaparral and HAWK SAM.
ARMY AVIATION: about 200 units with 9,000 hel and 2,600 fixed-wing ac.
DEPLOYMENT: Continental United States (i) Strategic Reserve: 1 cav div; 1 armd div; 1 mech inf div; 1 inf div; 1 AB div; 1 airportable div; 1 armd cav regt.
(ii) To reinforce 7th Army in Europe: 1 mech inf div (less one bde)*; 1 armd cav regt; 1 special forces gp.
(*This division is dual-based and its heavy equipment is stored in West Germany.)
(iii) Other: 1 inf bde; 1 armd cav regt; 2 special forces gps.
(iv) Hawaii: 1 inf div. Europe (i) Germany: 7th Army: 2 corps incl 2 armd divs, 2 mech inf divs, 2 armd cav regts and 1 mech inf bde: 190,000.
(ii) West Berlin: 1 infantry brigade: 1,700.
Italy: Task force: HQ elms and 1 SSM bn. Pacific (i) South Vietnam: 41,000.
(ii) South Korea: 1 infantry division: 20,000.
RESERVES: Authorized strength 660,000; actual strength 635,000.
(i) Army National Guard: 400,000, capable five weeks after mobilization of manning
2 armd, 1 mech and 5 inf divs and 19 indep bdes plus reinforcements and support units to fill regular formations; 27 SAM btys.
(ii) Army Reserves: 235,000, organized in 13 divs and 8 indep bdes; 48,000 a year undergo short active duty tours.
Marine Corps: 198,000.
3 divisions (each of 19,000 men), each supported by 1 tk bn and 1 HAWK SAM bn.
M-48 and M-103A2 tks; 175mm guns; 105mm SP hows; 105mm and 155mm hows.
3 Air Wings; 550 combat aircraft.
14 fighter sqns with F-4B and F-4J (with Sparrow and Sidewinder AAM).
12 attack sqns with A-4 and A-6A.
1 close-support sqn with 30 AV-8A (Harrier).
3 recce sqns with RF-4B/C, and RF-8A.
45 AH-1 gunship hel.
6 heavy hel sqns with CH-53D, RH-53D.
9 med assault hel sqns with CH-46A.
3 assault tpt sqns with 45 KC-130F.
DEPLOYMENT:
(i) Continental United States: 2 divisions, 1 brigade.
(ii) Hawaii/Okinawa: 1 division.
RESERVES: Authorized strength 45,849; actual strength 42,000.
1 division and 1 associated air wing which includes 4 sqns with F-8; 2 sqns with CH-53A and C-46A.
Navy: 602,000; 243 major combat surface ships; 91 attack submarines. Submarines, attack: 56 nuclear-powered, 35 diesel powered. Aircraft carriers:
(i) Attack: 14:
1 nuclear-powered (USS Enterprise 76,000 tons).
8 Forrestal/Kitty Hawk-class (60,000 tons).
3 Midway-class (52,000 tons).
2 Hancock-class (33,000 tons).
The larger carriers have a normal complement of 80-90 aircraft and the smaller ones between 70-80.
These are organized as an air wing of
2 fighter sqns with F-4 (F-8 in the Hancock-class),
2 light attack sqns, all-weather attack sqn with A-6; and AEW, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft.
Light attack aircraft include A-4 and A-7 (the A-7 due eventually to replace the A-4).
RA-5C are used for reconnaissance (RF-8G in the Hancock-class).
E-2A and E-1B are used for AEW and a few KA-3B as tankers.
(ii) Anti-Submarine (ASW): 2:
2 Essex-class (33,000 tons) each with
40-47 aircraft in 2 air groups with 3 sqns of 21 S-2E, 2 sqns 16 SH-3 hel, 4 E-1B AEW and A-4 or F-8 light attack aircraft. Other surface ships: 1 SAM cruiser (nuclear).
3 SAM cruisers.
1 gun cruiser.
4 SAM light cruisers.
2 SAM frigates (nuclear).
28 SAM frigates.
29 SAM destroyers.
97 gun/ASW destroyers.
6 SAM destroyer escorts.
53 gun escorts (radar picket).
3 frigates (radar picket).
72 amphibious warfare ships.
100+ minor landing craft.
20 MCM ships (plus numerous small craft).
155 logistics and operations support ships.
Missiles include Standard, Tartar, Talos, Terrier, Sea Sparrow SAM; ASROC and SUBROC ASW. Shore-based aircraft: 24 maritime patrol squadrons with 216 P-3.
Transports include C-47, C-54, C-118, C-119, C-130 and C-131.
DEPLOYMENT: Fleets: 1st (Eastern Pacific), 2nd (Atlantic), 6th (Mediterranean), 7th (Western Pacific).
RESERVES: Authorized strength 129,000; actual strength 120,000; 3,500 a year undergo short active duty tours. Ships in reserve: 7 submarines.
9 aircraft carriers.
4 battleships.
12 heavy cruisers.
2 SAM light cruisers.
106 destroyers.
3 frigates.
128 destroyer escorts (all classes).
9 rocket ships.
80 amphibious warfare ships.
75 MCM ships.
185 logistics support ships. Aircraft: 2 Reserve Air Wings: 25 ASW sqns with S-2; 24 maritime patrol sqns with P-2 and P-3A/B;
4 hel sqns; 10 fighter/attack sqns with F-8 and A-7.
2 ASW groups: 12 patrol sqns with S-2, P-3.
Air Force: 730,000; 6,000 combat aircraft.
General Purpose Forces include:
(i) Tactical Air Command: 110,000; 2,200 combat aircraft, about 1,000 normally based in the United States.
18 fighter squadrons with F-4, F-105 and F-111E.
1 attack squadron with A-7D.
9 tactical recce squadrons with RF-4C.
16 assault air-lift sqns with C-130E.
4 STOL air-lift sqns with C-1 and C-123B.
2 electronic warfare squadrons.
7 special operations sqns with A-37, AC-119, C-123K and AC-130.
(ii) US Air Force, Europe (USAFE): 50,000,
controlling 3rd Air Force (Britain), 16th Air Force (Spain), 17th Air Force (West Germany) and a Logistics Group in Turkey.
21 fighter squadrons (and 4 in USA on call) with 475 F-4C/D/E and 75 F-111E.
5 tactical recce sqns with 85 RF-4C.
2 transport sqns with C-130.
(iii) Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): 120,000, controlling:
5th Air Force: bases in Japan, Korea and Okinawa with F-4, RF-4C, and C-130.
13th Air Force: bases in the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand, with F-4, F-105, RF-4C and C-130.
7th Air Force: 15,800 in South Vietnam: (the air component of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam,
co-ordinating the operations of the Vietnamese Air Force) with F-4C, A-37, RF-4, A-1E, AC-119, AC-130, C-123 and C-7A aircraft
plus large numbers of light aircraft and helicopters.
(iv) Military Airlift Command (MAC): 90,000;
18 heavy transport squadrons with 35 C-133, 260 C-141 and 60 C-5A (planned strength 79 C-5A by mid-1973).
24 medical tpt, weather recce and SAR sqns.
RESERVES:
(i)Air National Guard :Authorized strength 88,191; actual strength 87,000; 1,500 aircraft in
18 fighter-interceptor, 28 tactical fighter and attack, 11 tactical reconnaissance, 5 tactical air support, 4 special operations,
7 tanker and 20 air transport squadrons.
(ii) Air Force Reserve: Authorized strength 49,634; actual strength 47,000; 400 aircraft in
52 squadrons incl 1 C-123K, 6 C-124,18 C-130 and 13 C-141 tpt sqns (the others have tactical support, special operations and SAR roles).
THE SOVIET UNION
Population: 246,800,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy and Border Guards, 2-3 years.
Total armed forces; 3,375,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: S536 billion.* (*An explanation of the valuation of GNP was given in The Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 10-12.)
Defence budget 1972: 179 billion roubles* (*For a discussion of the conversion of Soviet rouble defence expenditure into US dollars see p.9.)
Strategic Forces
(A) OFFENSIVE (Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)) 350,000ї ICBM: about 1,530.
210 SS-7 Saddler and SS-8 Sasin (Р-16 и Р-9 -ЕТ).
290 SS-9 Scarp (Р-36 -ЕТ).
970 SS-11 (including about 100 with variable range capability sited within IRBM/MRBM fields) (УР-100 -ЕТ).
60 SS-13 Savage (РТ-2 -ЕТ).
IKBM and MRBM: about 600.
100 SS-5 Skean (Р-14 -ЕТ) IRBM.
500 SS-4 Sandal (Р-12 -ЕТ) MRBM.
(The majority are sited near the western border of the USSR and the remainder east of the Urals.) SLBM: 560 in 61 submarines (Navy).
29 SSBN (Y-class) each with 16 SS-N-6 missiles (пр.667 с Р-27 -ЕТ).
10 SSBN (H-II-class) and 10 diesel (G-II-class), each with 3 SS-N-5 Serb missiles (пр.658М и пр.629А с Р-21).
12 diesel (G-I-class) each with 3 SS-N-4 Sark missiles (пр.629 с Р-13). Aircraft (Long Range Air Force*). *About 75% is based in European USSR, with most of the remainder in the Far East;
in addition, it has staging and dispersal points in the Arctic.
Long-range bombers: 140.
100 Tu-95 Bear and 40 Mya-4 Bison.
Tankers: 50 Mya-4 Bison.
Medium-range bombers: 700.
500 Tu-16 Badger and 200 Tu-22 Blinder. (B) DEFENSIVE: Air Defence Command (PVO-Strany) is a separate command of the armed forces comprising an
early-warning and control system, fighter interceptor squadrons and surface-to-air missile (SAM) units.
(*Air Defence Command has a total strength of 500,000, manpower being provided by the Army and Air Force.) Aircraft: about 3,000.
Interceptors: include about 1,060 MiG-17, -19 and Yak-25; 800 Su-9; 1,140 Yak-28P Firebar,
Tu-28P Fiddler, Su-11 Flagon A and MiG-23 Foxbat (Су-15 и МиГ-25П -ЕТ).
AEW aircraft: 10 modified Tu-114 Moss (Ту-126 -ЕТ).
Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM): 64 Galosh (А-35 -ЕТ) long-range missile launchers are deployed in 4 sites around Moscow, each with Try Add engagement radars.
Target acquisition and tracking is by a phased-array Dog House radar and
early warning is given by phased-array Hen House radar on the Soviet borders.
The range of Galosh is believed to be over 200 miles and its warheads nuclear, in the megaton range.
Work has been resumed on previously uncompleted complexes in the same area. SAM: 10,000 launchers at about 1,600 sites
SA-2 (С-75 -ЕТ): about 5,000; track-while-scan Fan Song radar; high-explosive warhead;
slant range (launcher to target) about 25 miles; effective between 1,000 and 80,000 feet.
SA-3 (С-125 -ЕТ): Two-stage, short range, low level missile; slant range about 15miles.
SA-4 (Круг -ЕТ): Twin-mounted (on tracked carriers), air transportable missile with solid fuel boosters and ram-jet sustainer.
SA-5 (С-200 -ЕТ): Two stage, boosted AA missile; slant range about 50 miles, with a capability against ASM.
SA-6 (Куб -ЕТ): Triple-mounted (on tracked carrier), low level missile. Anti-Aircraft Artillery: 14.5mm, 23mm, 57mm towed guns and ZSU-57-2 57mm twin-barrelled and ZSU-23-4 23mm four-barrelled tracked SP guns.
Army: 2,000,000.
106 motorized rifle divisions.
51 tank divisions.
7 airborne divisions. SSM about 900 (units are organic to formations).
(1) FROG (Луна -ЕТ), range 10-45 miles.
(2) Scud A (Р-11 -ЕТ), range 50 miles.
(3) Scud B (Р-17 -ЕТ), range 185 miles.
(4) Scaleboard (Темп -ЕТ), range 500 miles. SAM: SA-2, SA-4 and SA-6 (СА-75, Круг, Куб -ЕТ) Tanks: T-10 hy; T-62 and T-54/55 med; PT-76 amphibious recce
It (most Soviet tanks are equipped for amphibious crossing by deep wading, and many carry infra-red night-fighting equipment).
At full strength, tank divisions have 316 medium tanks and motorized rifle divisions 188. Artillery: ISU-122 and ISU-152 SP guns; 100mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm and 203mm field guns;
BM-21 122mm and M-1965 140mm RL;
ASU-57 and ASU-85 SP and 85mm, 100mm and 130mm ATK guns;
Sagger, Snapper, Swatter (Малютка, Шмель, Фагот -ЕТ) ATGW; AA guns.
DEPLOYMENT: Central and Eastern Europe: 31 divs: 20 divs (10 tank) in East Germany; 2 tank divs in Poland: 4 divs (2 tank) in Hungary; and 5 divs (2 tank) in Czechoslovakia. European USSR: 60 divs. Central USSR (between the Volga River and Lake Baikal): 8 divs. Southern USSR (Caucasus and West Turkestan): 21 divs. Sino-Soviet border area: 44 divs, incl 2 divs in Mongolia.
The 31 divisions in Eastern Europe are maintained at or near combat strength, as are about half of those in the Far East.
The other divisions in the Far East are probably in the second category of readiness: below combat-strength,
but not requiring major reinforcement in the event of war.
Most of the remaining combat-ready divisions are in European USSR, while the divisions in central USSR would mostly require
major reinforcement, as would about half of the divisions in southern USSR. Outside the Warsaw Pact area.* (*These were the approximate strengths at 1July 1972 and included some navy and air force personnel.
Since that date large numbers have left Egypt, notably from those operating SAM sites and air and naval facilities.)
Instructors and advisors:
Algeria 1,000, Cuba 1,000, Egypt 6,000, Iraq 1,200, North Vietnam 1,000, Somali Republic 300, Syria 1-2,000, Yemen 500-1,000.
The number in Iraq may have been increased.
Operating SAM sites: Egypt 8,000.
Operating Soviet air and naval facilities: Egypt 5-6,000.
Navy: 475,000 (incl Naval Air Force 75,000 and Naval Infantry 14,000): 231 major surface combat ships; 300 attack and cruise missile submarines. Submarines:
Attack: 34 nuclear (C, V, N-classes) 210 diesel (B, F, R, Q, Z, W-classes). Long-range cruise missile: 26 nuclear-powered (E-class) and 25 diesel (J, W-classes) with 4-8 450-mile range SS-N-3 (П-5/-6 -ЕТ) missiles. Surface ships: 2 ASW helicopter cruisers each with 2 twin SAM and about 20 Ka-25 helicopters (пр.1123 Москва -ЕТ)
1 Kara-class cruiser with SSM and SAM (пр.1134Б -ЕТ).
2 Kresta II-class cruisers with SSM and SAM (пр.1134А -ЕТ).
4 Kresta I-class cruisers with SSM and SAM. (пр.1134 -ЕТ)
4 Kynda-class cruisers with SSM and SAM (пр.58 -ЕТ).
11 Sverdlov-class (1 with SAM) and 4 older cruisers.
3 Krivak-class destroyers with SSM and SAM (пр.1135 -ЕТ).
5 Kanin-class destroyers with SAM (пр.57А -ЕТ).
3 Krupny-class destroyers with SSM (пр.57 -ЕТ).
4 Kildin-class destroyers with SSM (пр.56М -ЕТ).
17 Kashin-class destroyers with SAM (пр.61 -ЕТ).
6 modified Kotlin-class destroyers with SAM (пр.56А -ЕТ).
17 Kotlin-class destroyers (пр.56 -ЕТ)..
40 Skory- and modified Skory-class destroyers (пр.30бис -ЕТ).
112 other ocean-going escorts.
250 coastal escorts and submarine chasers.
6 Nanuchka-class escorts with SSM and SAM.
117 Osa- and 30 Komar-class FPB with Styx SSM (пр.205 и 183Р -ЕТ).
250 torpedo boats.
180 fleet minesweepers.
125 coastal minesweepers.
105 landing ships and numerous landing craft.
Some trawlers are used for electronic intelligence.
All submarines and the larger surface vessels not fitted with SSM are equipped for minelaying.
A proportion of the destroyers and smaller vessels may not be fully manned.
Coasts are covered by a coast watch radar and visual reporting system.
Approaches to naval bases and major ports are protected by SS-N-3 Shaddock coast defence missiles and by guns. Shore-based aircraft Bombers: 450, most based near the north-west and Black Sea coasts of the USSR.
300 Tu-16 with one Kipper or two Kelt ASM.
60 Tu-22 Blinder strike and reconnaissance.
40 Il-28 Beagle torpedo-equipped light bombers.
50 Tu-95 Bear long-range naval reconnaissance.
150 Tu-16 Badger reconnaissance and tanker.
Other aircraft and helicopters: 560.
80 Be-12 Mail ASW amphibians.
140 Il-18 May ASW aircraft.
240 Mi-4 and Ka-25 ASW helicopters.
200 miscellaneous transports. Naval infantry (marines): 14,000.
Organized in brigades and assigned to fleets.
Equipped with standard infantry weapons, T-54/55 med tks, PT-76 lt tanks and APC.
DEPLOYMENT: Arctic, Baltic, Black Sea and Far East Fleets.
Air Force: 550,000; about 9,000 combat aircraft,
(i) Long Range Air Force (see p. 7).
(ii) Tactical Air Force: about 4,300 aircraft, incl
medium, light bombers and fighter bombers, fighters, helicopters, transport and recce aircraft.
Some obsolescent MiG-17, MiG-19 and Il-28 are still in service.
The most notable high performance aircraft are the MiG-21J Fishbed J and Yak-28P Firebar fighters,
the ground-attack Su-7 Fitter and the light bomber Yak-28 Brewer.
The variable-geometry Flogger is now entering service. Ground-attack aircraft are equipped with a variety of ASM.
(iii) Air Defence Command (see p. 7).
(iv) Naval Air Force (see above),
(v) Air Transport Force: about 1,700 aircraft.
Il-14, An-24, some 800 An-12 and Il-18 medium transports and 10 An-22 heavy transports.
There are in addition civil airliners of Aeroflot, some of which could be adapted to military use;
these include about 275 long- and medium range Tu-104, Tu-114, Tu-124 and Tu-134.
About 800 helicopters in use with the ground forces, including troop-carrying Mi-6 and Mi-8 and the heavy load-carrier Mi-10.
The Mi-12, a very heavy load carrier, may now be in service.
The total helicopter inventory is probably around 1,750.
(vi) Training units: about, 1,800 aircraft.
DEPLOYMENT:* (*At 1July 1972; since this date the bulk of these aircraft have been withdrawn.)
10 squadrons of MiG-21J, Su-11 and Tu-16 and a few MiG-23 are in Egypt. Para-Military Forces: 300,000.
125,000 security troops; 175,000 border troops.
There are also about 1.5 million members of the part-time military training organization (DOSAAF),
who take part in such recreational activities as athletics, shooting and parachuting, but reservist training and refresher courses
seem to be haphazard and irregular.
However, DOSAAF assists in pre-military training being given in schools, colleges, and workers' centres to those of 16 years and over.
THE US DOLLAR PURCHASING POWER OF SOVIET DEFENCE EXPENDITURE
The rouble figure represents the declared budget of the Soviet Ministry of Defence and does not include certain expenditures, such as the cost of nuclear warheads, research and development on advanced weapon systems, the military elements of the space programme and the costs of frontier guards and security troops, which are believed to be included in the budgets of other ministries. These items cannot be precisely computed but are believed to add about 30 per cent to the overt defence vote, or some 6 billion roubles. This would bring total Soviet defence spending up to a level of some 23-24 billion roubles in both 1971 and 1972.
To compare Soviet defence spending with American, one must estimate it as far as possible in terms of what it would have cost to procure equivalent resources in the United States according to American prices (the only ones available in requisite detail).* (*For methodological problems, see The Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 10-12.). There are many difficulties of information and of methodology in achieving this (as may be gathered from the discussion on Soviet defence procurement between Michael Boretsky and Professor Alec Nove in the Survival issues of October 1971 and July/August 1972). However, it is clear that in American prices, though not Russian ones, the Soviet defence budget has risen rapidly in recent years. This is because the costs of military manpower in the United States have doubled, per head, between 1964 and 1972, while the numbers of personnel in the armed forces have fallen; whereas the Soviet Union, which has not faced such cost pressures, has maintained the numbers of its own armed forces, which are now over 40 per cent higher than those of the United States. Since manpower costs account for a major part of the American defence budget (in FY 1973, 40 per cent excluding, and 52 per cent including, National Guard, Reserves and Civilian appropriations), such a disparity weighs massively in any comparison based on American prices. A comparison in Russian prices would make the manpower factor less important.
US manpower costs (excluding, National Guard, Reserves and Civilian appropriations) amounted to $31.16 billions in FY 71 (Fiscal year 1971: 1July 1970-30 June 1971), $32.55 billions in FY 1972 and $33.54 billions in FY 1973, while manpower fell from 2.89 millions, to 2.54 millions, to 2.40 millions. On this basis, the equivalent expenditure in American prices for manpower in the Soviet armed forces (assuming a Soviet soldier is worth an American one) would be $39.8 billions in calendar year 1971 and $45.2 billions in 1972 for manpower kept steady at 3,375,000. Reserve, National Guard and Civilian appropriations add an other $10 billions to the US defence manpower budget in FY 1973. Assuming proportionate Soviet expenditure on trained reserves and security and frontier guards (there are estimated to be over two million of these in the Soviet Union against one million in the United States), total manpower costs in the Soviet Union in calendar year 1971 might have amounted to $51.8 billions in American prices and risen in 1972 to $58.7 billions; all this despite the fact that there was little or no change in manpower in the Soviet armed forces during that time. This is in short an indicator of the recent inflation in US military manpower costs.
Since in the actual Soviet defence budget, given Soviet resource weightings, and according to the US Defense Department^ manpower costs account for only 30-35% of the total, some 16 billion roubles seem available in both 1971 and 1972 for procurement, R & D, operations and maintenance, etc If one applies to this the appropriate purchasing power parity of the defence rouble in $ terms of 0.50 rouble=$1 one gets a figure for these items of some $32 billions in each year. This seems plausible, and even perhaps somewhat low since the equivalent figure for non-manpower items in the US defence budget for FY 1973 is $39.7 billions* (*TOA, Total Obligational Authority.) and high Soviet strategic expenditures, naval building programmes, the recent increase relative to the United States, in combat aircraft in the Soviet tactical air force and the maintenance of much larger ground forces, all argue for at least rough equality.
If this is correct, total Soviet defence spending may have reached a level in US $, at US prices, of $72 billions (without reserves) or $84 billions (with reserves) in 1971 and $77 billions (without reserves) or $91 billions (with reserves) in 1972, these figures being between 5 per cent and 10 per cent higher than the equivalent US defence budget levels. This compares with US Defense Department estimates* (*Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, pp. 32 &33.) which suggest that American defence outlays have recently tended to fall in real terms while Soviet defence outlays have relatively risen, in such a way that in 1971 there was virtual parity in defence spending between the two super-powers.
їExchange parity used by Professor Benoit and Dr. Lubell in Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967) on the basis of studies by Professor Morris Bornstein in 'A Comparison of Soviet and United States National Product,' 1959.
ПОКУПАТЕЛЬНАЯ СПОСОБНОСТЬ СОВЕТСКИХ ОБОРОННЫХ РАСХОДОВ В ДОЛЛАРАХ США
Рублевая цифра представляет собой заявленный бюджет Министерства Обороны СССР и не включает в себя определенные расходы, такие как расходы на ядерные боеголовки, исследования и разработки перспективных систем вооружения, военные элементы космической программы и расходы пограничников и сил безопасности, которые, как полагают, включены в бюджеты других министерств. Эти пункты не поддаются точному подсчету, но, как полагают, прибавляют к открытым данным порядка 30%, то есть около 6 млрд рублей. Это позволит довести общие расходы на оборону СССР до уровня 23-24 млрд рублей как в 1971, так и в 1972 годах.
Чтобы сравнить советские расходы на оборону с американскими, необходимо оценить, насколько это возможно, с точки зрения стоимости приобретения эквивалентных ресурсов в Соединенных Штатах в соответствии с американскими ценами (единственными доступными в требуемых деталях).* (*Методологические проблемы см. The Military Balance 1970-71, стр. 10-12.). Для достижения этой цели существует много трудностей, связанных с информацией и методологией (о чем свидетельствует обсуждение вопроса о советских оборонных закупках между Михаилом Борецким и профессором Алеком Нове в вопросах выживания в октябре 1971 года и июле/августе 1972 года). Однако ясно, что в американских ценах, советский оборонный бюджет в последние годы стремительно рос. Это потому что военное содержание в США выросло вдвое, в расчете на одного человека, между 1964 и 1972, но численность личного состава Вооруженных сил сократилась; тогда как Советский Союз, который не сталкивался с таким давлением, поддерживает численность собственных вооруженных сил, которые сейчас более чем на 40% больше, чем в Соединенных Штатах. Так как затраты на содержание составляют основную часть американского оборонного бюджета (в финансовом 1973, 40%, исключая, и 52%, включая Национальную гвардию, резерв и гражданские ассигнования), то есть весьма большая величина. По сравнению с ними российские затраты на содержание сил менее важны.
Затраты США на персонал (за исключением, Национальной гвардии, резервов и гражданской ассигнований) составил $31.16 миллиарды в 71 финансовом году (финансовый 1971 год: 1 июля 1970-30 июня 1971), $32.55 миллиардов в 1972 финансовом году и $33.54 миллиардов в финансовом 1973, в то время как численность снизилась с 2,89 миллионов, до 2,54 миллионов, до 2,40 миллионов. Исходя из этого, эквивалентные расходы в американских ценах на личный состав в советских вооруженных силах (при условии, что Советский солдат стоит как американский) будут $39.8 млрд. долл. США в 1971 календарном году и $45,2 млрд. в 1972 году на 3,375,000. Резерв, Национальная гвардия и гражданские ассигнования добавляют еще $10 миллиардов к бюджету людских ресурсов обороны США в 1973 финансовом году. Полагая соразмерным советские расходы на подготовку резервов, сил безопасности и пограничников (по оценкам, более двух миллионов из них в СССР на один миллион в США), общая затраты в СССР в календарь 1971 году, возможно, составил $51.8 миллиардов в американских ценах и поднялись в 1972 году до $58.7 миллиардов; все это несмотря на то, что в Вооруженных Силах СССР за это время практически не было изменений в численности личного состава. Короче говоря, это показатель недавней инфляции расходов на рабочую силу в США.
Поскольку в реальной советской оборонный бюджет, учитывая удельный вес советского ресурса, и по данным Министерства обороны США затраты на содержание составляют лишь 30-35% от общего числа, около 16 млрд. рублей, похоже, доступны в 1971 и 1972 гг. для закупок, НИОКР, производства и технического обслуживания и т. д. Если, как считается, покупательная способность на рубля в долларовом эквиваленте составляет 0,50 рубль=$1, получается цифра для этих предметов около $32 миллиардов в год. Это кажется правдоподобным, и даже, возможно, несколько заниженной, так как эквивалентный показатель для не-людских статей в оборонном бюджете США за 1973 финансовый год составляет $39,7 млрд* (*TOA, Total Obligational Authority.) и высокие советские стратегические расходы, программы военно-морского строительства, недавний рост по сравнению с Соединенными Штатами, в боевых самолетах в советских тактических военно-воздушных силах и поддержание гораздо больших сухопутных войск. все они утверждают, по крайней мере, грубое равенство.
Если это правильно, то общие советские оборонные расходы, возможно, достигли уровня в американских долларах и ценах, $72 миллиардов (без резервов) или $84 миллиардов (с учетом резервов) в 1971 году и $77 миллиардов (без резервов) или $91 миллиардов (с учетом резервов) в 1972 году, это на 5-10% больше аналогичного бюджета обороны США. Это сравнивается с оценками Министерства обороны США* (*ежегодный доклад министра обороны США Мелвина Лэрда fy 1973, pp. 32 &33.), что свидетельствует о том, что в последнее время американские расходы на оборону в реальном выражении имеют тенденцию к сокращению, в то время как советские расходы на оборону относительно возросли, таким образом, что в 1971 году существовал фактический паритет в расходах на оборону между двумя сверхдержавами.
ї Обменный паритет используется профессором Бенуа и доктором Любеллом в разоружении и мировой экономической взаимозависимости (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967) на основе исследований профессора Морриса Борнштейна в "сравнении советского и Американского национального продукта", 1959.
Treaties The Warsaw Pact is a multilateral military alliance formed by the 'Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation' which was signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955 by the Governments of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania; Albania left the Pact in September 1968. The Pact is committed to the defence only of the European territories of the member states.
The Soviet Union is also linked by bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. Members of the Warsaw Pact have similar bilateral treaties with each other. The essence of East European defence arrangements is not therefore dependent on the Warsaw Treaty as such. The Soviet Union has concluded status-of-forces agreements with Poland, East Germany, Rumania and Hungary between December 1956 and May 1957 and with Czechoslovakia in October 1968; all these remain in effect except the one with Rumania which lapsed in June 1958 when Soviet troops left Rumania.
Organization The Political Consultative Committee consists, in full session, of the First Secretaries of the Communist Party, Heads of Government and the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member countries. The Committee has ajoint Secretariat, headed by a Soviet official, consisting of a specially appointed representative from each country, and a Permanent Commission, whose task it is to make recommendations on general questions of foreign policy for Pact members. Both these bodies are located in Moscow.
The second body, the Joint High Command, is required by the Treaty 'to strengthen the defensive capability of the Warsaw Pact, to prepare military plans in case of war and to decide on the deployment of troops'. The Command consists of a Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), a Defence Committee made up of the six Defence Ministers of the Pact, which acts as an advisory body, and a Military Council. This council meets under the chainnanship of the C-in-C, and includes the Chief of Staff (C of S) and permanent military representatives from each of the allied armed forces. It seems to be the main channel through which the Pact's orders are transmitted to its forces in peacetime and through which the East European forces are able to put their point of view to the C-in-C. The Pact also has a Military Staff, which includes non-Soviet senior officers. The posts of C-in-C and C of S of the Joint High Command have, however, always been held by Soviet officers and most of the key positions are still in Soviet hands.
In the event of war, the forces of the other Pact members would be operationally subordinate to the Soviet High Command. The command of the air defence system covering the whole Warsaw Pact area is now centralized in Moscow and directed by the C-in-C of the Soviet Air Defence Forces. The Soviet military headquarters in the Warsaw Pact are the Northern Group of Forces at Legnica in Poland; the Southern Group of Forces at Budapest; the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany at Zossen-Wonsdorf, near Berlin; and the Central Group of Forces at Milovice, north of Prague. Soviet tactical air forces are stationed in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet Union has deployed short-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers in Eastern Europe. Most East European countries have displayed short-range SSM launchers, but there is no evidence that nuclear warheads for these missiles have been supplied to these countries. Soviet longer-range missiles are all based in the Soviet Union.
ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР
Договор Варшавский договор-это многосторонний военный союз, образованный на основе "Договора о дружбе, взаимной помощи и сотрудничестве", который был подписан в Варшаве 14 мая 1955 года правительствами Советского Союза, Албании, Болгарии, Чехословакии, Восточной Германии, Венгрии, Польши и Румынии; Албания вышла из договора в сентябре 1968 года. Договор об обороне только европейских территорий государств-членов.
Советский Союз также связан двусторонними договорами о дружбе и взаимной помощи с Болгарией, Чехословакией, ГДР, Венгрией, Польшей и Румынией. Члены Варшавского договора имеют аналогичные двусторонние договоры друг с другом. Таким образом, суть восточноевропейских оборонных договоренностей не зависит от Варшавского договора как такового. Советский Союз заключил соглашения о статусе сил с Польшей, Восточной Германией, Румынией и Венгрией в период с декабря 1956 года по май 1957 года и с Чехословакией в октябре 1968 года; все они остаются в силе, за исключением Румынии, которая закончилась в июне 1958 года, когда советские войска покинули Румынию.
Организация В состав политического консультативного комитета в полном составе входят первые секретари Коммунистической партии, главы правительств и министры иностранных дел и обороны стран-членов. Комитет имеет совместный Секретариат, возглавляемый Советским должностным лицом, в состав которого входят специально назначенные представители от каждой страны, и постоянную комиссию, в задачу которой входит вынесение рекомендаций по общим вопросам внешней политики для членов пакта. Оба эти органа находятся в Москве.
Второй орган, Объединенное Верховное Командование, требуется договором "для укрепления обороноспособности Варшавского договора, подготовки военных планов на случай войны и принятия решения о развертывании войск". В состав командования входят Верховный Главнокомандующий, Комитет Обороны в составе шести министров обороны пакта, который действует в качестве консультативного органа, и Военный Совет. Этот совет заседает под руководством Командующего и включает начальника штаба и постоянных военных представителей от каждой из вооруженных сил союзников. По-видимому, это основной канал, по которому приказы пакта передаются его силам в мирное время и по которому восточноевропейские силы могут изложить свою точку зрения командования. В Пакте также есть военный штаб, в который входят не советские старшие офицеры. Однако должности командующего и начальника штаба объединенного Верховного командования всегда занимали советские офицеры, и большинство ключевых должностей все еще находятся в советских руках.
В случае войны силы других участников пакта находились бы в оперативном подчинении Советского Верховного командования. Командование системой противовоздушной обороны, охватывающей весь район Варшавского договора, в настоящее время централизовано в Москве и управляется Командующим Советских Войск Противовоздушной обороны. Советские военные штабы в Варшавском договоре:
Северная группа войск в Легнице в Польше;
Южная группа войск в Будапеште;
группа советских войск в Германии в Зоссен-Вюнсдорфе под Берлином; и
Центральная группа сил в Миловице, к северу от Праги.
Советские тактические ВВС дислоцируются в Польше, ГДР, Венгрии и Чехословакии. Советский Союз развернул пусковые установки ракет малой дальности класса "земля-земля" в Восточной Европе. Большинство восточноевропейских стран получили пусковые установки малой дальности, но нет доказательств того, что ядерные боеголовки для этих ракет были поставлены в эти страны. Советские ракеты большой дальности базируются в Советском Союзе.
BULGARIA
Population: 8,610,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy, 3 years.
Total regular forces: 146,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $9.36 billion.
Defence expenditure 1970: 324 million leva ($279,000,000). 1.16 leva=$1. Army: 117,000.
8 motorized rifle divisions (3 cadre).
5 tank brigades.
Some hy tks; about 1,900 med tks mainly T-54, with some T-34, T-55 and T-62; PT-76 lt tks;
BRD scout cars; BTR-50, BTR-60 and BTR-152 APC;
85mm, 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns; SU-100 SP guns;
FROG and Scud SSM;
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger and Snapper ATGW;
37mm and 57mm AA guns.
Navy: 7,000.
2 submarines.
2 escorts.
8 coastal escorts.
20 MCM ships.
3 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
15 motor torpedo boats (8 less than 100 tons).
20 landing craft."
A small Danube flotilla.
6 Mi-4 helicopters. Air Force: 22,000; 252 combat aircraft. (12 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
6 fighter-bomber squadrons with MiG-17.
3 interceptor squadrons with MiG-21.
3 interceptor squadrons with MiG-19.
6 interceptor squadrons with MiG-17.
1 reconnaissance squadron with Il-28.
2 recce squadrons with MiG-17 and MiG-21.
4 Li-2, 6 An-2 and 10 Il-14 transports.
About 40 Mi-4 helicopters.
SA-2 SAM.
1 parachute regiment Para-Military Forces: 15,000, including border security troops; a volunteer People's Militia of 150,000.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Population: 14,800,000.
Military service: Army 24 months; Air Force 27 months.
Total regular forces: 185,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $32.4
Defence expenditure 1972: 15,920 million crowns billion. ($1,875,000,000). 8.5 crowns=$1. Army: 145,000.
5 tank divisions.
5 motorized rifle divisions.
1 airborne brigade.
Some hy tanks; about 3,400 med tks. mostly T-55 and T-62 with some T-54 and T-34;
OT-65 scout cars; OT-62 and OT-64 APC;
SU-100, SU-122 and ISU-152 SP guns; 122mm how; 82mm and 120mm mortars;
FROG and Scud SSM;
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper and Swatter ATGW;
23mm and 57mm AA guns.
About 200 Mi-1 and Mi-4 hel. Air Force: 40,000; 504 combat aircraft. (14 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
12 ground-support squadrons with Su-7, MiG-15 and MiG-17.
18 interceptor squadrons with MiG-19 and MiG-21.
6 reconnaissance squadrons with MiG-21, Il-28 and L-29.
About 50 Li-2, Il-14 and Il-18 transports.
About 90 Mi-1, Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters.
SA-2 SAM. Para-Military Forces: Border troops (Pohranicki straz): 35,000 (subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior).
A part-time People's Militia of about 120,000 is being increased to 250,000.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Population: 17,285,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total regular forces: 131,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $35.9 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 7,600 million Ostmarks ($2,240,000,000). 3.39 Ostmarks=$1. Army: 90,000.
2 tank divisions.
4 motorized rifle divisions.
Some hy tks; about 2,000 med tks, T-54, T-55, and T-62; several hundred T-34 (used for training); about 130 PT-76 lt tks;
BRDM scout cars; BTR-50P, BTR-60P and BTR-152 APC;
SU-100 SP guns; 85mm, 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns;
FROG 7 and Scud B SSM;
57mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper and Swatter ATGW;
23mm and 57mm SP AA guns; and 100mm AA guns. Navy: 16,000.
2 destroyer escorts.
25 coastal escorts.
49 minesweepers.
12 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
65 motor torpedo boats (45 less than 100 tons).
18 landing ships and craft.
16 Mi-4 helicopters. Air Force: 25,000; 304 combat aircraft. (16 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
2 interceptor squadrons with MiG-17.
17 interceptor squadrons with MiG-21.
30 transports, including An-2 and Il-14.
30 Mi-1, Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters.
An AD div of 9,000 (5 regiments), with about 120
57mm and 100mm AA guns and SA-2 SAM.
Para-Military Forces:60,000.
40,000 Border Guards (Grenzschutz-truppe) including a Border Command separate from the regular army.
20,000 security troops plus 350,000 in armed workers' organizations (Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse).
HUNGARY
Population: 10,500,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total regular forces: 103,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $15.6 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 9,717 million forints ($558,000,000). 17.4 forints=$1. Army: 90,000.
2 tank divisions (1 cadre).
4 motorized rifle divisions (1 cadre).
Some hy tks; about 1,500 med tks, mainly T-55, T-54 and T-62; some T-34 for training; 50 PT-76 lt tks;
FUG-M and OT-65 scout cars; FUG-M-1970, OT-64 and BTR-152 APC;
76mm, 85mm and 122mm guns; 122mm and 152mm hows; FROG SSM;
57mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper and Swatter ATGW;
57mm twin SP AA guns. Navy: 500. Danube River Guard of small patrol craft. Air Force: 12,500; 108 combat aircraft. (12 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
9 interceptor squadrons with MiG-19 and MiG-21.
About 25 An-2, Il-14 and Li-2 transport aircraft.
About 15 Mi-1, Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters.
2 SAM battalions with SA-2. Para-Military Forces: 27,000 security and border guard troops; 250,000 workers' militia.
POLAND
Population: 33,600,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy and special services, 3 years; internal security forces, 27 months.
Total regular forces: 274,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $45.3 billion.
Defence expenditure 1971: 37.4 billion zloty ($2,350,000,000). 15.9 zloty=$1. Army: 200,000.
5 tank divisions.
8 motorized rifle divisions.
1 airborne division.
1 amphibious assault division.
(Divisions are at 70 per cent strength, except those in the Warsaw Military District, which are at 30-50% strength.)
Some hy tks; 3,400 med tks, T-54, T-55 and some T-62; some T-34 for training; about 250 PT-76 lt tks;
FUGM and BRDM scout cars; OT-62, OT-64 and BTR-152 APC;
ASU-57 and ASU-85 AB assault guns; 122mm guns, 122mm hows and 152mm gun/hows;
FROG and Scud SSM;
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper and Swatter ATGW;
23mm and 57mm SP AA guns. Navy: 19,000 (including 1,000 marines).
5 submarines.
4 destroyers.
30 coastal escorts/submarine chasers.
55 MGM ships.
15 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
20 torpedo boats.
22 landing ships.
55 naval aircraft, mostly MiG-17, with a few Il-28
Lt bomber/recce and some helicopters. Air Force: 55,000; 696 combat aircraft. (12 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
4 light bomber squadrons with Il-28.
12 fighter-bomber sqns with MiG-17 and Su-7.
36 interceptor squadrons with MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21.
6 recce sqns with MiG-21 and Il-28.
About 45 An-2, An-12, Il-12, Il-14, Il-18 and Li-2 transports.
40 helicopters, including Mi-1, Mi-4 and Mi-8.
SA-2 SAM. Para-Military Forces: 73,000 security and border troops, including armoured brigades of the Territorial Defence Force;
20 small patrol boats are operated.
RUMANIA
Population: 20,600,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 16 months; Navy, 2 years.
Total regular forces: 179,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $22.8 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 6,800 million lei ($725,000,000). 9.4 lei=$1. Army: 150,000.
2 tank divisions.
7 motorized rifle divisions.
1 mountain brigade.
1 airborne regiment.
Some hy tks; 1,700 T-34, T-54, T-55 and T-62 med tks; BTR-40, BTR-50P and BTR-152 APC;
SU-100 SP guns; 76mm, 122mm and 152mm guns; FROG SSM;
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATk guns; Sagger, Snapper and Swatter ATGW;
37mm, 57mm and 100mm AA guns. Navy: 8,000.
6 coastal escorts.
30 MCM ships.
5 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
12 motor torpedo boats.
4 Mi-4 helicopters. Air Force: 21,000; 252 combat aircraft. (12 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
20 interceptor squadrons with MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21.
1 reconnaissance squadron with Il-28.
1 transport squadron with Il-14 and Li-2.
10 Mi-4 helicopters.
SA-2 SAM. Para-Military Forces: 40,000, including border troops; a militia of about 500,000.
Treaties The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States; Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and West Germany in 1955. The Treaty unites Western Europe and North America in a commitment to consult together if the security of any one member is threatened, and to consider an armed attack against one as an attack against all, to be met by such action as each of them deems necessary, 'including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
The Paris Agreements of 1954 added a Protocol to the Treaty aimed at strengthening the structure of NATO, and revised the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which now includes Italy and West Germany in addition to its original members (Benelux countries, Britain and France). The Brussels Treaty signatories are committed to give one an other 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power' if one is the subject of 'armed aggression in Europe'.
Since 1969 members of the Atlantic Alliance can withdraw on one year's notice; the Brussels Treaty was signed for 50 years.
Organization The Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty is known as NATO. The governing body of the alliance, the North Atlantic Council, which has its headquarters in Brussels, consists of the Ministers of the fifteen member-countries, who normally meet twice a year, and, in permanent session, of ambassadors representing each government.
In 1966, France left the integrated military organization and the 14-nation Defence Planning Committee (DPC), on which France does not sit, was formed. It meets at the same levels as the Council and deals with questions related to NATO's integrated military planning and other matters in which France does not participate. The Secretary-General and an international staff advise on the politico-military, financial, economic and scientific aspects of defence planning.
Two permanent bodies for nuclear planning were established in 1966. The first, the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC), is open to all NATO members (France, Iceland and Luxembourg do not take part); it normally meets at Defence Minister level once or twice a year, to associate non-nuclear members in the nuclear affairs of the alliance. The Secretary-General is Chairman of the NDAC.
The second, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), derived from and subordinate to the NDAC, has seven or eight members, and is intended to go further into the details of topics raised there. The composition, which changes each year, was, in June 1972, Britain, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United States. The Secretary-General also chairs the NPG.
The Council's military advisors are the Military Committee, which gives policy direction to the NATO military commands. The Military Committee consists of the Chiefs of Staff of all member countries, except France, which maintains a liaison staff, and Iceland, which is not represented; in permanent session, the Chiefs of Staff are represented by Military Representatives who are located in Brussels together with the Council. The Military Committee has an independent Chairman and is served by an integrated, international military staff. The major NATO Commanders are responsible to the Military Committee, although they also have direct access to the Council and heads of Governments.
The principal military commands of NATO are Allied Command Europe (ACE), Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN).
The NATO European and Atlantic Commands participate in the Joint Strategic Planning System at Omaha, Nebraska, but there is no Alliance Command specifically covering strategic nuclear forces. As for ballistic-missile submarines, the United States has committed a small number and Britain all hers to the planning control of SACEUR, and the United States a larger number to SACLANT.
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) have always been American officers; and the Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCCHAN) and Deputy SACEUR and Deputy SACLANT British. SACEUR is also Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in Europe.
(i) ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE) has its headquarters, known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe), at Casteau, near Mons, in Belgium. It is responsible for the defence of all NATO territory in Europe excluding Britain, France, Iceland and Portugal, and of all Turkey. It also has general responsibility for the air defence of Britain.
The European Command has some 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads in its area. The number of delivery vehicles (aircraft, missiles and howitzers) is about 2,250, spread among all countries, excluding Luxembourg. The nuclear explosives themselves, however, are maintained in American custody. Tactical nuclear bombs and missile warheads are all fission. There is a very wide range in the kiloton spectrum, but the average yield of the bombs stockpiled in Europe for the use of NATO tactical aircraft is about 100 kilotons, and of the missile warheads, 20 kilotons.
About 60 division equivalents are available to SACEUR in peacetime. The Command has some 2,900 tactical aircraft based on about 150 standard NATO airfields, and backed up by a system of jointly financed storage depots, fuel pipelines and signal communications. The majority of the land and air forces stationed in the Command are assigned to SACEUR, while the naval forces are normally earmarked.
The 2nd French Corps of two divisions (which is not integrated in NATO forces) is stationed in Germany under a status agreement reached between the French and German Governments. Cooperation with NATO forces and commands has been agreed between the commanders concerned.
The ACE Mobile Force (AMF) has been formed as a NATO force with particular reference to the northern and south-eastern flanks. Found by eight countries, it comprises eight infantry battalion groups, an armoured reconnaissance squadron and ground-support fighter squadrons, but has no air transport of its own.
The following Commands are subordinate to Allied Command Europe:
(a) Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) has command of both the land forces and the air forces in the Central European Sector. Its headquarters are at Brunssum, Netherlands, and its Commander (CINCENT) is a German general.
The forces of the Central European Command include 21 divisions, assigned by Belgium, Britain, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands and the United States, and about 1,700 tactical aircraft.
The Command is sub-divided into Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). NORTHAG, responsible for the defence of the sector north of the Gottingen Liege axis, includes the Belgian, British and Dutch divisions and four German divisions and is supported by 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF), composed of Belgian, British, Dutch and German units. The American forces, seven German divisions and the Canadian battle group are under the Central Army Group, supported by the 4th ATAF which includes American, German and Canadian units, and an American Army Air Defense Command.
(b) Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) has its headquarters at Kolsaas, Norway, and is responsible for the defence of Denmark, Norway, Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic Approaches. The Commander has always been a British General. Most of the Danish and Norwegian land, sea and tactical air forces are earmarked for it, and most of their active reserves assigned to it. Germany has assigned one division, two combat air wings and her Baltic fleet.
(c) Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) has its headquarters at Naples, and its Commander (CINCSOUTH) has always been an American admiral. It is responsible for the defence of Italy, Greece and Turkey, and for safeguarding communications in the Mediterranean and the Turkish territorial waters of the Black Sea. The formations available include 15 divisions from Turkey, 12 from Greece and 7 from Italy, as well as the tactical air forces of these countries. Other formations from these three countries have been earmarked for AFSOUTH, as have the United States 6th Fleet and naval forces from Greece, Italy, Turkey and Britain. The ground-defence system is based on two separate commands: Southern, comprising Italy and the approaches to it, under an Italian Commander, and South-Eastern, comprising Greece and Turkey, under an American Commander. There is, however, an overall air command and there is a single naval command (NAVSOUTH), responsible to AFSOUTH with headquarters, in Naples.
A special air surveillance unit, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (MARAIRMED), is now operating Italian, British and American patrol aircraft from bases in Greece, Turkey, Sicily, and Italy; French aircraft are participating in these operations. Its Commander, an American rear admiral, is immediately responsible to CINCSOUTH.
The Allied On-Call Naval Force for the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) has consisted of at least three destroyers, contributed by Italy, Britain and the United States, and three smaller ships provided by other Mediterranean countries, depending upon the area of operation.
(ii) ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC (ACLANT) has its headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, and is responsible for the North Atlantic area from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, including Portuguese coastal waters. The Commander is an American admiral.
In the event of war, its duties are to participate in the strategic strike and to protect sea communications. There are no forces assigned to the command in peacetime except Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which normally consists, at any one time, of four destroyer-type, ships. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces which are predominantly naval are earmarked for assignment by Britain, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal and the United States. There are arrangements for co-operation between French naval forces and those of SACLANT. There are five subordinate commands: Western Atlantic Command, Eastern Atlantic Command, Iberian Atlantic Command, Striking Fleet Atlantic and Submarine Command. The nucleus of the Striking Fleet Atlantic has been provided by the American 2nd Fleet with up to six attack carriers; carrier-based aircraft share the nuclear strike role with missile-firing submarines.
(iii) ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL (ACCHAN) has its headquarters at Northwood near London. The wartime role of Channel Command is to exercise control of the English Channel and the southern North Sea. Many of the smaller warships of Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands are earmarked for this Command, as are some maritime aircraft. There are arrangements for co-operation with French naval forces. The Commander is a British admiral.
Policy Political guide-lines agreed between NATO members in 1967 include the concept of political warning time in a crisis and the possibility of distinguishing between an enemy's military capabilities and his political intentions. The strategic doctrine defined by the DPC in December 1967 envisaged that NATO would meet attacks on its territory with whatever force levels were appropriate including nuclear weapons. In June 1968, at the Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik, the Council called on the countries of the Warsaw Pact to join in discussions of mutual force reductions, reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing. This invitation was repeated at subsequent NATO Council meetings, and it now appears possible that some form of preparatory or preliminary negotiation with the East on this subject will be undertaken in the nearer future.
СЕВЕРОАТЛАНТИЧЕСКИЙ ДОГОВОР
Договор Североатлантический договор был подписан в 1949 году Бельгией, Великобританией, Канадой, Данией, Францией, Исландией, Италией, Люксембургом, Нидерландами, Норвегией, Португалией и Соединенными Штатами. Греция и Турция присоединились в 1952 году, а Западная Германия в 1955 году. Договаривающиеся страны Западной Европы и Северной Америки взяли на себя обязательство консультироваться друг с другом, если один из участников находится под угрозой, и рассматривать вооруженное нападение на одну как нападение на всех, выполнять такие действия, какие каждый из них сочтет необходимым, включая применение вооруженной силы с целью восстановления и последующего сохранения безопасности Североатлантического региона.
Парижские соглашения 1954 года добавили к Договору протокол, направленный на укрепление структуры NATO, и пересмотрели Брюссельский договор 1948 года, который теперь включает Италию и Западную Германию в дополнение к его первоначальным членам (страны Бенилюкса, Великобритания и Франция). Стороны, подписавшие Брюссельский договор, обязуются оказывать друг другу "всю военную и иную помощь и содействие какая в их власти", если они являются объектом "вооруженной агрессии в Европе".
С 1969 года члены Атлантического Альянса могут выйти из него по прошествии одного года; Брюссельский договор был подписан на 50 лет.
Организация Организация Североатлантического договора - NATO. Руководящий орган Североатлантического союза - Североатлантический совет, штаб-квартира которого находится в Брюсселе, состоит из министров пятнадцати стран-членов, которые обычно встречаются два раза в год, и послов, представляющих каждое правительство, на постоянных сессиях.
В 1966 году Франция покинула объединенную военную организацию, и был создан 14-Национальный комитет по оборонному планированию (DPC), в состав которого Франция не входит. Он заседает на тех же уровнях, что и Совет, и занимается вопросами, связанными с комплексным военным планированием NATO и другими вопросами, в которых Франция не участвует. Генеральный секретарь и международный персонал консультируют по военно-политическим, финансовым, экономическим и научным аспектам оборонного планирования.
В 1966 году были созданы два постоянных органа по ядерному планированию. Во-первых, Комитет по вопросам ядерной обороны (NDAC) открыт для всех членов NATO (Исландия, Люксембург и Франция не принимают в нем участия); он обычно собирается на уровне министров обороны один или два раза в год, чтобы привлечь неядерных членов к участию в ядерных делах Североатлантического союза. Генеральный секретарь является председателем NDAC.
Во-вторых, группа ядерного планирования (NPG), созданная на основе NDAC и подчиняющаяся ему, состоит из семи или восьми членов и призвана более подробно рассмотреть поднятые там темы. Состав, который меняется каждый год, в июне 1972, Великобритания, Бельгия, Дания, Германия, Греция, Италия и США. Генеральный секретарь также председательствует в NPG.
Военные советники Совета являются военным комитетом, который дает политическое руководство военным командованиям NATO. Военный комитет состоит из начальников штабов всех государств-членов, за исключением Франции, которая имеет персонал связи, и Исландии, которая не представлена; на постоянной сессии начальники штабов представлены военными представителями, которые находятся в Брюсселе вместе с Советом. Военный комитет имеет независимого председателя и обслуживается интегрированным международным военным персоналом. Главные командующие NATO несут ответственность перед Военным комитетом, хотя они также имеют прямой доступ к Совету и главам правительств.
Главным военным командованием NATO командования ОВС NATO в Европе (ACE), командование NATO на Атлантике (ACLANT) и союзное командование канала (ACCHAN).
Европейское и Атлантическое командования NATO участвуют в совместной системе стратегического планирования в Омахе, штат Небраска, но нет командования Североатлантического союза, специально охватывающего стратегические ядерные силы. Что касается подводных лодок с баллистическими ракетами, то Соединенные Штаты Америки обязались предоставить небольшое число, а Великобритания - все свои, для осуществления контроля над планированием SACEUR, а Соединенные Штаты - большее число для SACLANT.
Верховный главнокомандующий ОВС NATO в Европе (ВГК ОВС NATO в Европе) и Верховный главнокомандующий ОВС NATO на Атлантике (ВГК ОВС NATO на Атлантике) всегда были американские офицеры, и Командующий (CINCCHAN) и заместитель верховного главнокомандующего и заместителя ВГК ОВС NATO на Атлантике английские. SACEUR также является Главнокомандующим Вооруженными силами Соединенных Штатов в Европе.
(i) СОЮЗНОЕ КОМАНДОВАНИЕ В ЕВРОПЕ (ACE) имеет штаб-квартиру, известную под названием SHAPE (Верховный штаб союзных держав в Европе), в Касто, недалеко от Монса, в Бельгии. Оно отвечает за оборону всей территории NATO в Европе, за исключением Великобритании, Франции, Исландии и Португалии, а также всю Турцию. Он также несет общую ответственность за противовоздушную оборону Великобритании.
Европейское командование имеет около 7000 тактических ядерных боеголовок в своем районе. Количество средств доставки (самолетов, ракет и гаубиц) составляет около 2250, распределенных между всеми странами, за исключением Люксембурга. Однако сами ядерные боеприпасы находятся под американским контролем. Тактические ядерные бомбы и ракетные боеголовки из расщепляющегося материала. Существует очень широкий спектр в килотоннах, но средняя мощность бомб, накопленных в Европе для использованию тактической авиацией NATO составляет около 100 килотонн, и ракетных боеголовок, 20 килотонн.
Около 60 эквивалентных дивизий доступны для SACEUR в мирное время. Командование располагает 2900 тактическими самолетами, базирующимися примерно на 150 стандартных аэродромах NATO, и обеспеченных системой совместно финансируемых складов хранения, топливопроводов и сигнальной связи. Большая часть сухопутных и военно-воздушных сил, дислоцированных в командовании, закреплена за SACEUR, в то время как военно-морские силы обычно выделяются.
2-й французский корпус из двух дивизий (который не интегрирован в силы NATO) дислоцируется в Германии в соответствии с соглашением о статусе, достигнутым между правительствами Франции и Германии. Между соответствующими командующими было согласовано сотрудничество с силами и командованиями NATO.
Мобильные силы ACE (AMF) были сформированы в качестве сил NATO с уделением особого внимания северным и юго-восточным флангам. Собранные в восьми странах, они состоят из восьми групп пехотных батальонов, бронетанковой разведывательной эскадрильи и эскадрилий истребителей наземного обеспечения, но не имеет собственного воздушного транспорта.
В подчинении командования ОВС NATO в Европе находятся:
(a) Союзные Силы в Центральной Европе (AFCENT) включют как сухопутные, так и военно-воздушные силы в центрально-европейском секторе. Штаб-квартира находится в Брунссуме, Нидерланды, а командующий (CINCENT) - немецкий генерал.
Силы Центрально-европейского командования включают 21 дивизию, назначенную Бельгией, Великобританией, Канадой, Западной Германией, Нидерландами и Соединенными Штатами, и около 1700 тактических самолетов.
Командование подразделяется на Северной группы войск (NORTHAG) и Центральную группу войск (CENTAG). NORTHAG, ответственен за оборону сектора к северу от оси Геттинген-Льеж, включает в себя бельгийские, британские и голландские дивизии и четыре немецкие дивизии и поддерживается 2-й союзных тактических ВВС (ATAF), в составе бельгийских, британских, голландских и немецких подразделений. Американские войска, семь немецких дивизий и канадская боевая группа находятся в центральной армейской группой, поддерживаемой 4-м ATAF, которая включает в себя американские, немецкие и канадские подразделения, а также командование ПВО американской армии.
(b) Союзные Силы в Северной Европе (AFNORTH) имеют штаб-квартиру в Кольсаасе, Норвегия, и отвечают за оборону Дании, Норвегии, Шлезвиг-Гольштейнского и Балтийского проходов. Командующий всегда был британским генералом. Большая часть сухопутных, морских и тактических военно-воздушных сил Дании и Норвегии предназначена для него, и большая часть их активных резервов закреплена за ним. Германия назначила одну дивизию, два боевых воздушных крыла и свой Балтийский флот.
(c) Союзные Силы в Южной Европе (AFSOUTH) находится в Неаполе, а их командующий (CINCSOUTH) всегда был американским адмиралом. Он отвечает за оборону Италии, Греции и Турции, а также за охрану коммуникаций в Средиземном море и турецких территориальных водах Черного моря. В состав соединений входят 15 дивизий из Турции, 12 из Греции и 7 из Италии, а также тактические военно-воздушные силы этих стран. Другие формирования из этих трех стран были предназначены для AFSOUTH, а также 6-й флот Соединенных Штатов и военно-морские силы из Греции, Италии, Турции и Великобритании. Система наземной обороны базируется на двух отдельных командованиях: Южном, включающем Италию и подходы к ней, под командованием итальянского командующего, и Юго-Восточном, включающем Грецию и Турцию, под командованием американского командующего. Существует, однако, общее воздушное командование, и есть одно военно-морское командование (NAVSOUTH), ответственное за AFSOUTH со штабом в Неаполе.
Специальное подразделение воздушного наблюдения Военно-Морских Сил Средиземноморья (MARAIRMED) в настоящее время использует итальянские, британские и американские патрульные самолеты с баз в Греции, Турции, Сицилии и Италии; в этих операциях участвуют французские самолеты. Его командир, американский контр-адмирал, немедленно отвечает на CINCSOUTH.
Союзные военно-морские силы по вызову для Средиземноморья (NAVOCFORMED) состояли по крайней мере из трех эсминцев, предоставленных Италией, Великобританией и Соединенными Штатами, и трех меньших кораблей, предоставленных другими средиземноморскими странами, в зависимости от района операции.
(ii) СОЮЗНОЕ КОМАНДОВАНИЕ НА АТЛАНТИКЕ (ACLANT) имеет штаб-квартиру в Норфолке, штат Вирджиния, и отвечает за Североатлантический район от Северного полюса до Тропика Рака, включая прибрежные воды Португалии. Командующий - американский адмирал.
В случае войны в его обязанности входит участие в стратегических ударах и защита морских коммуникаций. Нет никаких сил, назначенных командованию в мирное время, кроме постоянных Военно-Морских Сил Атлантики (STANAVFORLANT), которые обычно состоят из четырех кораблей типа эсминец. Однако для целей подготовки и в случае войны силы, которые в основном являются военно-морскими, предназначены для назначения Великобританией, Канадой, Данией, Нидерландами, Португалией и Соединенными Штатами. Есть договоренности о сотрудничестве между французскими военно-морскими силами и ВГК ОВС NATO на Атлантике. Есть пять подчиненных командований: Западное Атлантическое командование, Восточно-Атлантическое командование, Иберийской Атлантики командование, Ударный флот Атлантики и Командование подводными силами. Ядро ударного флота Атлантики обеспечено американским 2-ым флотом, до 6 ударных авианосцев; палубная авиация играет роль ядерного удара наряду с ракетными подводными лодками.
(iii) СОЮЗНОЕ КОМАНДОВАНИЕ КАНАЛА (ACCHAN) находится в Нортвуде, недалеко от Лондона. Роль командования канала в военное время заключается в осуществлении контроля над проливом Ла-Манш и южной частью Северного моря. Многие из небольших военных кораблей Бельгии, Великобритании и Нидерландов, а также некоторые морские самолеты предназначены для этого командования. Есть договоренности о сотрудничестве с французскими военно-морскими силами. Командир - британский адмирал.
Политика Политические ориентиры, согласованные между членами NATO в 1967 г., включают концепцию времени политического предупреждения в условиях кризиса и проведения различия между военным потенциалом противника и его политическими намерениями. Стратегическая доктрина, определенная DPC в декабре 1967 года, предусматривала, что NATO будет отвечать на нападения на своей территории с любым уровнем силы, включая ядерное оружие. В июне 1968 года на совещании министров в Рейкьявике совет призвал страны Варшавского договора присоединиться к обсуждению вопроса о взаимных сокращениях сил, взаимных и сбалансированных по охвату и срокам. Это приглашение было повторено на последующих заседаниях Совета NATO, и теперь представляется возможным, что в ближайшем будущем будут проведены подготовительные или предварительные переговоры с Востоком по этому вопросу.
BELGIUM
Population: 9,800,000.
Military service: 12 months.
Total armed forces: 90,200.
Estimated GNP 1971: $26 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 31,700 million francs ($723,744,292). 50 francs = $1 1July 1971. 43.8 francs=$1 1July 1972. Army: 66,000.
1 armoured brigade.
3 motorized infantry brigades.
2 reconnaissance battalions.
1 para-commando regiment.
2 SSM battalions with Honest John.
2 SAM battalions with HAWK.
4 air sqns with 80 Alouette II hel and 12 Do-27.
330 Leopard and 175 M-47 med tks; 135 M-41 lt tks; M-75 and AMX-VTT APC;
M-108 105mm, M-44 and M-109 155mm and M-55 203mm SP hows; 203mm hows.
Honest John SSM; HAWK SAM.
RESERVES: 1 mech inf bde and 1 inf bde. Navy: 4,200.
7 ocean minesweepers/minehunters.
9 coastal minesweepers/minehunters.
14 inshore minesweepers.
2 support ships.
2 S-58 and 3 Alouette III helicopters.
RESERVES: 7,600 trained. Air Force: 20,000; 144 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron normally has 18 aircraft.)
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104G.
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with Mirage-VBA.
2 AWX squadrons with F-104G.
1 reconnaissance squadron with Mirage-VBR.
2 tpt sqns with 24 C-119, 5 C-47, 12 Pembroke and 4 DC-6 tpts (12 C-130 Hercules are to replace C-119 by end 1973).
11 HSS-1 helicopters.
8 SAM squadrons with Nike-Hercules. Para-Military Forces: 13,500 Gendarmerie.
BRITAIN
Population: 56,250,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 372,331 (including 9,500 enlisted outside Britain).
Estimated GNP 1971: $130 billion.
Defence budget 1972/73; £2,854 million ($6,900,000,000). £0.416=$1 1July 1971. £0.413=$1 1July 1972. Strategic Forces:
SLBM: 4 SSBN each with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles.
The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Fylingdales. Army: 180,458 (incl 8,200 enlisted outside Britain).
12 armoured regiments.
5 armoured car regiments.
47 infantry battalions.
3 parachute battalions.
6 Gurkha battalions.
1 special air service (SAS) regiment.
3 regts with Honest John SSM and 203mm howitzers.
24 other artillery regiments.
1 SAM regiment with Thunderbird.
14 engineer regiments.
59 of the above units are organized in 2 armd, 12 inf, 1 para and 1 Gurkha bdes.
900 Chieftain and Centurion med tks (Scorpion lt tk on order for 1972);
105mm Abbot and M-107 175mm SP guns; M-109 155mm SP hows; M-110 203mm SP hows; Model 56 105mm pack hows;
Honest John SSM;
Vigilant and Swingfire ATGW;
L-40/70 AA guns; Thunderbird SAM;
lt aircraft; 132 Scout and 265 Sioux hels.
DEPLOYMENT:
The Strategic Reserve: includes 1 div of 3 air-portable bdes and 2 para bns of the United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF), and the SAS regiment. Germany*: British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), of 54,900, includes
1 corps HQ, 3 div HQ, 5 armd bdes, 1 mech bde, 2 arty bdes, 2 armd car regts and the Thunderbird SAM regt.
In Berlin there is one 3,000-strong inf bde.
(*Some units from BAOR are serving on short tours in Northern Ireland, being away from Germany for up to 6 months.
Numbers involved average 2-3,000.) Singapore: 1 inf bn gp (ANZUK force). Brunei:1 Gurkha bn. Hong Kong: 2 British and 3 Gurkha inf bns; 1 arty regt. Cyprus:1 inf bn and 1 airportable recce sqn with UN force (UNFICYP); 1 inf bn and 1 armd car sqn in garrison at Sovereign Base Areas. Gibraltar: 1 inf bn and 1 coy. British Honduras: 1 inf coy.
RESERVES: 296,700 Regular reserves, 56,400 Volunteer reserves; 8,500 Ulster Defence Regiment. Navy: 82,024 (including Fleet Air Arm, Royal Marines and 1,200 enlisted outside Britain). Submarines, attack: 6 nuclear (SSN); 24 diesel. Surface ships: 1 aircraft carrier.
3 commando carriers.
2 assault ships.
2 SAM cruisers with Seacat.
9 SAM destroyers with Seaslug II and Seacat.
3 other destroyers.
33 general purpose frigates.
24 ASW frigates (3 to be retired in 1972).
4 AA and 4 aircraft direction frigates.
38 coastal minesweepers/minehunters.
6 inshore minesweepers.
5 coastal patrol vessels.
5 patrol boats.
(Ships in reserve or undergoing refit or conversion are included in the above totals.)
THE FLEET AIR ARM: 96 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 12 aircraft.)
2 strike squadrons with Buccaneer.
2 air defence sqns with F-4K.
4 air defence sqns with Sea Vixen.
8 helicopter sqns with Wessex.
3 helicopter sqns with Sea King.
3 helicopter sqns with Wasp and Whirlwind.
THE ROYAL MARINES: 8,000; including 3,500-men in commandos.
DEPLOYMENT: Malta: one commando.
RESERVES (naval and marines): 26,300 regular and 8,000 volunteers. Air Force: 109,849 (incl 600 enlisted outside Britain); about 500 combat aircraft. (Combat squadrons have 6-12 aircraft.)
8 medium bomber squadrons with Vulcan.
3 strike squadrons with Buccaneer.
7 strike/attack/recce squadrons with F-4M.
4 close support squadrons with Harrier.
8 air defence squadrons with Lightning.
1 air defence squadron with F-4M.
1 recce squadron with Victor SR2.
4 recce squadrons with Canberra.
1 AEW squadron with Shackleton.
2 maritime patrol squadrons with Nimrod.
3 tanker squadrons with Victor K1/K1A.
5 strategic tpt sqns with VC-10, Belfast, Britannia.
7 tactical tpt sqns with C-130 Hercules.
2 light communication squadrons with HS-125.
7 hel sqns with 60 Wessex, Whirlwind and 30 SA-330 Puma.
There are 11 ground defence and air defence squadrons of the Royal Air Force Regiment,
some with Bloodhound and Tigercat SAM, and L-40/70 AA guns.
DEPLOYMENT: The Royal Air Force includes 1 operational home command - Strike Command - and 2 smaller overseas commands-
RAF Germany (8,600), and Near East Air Force. Squadrons are deployed overseas as follows: Germany: 4 F-4; 2 Buccaneer; 2 Lightning; 3 Harrier; 1 Wessex. Near East: (a) Cyprus: 2 Vulcan; 1 Lightning; 1 Hercules; 1 Whirlwind, (b) Malta: 1 Nimrod; 1 Canberra. Singapore: dets Nimrod and Wessex hel (ANZUK force).
RESERVES: 33,100 regular; about 400 volunteer.
CANADA
Population: 21,800,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 84,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: S95.57 billion.
Defence expenditure 1972-73: $Can. 1,936,634,000 ($US 1,936,634,000). $Can 1.02 = $US* 1 1July 1971. $Can 1= $US 1 1July 1972.
(*The exchange rate has been allowed to fluctuate since 1 June 1970.)
(The Canadian Armed Forces have been unified since February 1968. The strengths shown here for Army, Navy and Air Force are only approximate.) Army (Land): 34,000.
IN CANADA: Mobile Command (about 20,000).
1 airborne regiment.
3 combat groups each comprising:
3 infantry battalions.
1 reconnaissance regiment.
1 reduced light artillery regiment (of 2 batteries).
Support units.
M-113 APC, Ferret armd cars; Model 56 105mm pack hows.
1 group is intended for operations in Europe; part of it, an air transportable bn gp, for use with the AMF.
The other groups contribute to North
American ground defence and UN commitments.
IN EUROPE: 1 mech battle group of 2,800 men, with 32 Centurion med tks, 375 M-113 APC and 18 M-109 155mm SP hows
(Centurion tks are to be replaced by Scorpion in 1974).
IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP): 580 men.
RESERVES: about 19,000. Navy (Maritime): 14,000.
4 submarines.
9 ASW hel destroyer escorts (4 hel destroyers under construction).
11 ASW destroyer escorts.
6 coastal minesweepers.
3 support ships.
The Maritime Air Element consists of:
4 maritime patrol squadrons with Argus.
1 maritime patrol squadron with S-2 Tracker.
1 ASW squadron with SH-3 Sea King helicopters.
RESERVES: about 2,900. Air Force (Air): 36,000; 162 combat aircraft. (Squadrons have 6-18 aircraft.)
IN CANADA:
Mobile Command:
2 CF-5 tactical fighter sqns (for use with AMF).
6 helicopter squadrons.
Air Defence Command (Canadian component of NORAD).
3 interceptor squadrons with F-101C.
28 surveillance and control radar squadrons.
1 SAGE control centre.
1 CF-100 electronic warfare training squadron.
Air Transport Command:
1 sqn with 5 Boeing 707-320C transport/tankers.
2 sqns with C-130E Hercules.
4 sqns with CC-115 Buffalo, CC-138 Twin Otter and CH-113 Labrador SAR hel.
1 sqn with CC-109 Cosmopolitan and Falcon.
IN EUROPE:
Germany: 2,300; 3 strike/attack/recce sqns with CF-104.
RESERVES: 800.
DENMARK
Population: 5,000,000.
Military service: 12 months.
Total armed forces: 43,400.
Estimated GNP 1971: $17.3 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 3,068,000,000 kroner ($438,300,000). 7.53 kr=$1 1July 1971. 7.0 kr=$1 1July 1972. Army: 27,000.
4 armoured infantry brigades each of 2 infantry battalions, 1 tank battalion, 1 artillery battalion and support units.
1 battalion group.
3 artillery battalions.
Centurion med tks; M-41 lt tks; M-113 APC;
M-109 155mm SP howitzers; 203mm howitzers;* Honest John SSM* (* Dual-capable, but there are no nuclear warheads on Danish soil.);
12 Hughes 500M helicopters.
RESERVES: 65,000, including 2 armd inf bdes and support units to be formed from reservists within 72 hours;
local defence units form 15 inf bn gps and 15 arty btys. Volunteer Home Guard of 51,000. Navy: 6,600.
6 coastal submarines.
2 destroyers.
4 frigates.
4 coastal escorts.
9 seaward defence craft.
13 fast patrol boats.
7 coastal minelayers.
12 minesweepers (4 inshore).
8 Alouette III helicopters.
RESERVES: 3,000. Volunteer Home Guard of 4,100 with small patrol boats. Air Force: 9,800; 112 combat aircraft.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with 16 F-35XD Draken.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with 32 F-100D/F.
2 interceptor squadrons with 32 F-104G.
1 interceptor squadron with 16 Hunter.
1 recce sqn with 16 RF-35XD Draken.
1 transport squadron with 6 C-47 and 8 C-54.
1 SAR squadron with 12 S-61 helicopters.
4 SAM squadrons with Nike-Hercules.
4 SAM squadrons with HAWK.
RESERVES: 11,500. Volunteer Home Guard.
FRANCE
Population: 51,700,000.
Military service: 12 months.
Total armed forces: 500,600.
Estimated GNP 1971: $170 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 31,205 million francs ($6,241,000). 5.55 francs=$1 1July 1971. 5.0 francs=$1 1July 1972. Strategic Forces: IRBM: 2 squadrons, each with 9 SSBS S-2 missiles. SLBM: 1 SSBN with MSBS M-l missiles; a second is due to become operational in 1972.* (*5 SSBN are due to be built in all.) Aircraft: 36 Mirage IVA bombers (9 squadrons).
12 KC-135F tankers (3 squadrons).
22 Mirage IVA bombers are in reserve. Army: 328,000.
5 mechanized divisions.
1 airborne division (2 brigades).
1 airportable motorized brigade.
2 alpine brigades.
4 armoured car regiments.
2 motorized infantry regiments.
1 parachute battalion.
25 infantry battalions.
5 SSM battalions with Honest John.*
(*The nuclear warheads held under double-key arrangements with the United States were withdrawn in 1966.
The tactical nuclear SSM Pluton is due to enter service in 1973-74.)
3 SAM regiments with HAWK.
M-47 and about 575 AMX-30 med tks; AMX-13 lt tks; Panhard EBR hy and AML lt armd cars;
VTT-AMX APC; AMX SP 105mm guns and 155mm hows; Model 56 105mm pack hows.
30mm twin SP AA guns; SS-11/Harpon ATGW. Army Aviation (ALAT): 4,500.
450 Bell, Alouette and SA-330 Puma helicopters.
300 light fixed-wing aircraft.
DEPLOYMENT: Strategic Reserve (Force a"intervention): 2 airborne and 1 airportable motorized brigades. Manoeuvre Forces (Force de Manoeuvre): 1st Army: 58,000; 2 mech divs and 4 SSM bns in Germany; 3 mech divs in support in France.
About 2,000 men in Berlin. French Territory of the Afars and Issas: 2 battalions. Elsewhere in Africa: about 4,000. Malagasy: 3,000; 2 battalions, 2 minesweepers, 2 GA squadrons, 6 tpt aircraft. Pacific Territories: 2 battalions. Caribbean: 1 battalion.
The remaining troops are stationed in France for territorial defence (La Defence Operationelle du Territoire - DOT).
Their strength is about 56,000 including two alpine bdes, 25 inf bns, 3 armd cav regts and one arty regt.
Mobilization of reserves would bring the force up to a total of 80 bns. Navy: 67,600 (including Naval Air Force).
19 attack submarines (diesel).
2 aircraft carriers.
1 helicopter carrier.
1 helicopter cruiser.
2 cruisers (1 SAM, 1 command).
17 destroyers (4 SAM with Tartar, 6 ASW, 4 aircraft direction, 3 command).
29 frigates (2 SAM with Masurca, and Malafon ASW).
15 fleet minesweepers.
61 coastal minesweepers.
15 inshore minesweepers.
23 patrol vessels.
5 landing ships.
18 landing craft.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: 12,000; 150 combat aircraft.
2 fighter-bomber sqns with Etendard IV-M.
2 interceptor sqns with F-8F Crusaders.
1 reconnaissance sqn with Etendard IV-P.
3 ASW sqns with Alize 1 ASW helicopter sqn with Super Frelon.
4 helicopter sqns, 1 with Alouette and 3 with HSS 1.
3 maritime recce sqns with Atlantic and P-2. Air Force: 105,O00;-50O combat aircraft.
Air Defence Command (CAFDA):
3 interceptor sqns with Mirage IIIC.
2 AWX sqns with 30 Vautour IIN (Mirage F-1 to be delivered early 1973).
3 interceptor sqns with Super Mystere B-2.
(Automatic STRIDA II air defence system.)
Tactical Air Force (FATAQ; (divided into 1st and 2nd CATAQ:
8 fighter-bomber squadrons with Mirage IIIE.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with Mirage IIIB.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-100D.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with Mystere IVA.
2 light bomber sqns with 30 Vautour II-1B.
3 recce sqns with Mirage IIIR/RD.
Air Transport Command (COTAM):
7 tactical transport sqns; 3 with Transall C-160 and 4 with 173 Nord 2501 Noratlas.
1 heavy transport sqn with 4 DC-6B and 4 Br-765 Sahara.
2 mixed transport sqns.
4 helicopter transport sqns with H-34, Alouette II. Para-Military Forces: Gendarmerie 58,000;
CRS (Compagnies Republicainesde Securite) 15,000 (subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior.)
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Population: 59,520,000 (excluding West Berlin).
Military service: 15 months.
Total armed forces: 467,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $210 billion.
Defence budget 1972: DM 24,219 million ($7,568 million). DM 3.66=$1 1July 1971. DM 3.2=$1 1July 1972. Army: 327,000 (including the 35,000 Territorial Army).
13 armoured brigades.
12 armoured infantry brigades.
3 motorized rifle brigades.
2 mountain brigades.
3 airborne brigades.
(the above are organized in 12 divisions.)
11 SSM battalions with Honest John.
4 SSM battalions with Sergeant.
1,050 M-48A2 Patton and 2,200 Leopard med tks;
1,800 HS-30, 225 Marder, 2,374 Hotchkiss and 3,170 M-113 APC; 1,100 tank destroyers;
280 105mm hows, 150 155mm hows; 660 155mm, 150 175mm and 75 203mm SP guns; 209 multiple RL;
500 40mm SP AA guns;
about 540 H-34, UH-1D Iroquois and Alouette II hels and 18 Do-27 lt aircraft.
RESERVES: 540,000 on immediate recall. Navy: 36,000 (including Naval Air Arm).
6 coastal submarines.
11 destroyers (3 with Tartar SAM).
6 fast frigates.
6 fleet utility vessels.
13 fast combat support ships.
58 minesweepers.
40 fast patrol boats.
2 landing ships.
10 landing craft.
NAVAL AIR ARM: 6,000; 75 combat aircraft.
4 fighter-bomber/recce squadrons with 60 F-104G.
2 MR squadrons with 15 BR-1150 Atlantic.
23 S-58 SAR helicopters (being replaced by
22 SH-3D Sea King Mk 41.
20 Do-28 and 9 miscellaneous liaison aircraft.
RESERVES: 18,000 on immediate recall. Air Force: 104,000; 459 combat aircraft.
(Fighter, fighter-bomber, reconnaissance and light attack squadrons have 15-21 aircraft and tpt squadrons up to 18.)
7 fighter-bomber squadrons with 126F-104G.
3 fighter-bomber/interceptor sqns with 45 F-104G.
8 It ground-attack/recce squadrons with 168 G-91.
4 interceptor squadrons with 60 F-104G.
4 heavy reconnaissance squadrons with 60 RF-4E.
4 transport squadrons with C-160 Transall.
4 helicopter squadrons with 134 UH-1D, 55 Bell 47 and Alouette II.
2 SSM wings with 72 Pershing.
24 SAM batteries with 216 Nike-Hercules.
31 SAM batteries with 186 HAWK.
RESERVES: 87,000 on immediate recall. Para-Military Forces: 18,500 Border Police with Saladin armoured cars and coastal patrol boats.
GREECE
Population: 9,030,000.
Military service: 24 months.
Total armed forces: 157,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $10.2 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1972:14,854 million drachmas ($495,134,000). 30 drachmas=$1. Army: 118,000.
1 armoured division.
11 infantry divisions (3 close to full strength).
1 commando brigade.
12 light infantry battalions.
2 SSM battalions with Honest John.
1 SAM battalion with HAWK.
200 M-47, 220 M-48 and 30 AMX-30 med tks; M-24, M-26 and M-41 lt tks;
M-8 and M-20 armd cars; M-2, M-3, M-59 and M-113 APC;
105mm, 155mm and 175mm SP guns; 105mm, 155mm and 203mm hows;
40mm, 75mm and 90mm AA guns. Navy: 18,000.
2 submarines (1 more to be delivered in 1973, 3 in 1974).
8 destroyers.
4 destroyer escorts.
3 coastal patrol vessels.
2 minelayers.
20 coastal minesweepers.
13 fast torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
4 fast missile patrol boats with Exocet SSM.
8 tank landing ships.
6 medium landing ships.
1 dock landing ship.
8 landing craft.
12 HU-16 maritime patrol aircraft. Air Force: 21,000; 190 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has up to 18 aircraft.)
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-84F.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104G.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with F-5A.
2 interceptor squadrons with F-5A.
1 interceptor squadron with F-102A.
1 reconnaissance squadron with RF-5.
1 reconnaissance squadron with RF-84F.
3 tpt sqns of 15 C-47 and 45 Noratlas.
1 helicopter squadron with 12 H-19 and 6 AB-205.
1 helicopter squadron with 10 Bell 47G.
1 SAM battalion with Nike-Hercules.
RESERVES: 120,000. Para-Military Forces: 22,500 Gendarmerie; 65,000 National Guard.
ITALY
Population: 54,490,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 15 months; Navy, 24 months.
Total armed forces :427,600 (excluding Carabinieri).
Estimated GNP 1971: $103.6 billion.
Defence budget 1971: 1,885.5 billion lire ($3,244,000,000). 625 lire=$1 1July 1972. 582 lire=$1 1July 1972. Army: 306,600.
2 armoured divisions.
5 infantry divisions.
1 independent cavalry brigade.
4 independent infantry brigades.
5 alpine brigades.
1 airborne brigade.
1 SSM brigade with Honest John.
4 SAM battalions with HAWK.
800 M-47 and 200 M-60 med tks (deliveries of 800 Leopard have started); 3,300 M-113 APC;
155mm, 175mm and 203mm SP guns; Model 56 105mm pack hows; M-42 SP AA guns.
ARMY AVIATION: Agusta Bell 205/206A (26 CH-47C Chinook on order) hels; lt fixed-wing aircraft. Navy: 44,500 (incl air arm and marines).
9 submarines.
3 SAM cruisers with Terrier SAM and ASW helicopters (1 with ASROC ASW msls).
2 SAM destroyers with Tartar.
4 ASW destroyers.
10 destroyer escorts.
12 coastal escorts.
4 ocean minesweepers.
37 coastal minesweepers.
20 inshore minesweepers.
5 fast patrol boats (Otomat SSM to be operational in 1973).
7 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
4 landing ships.
1 marine infantry battalion.
NAVAL AIR ARM: 3 maritime patrol squadrons with about 30 S-2 Tracker. (Delivery of an order of 18 Atlantic started mid-1972),
HU-16A, 24 SH-3D, 9 SH-34, 30 AB-204B and 12 Bell-47 helicopters. Air Force: 76,500; 320 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 12-18 aircraft and a transport squadron 16.)
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104G.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with F-104S.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with G-91Y.
4 light attack squadrons with G-91R.
1 AWX squadron with F-104G.
4 AWX squadrons with F-104S.
1 AWX squadron with F-86K.
3 recce squadrons with 27 RF-84F and 20 RF-104G.
3 transport squadrons with C-119 (14 C-130E Hercules to be delivered by mid-1973).
12 SAM groups with Nike-Hercules.
RESERVES: about 660,000. Para-Military Forces: 86,300 Carabinieri.
NETHERLANDS
Population: 13,325,000.
Military service: Army, 16-18 months; Navy and Air Force, 18-21 months.
Total armed forces: 122,200.
Estimated GNP 1971: $39.87 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 4,952 million guilders ($1.562 million). 3.62 guilders=$1 1July 1971.3.19 guilders=$1 1July 1972. Army: 80,000.
2 armoured brigades.
4 armoured infantry brigades.
2 SSM battalions with Honest John.
400 Centurion and 485 Leopard med tks; 120 AMX-13 lt tks;
M-106, M-113 and M-577 (amphibious) APC; AMX-VTT and YP-408 APC;
AMX 105mm, M-109 155mm, M-107 175mm and M-110 203mm SP hows.
RESERVES: 1 inf div and corps troops, incl 1 indep inf bde, would be completed by call-up of reservists.
A number of infantry brigades could be mobilized, if needed for territorial defence. Navy: 20,000 (including 2,800 marines and 2,000 naval air force).
4 submarines (2 more to be operational in 1972).
2 cruisers (1 SAM with Terrier).
6 SAM frigates with Seacat.
12 destroyers.
6 corvettes.
6 support escorts.
5 patrol vessels.
26 coastal minesweepers/minehunters.
16 inshore minesweepers.
1 fast combat support ship.
NAVAL AIR ARM: 2,000; 44 combat aircraft.
2 MR sqns with BR-1150 Atlantic and P-2 Neptune.
18 Wasp and AB-204B ASW helicopters.
23 S-58 SAR hels, being replaced by SH-3D.
RESERVES: 9,000 on immediate recall.
6 frigates, about 1 sqn of hels (all types). Air Force: 22,200; 144 combat aircraft.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with 36 F-104G.
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with 54 NF-5A.
2 interceptor squadrons with 36 F-104G.
1 reconnaissance squadron with 18 RF-104G.
1 transport squadron with 12 F-27.
30 NF-5B trainers.
3 observation and communication squadrons (under Army command) with Alouette III hel, and Piper Super-Cub and DHC-2 Beaver lt aircraft.
8 SAM sqns with Nike-Hercules.
11 SAM squadrons with HAWK. Para-Military Forces: 3,200 Gendarmerie.
NORWAY
Population: 3,935,000.
Military service: Army, 12 months; Navy and Air Force, 15 months.
Total armed forces: 35,900.
Estimated GNP 1971: $13.09 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 3,195 million kroner ($490,780,000). 7.14 kroner = $1 1July 1971. 6.51 kroner=$1July 1972. Army: 18,000.
The peacetime establishment includes 1 brigade group in North Norway, independent battalions and supporting elements and training units.
Leopard and M-48 med tks; M-24 lt tks; M-8 armd cars; M-113 and BV-202 APC; M-109 155mm SP hows;
L-18 and L-19 lt aircraft.
RESERVES: mobilization would produce 11 Regimental Combat Teams (brigades) of 5,000 men each,
supporting units and territorial forces totalling 157,000. Navy: 8,500 (incl 800 coastal artillery).
15 coastal submarines.
5 frigates.
2 coastal escorts.
10 coastal minesweepers.
5 minelayers.
20 fast patrol boats (refitting with Penguin SSM).
26 torpedo boats.
2 support ships.
4 landing craft.
A number of coastal artillery batteries.
RESERVES: 12,000. Air Force: 9,400; 117 combat aircraft.
5 light attack squadrons each with 16 F-5A.
1 AWX fighter squadron with 16 F-104G.
1 photo-reconnaissance squadron with 16 RF-5A.
1 maritime patrol squadron with 5 P-3B.
1 transport squadron with 6 C-130 and 4 C-47.
2 helicopter squadrons with UH-1B.
4 SAM batteries with Nike-Hercules.
RESERVES: 10,600, providing 12 airfield defence lt AA bns. Home Guard (all services), 75,000.
PORTUGAL
Population: 9,780,000.
Military service: Army, 24 months; Air Force, 36 months; Navy, 48 months.
Total armed forces: 218,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.25 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1972: 12,403 million escudos ($459,400,000). 28.75 escudos=$1 1July 1971. 27 escudos=$1 1July 1972. Army: 179,000.
2 tank regiments.
8 cavalry regiments.
35 infantry regiments.
17 coastal artillery regiments.
M-47 and M-4 med tks; M-41 lt tks;
Humber Mark IV and EBR-75 armd cars; AML-60 scout cars; FV-1609 and M-16 half-track APC;
105mm and 140mm howitzers.
DEPLOYMENT: some of the above units form 2 infantry divisions, at or below half-strength, in Portugal.
About 25 infantry regiments and supporting units are located in the African provinces.
(The numbers from all armed forces, in each province, including locally enlisted, are:
Angola: 55,000. Mozambique: 60,000. Portuguese Guinea: 27,000). Navy: 18,000 (including 3,300 marines).
4 submarines.
11 frigates.
6 corvettes.
16 coastal patrol vessels.
4 ocean minesweepers.
12 coastal minesweepers.
37 patrol launches (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 21,000; 150 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 10-25 aircraft.)
2 light bomber sqns with B-26 Invader and PV-2.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with F-84G.
2 light-strike squadrons with G-91.
1 interceptor squadron with F-86F.
6 COIN flights with armed T-6.
1 maritime patrol squadron with P-2V5.
22 Noratlas, 16 C-47, 11 DC-6 and 15 C-45 tpts.
13 T-33, 25 T-37 and 35 T-6 recce trainers.
Other aircraft include 11 Do-27 and about 85 Alouette II/III and SA-330 Puma helicopters.
1 parachute regiment of 4,000.
DEPLOYMENT: 1 parachute battalion in each of the African provinces; 1 G-91 squadron in Mozambique.
RESERVES: 500,000. Para-Military Forces: 9,700 National Republican Guard.
TURKEY
Population: 37,000,000.
Military service: 20 months.
Total armed forces: 449,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $13.4 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 8,124 million liras ($573,324,000). 15 liras=$1 1July 1971. 14.17 liras=$1 1July 1972. Army: 360,000.
1 armoured division.
1 mechanized infantry division.
11 infantry divisions.
4 armoured brigades.
2 armoured cavalry brigades.
1 mechanized infantry brigade.
4 infantry brigades.
1 armoured cavalry regiment.
1 parachute battalion.
M-47 and M-48 med tks; M-24, M-26 and M-41 lt tks; M-36 tank destroyers;
M-8 armd cars; M-59 and M-113 APC;
105mm and 155mm SP guns; 105mm, 155mm and 203mm hows;
SS-11 and Cobra ATGW; 40mm, 75mm and 90mm AA guns; Honest John SSM;
about 20 AB-204 helicopters. Navy: 39,000.
10 submarines.
10 destroyers.
6 coastal escorts.
11 motor torpedo boats (2 less than 100 tons).
14 fast patrol boats.
20 minesweepers.
6 minelayers.
A number of landing craft.
3 AB-204B ASW helicopters. Air Force: 50,000; 288 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has an average of 18 aircraft.)
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-104G.
6 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-100D.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with F-5.
2 interceptor squadrons with F-86 (in store).
2 AWX squadrons with F-102A.
3 recce squadrons with RF-84F and RF-5A.
3 tpt sqns incl 30 C-47, 8 C-130 and 16 Transall.
2 SAM battalions (8 batteries) with Nike-Hercules. Para-Military Forces: 75,000 Gendarmerie (including 3 mobile brigades).
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ALBANIA
Population: 2,250,000.
Military service: Army 18 months; Air Force, Navy and special units 2 years.
Total regular forces: 35,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 580 million leks ($116,000,000). 5 1eks=$1. Army: 28,000.
1 tank brigade.
6 infantry brigades.
Some light shore batteries.
70 T-34, 15 T-54 and T-59 med tks; T-62 lt tks;
20 BA-64, BTR-40 and BTR-152 APC;
SU-76 SP guns; 122mm and 152mm gun/hows; 45mm, 57mm, 76mm and 85mm ATk guns;
37mm, 57mm and 85mm AA guns; a few SA-2 SAM. Navy: 3,000.
4 submarines.
4 coastal escorts.
40 MTB and patrol boats.
8 MCM ships.
Some SSM deployed around the ports of Durazzo and Valona for coastal defence. Air Force: 4,000; 72 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 12 aircraft.)
2 fighter squadrons with MiG-17.
2 fighter squadrons with MiG-15.
2 interceptor squadrons with MiG-19 and MiG-21.
1 transport squadron with An-2 and Il-14.
1 squadron with Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 15,000: Internal security force 5,000; frontier force 10,000.
AUSTRIA
Population: 7,500,000.
Military service: 6 months.
Total armed forces: 43,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $16,756,000.
Defence budget 1972: Sch 4,607 million ($200 million). 24.75 Sch=$1 1July 1971. 23 schillings=$1 1July 1972. Army: 40,000.
3 mechanized infantry brigades.
4 infantry brigades.
3 independent air defence battalions.
150 M-47 and 120 M-60 med tks; 40 M-41 lt tks and 30 tk destroyers;
120 Saurer APC; 30 105mm, 15 M-109 SP 155mm and. 15 155mm hows; 21 130mm Praga V3S multiple RL;
36 35mm Oerlikon Super Bat AA guns. Air Force*: 3,000; 39 combat aircraft.
(* Austrian air units are an integral part of the Army but for purposes of comparison have been listed separately.)
39 Saab 105 fighter-bombers.
11 Magister, 5 Vampire, 26 Safir trainers.
19 Cessna L-19 and 2 Cessna 185 lt ac.
24 AB-204, 15 Alouette II, 16 Alouette III, 12 AB-206, 10 AB-47G, 2 S-65 and 4 OH-13 helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 11,250 Gendarmerie.
EIRE
Population: 3,000,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 9,850.
Estimated GNP 1971: $7.2 billion.
Defence budget: £22 million ($53.3 million). £0.416=$1 1July 1971. £0.413=$1 1July 1972. Army: 9,000.
7 infantry battalions.
1 tank squadron.
1 recce sqn (to be increased to regt).
6 artillery batteries.
Comet med tks; 16 AML-60A and KML-90 and some Landswerk armed cars; 25 pdr guns; 40mm AA guns.
RESERVES: 17,500 Territorial Army. Navy: 500.
1 corvette.
3 coastal minesweepers. Air Force: 450; 8 combat aircraft.
2 Vampire, 6 BAC Provost, 6 Chipmunk and 8 Reims-Cessna FR-172 trainers, 3 Alouette III helicopters, 3 Dove tpts.
FINLAND
Population: 4,650,000.
Military service: 8-11 months.
Total armed forces: 39,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $11.2 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 747.8 million markkaa ($182 million). 4.2 markkaa=$1 1July 1971. 4.1 markkaa=$1 1July 1972. Army: 34,000.
1 armoured brigade (at about half strength).
6 infantry brigades (at about 35 per cent strength).
6 independent infantry battalions.
6 coastal artillery battalions.
4 anti-aircraft battalions.
T-54, T-55 and Charioteer med tks; PT-76 lt tks;
BTR-50P APC; 105mm, 122mm and 130mm guns; 122mm and 152mm how;
Vigilant and SS-11 ATGW; ZSU 57-2 35mm, Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors AA guns. Navy: 2,500.
3 frigates (one used as training ship).
2 gunboats.
1 patrol boat with SSM.
15 fast patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
2 coastal minelayers.
5 inshore minesweepers. Air Force: 3,000; 47 combat aircraft.
3 fighter sqns with MiG-21F and Gnat Mark 1 (12 Saab J-35BS Draken will replace Gnats by 1974).
About 100 trainers, incl 60 Magister, 30 Safir and a few MiG-15/21UTI.
About 10 DC-3 and Beaver transports.
Mi-4, Alouette II and 4 AB-204B helicopters.
RESERVES: 650,000. Para-Military Forces: 4,000 Frontier-defence guards.
SPAIN
Population: 34,500,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total armed forces: 301,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $37.1 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 54,172 million pesetas. ($879 million). 70 pesetas=$1 1July 1971. 63 pesetas=$1 1July 1972. Army: 220,000.
1 armoured division.
1 mechanized infantry division.
1 motorized infantry division.
2 mountain divisions.
1 armoured cavalry brigade.
12 independent infantry brigades.
(All above are about 70% strength.)
1 mountain brigade.
1 airportable brigade.
1 parachute brigade.
2 artillery brigades (1 coast artillery).
1 SAM battalion with HAWK.
M-47 and M-8 med tks; M-24 and M-41 lt tks;
Greyhound armd cars; AML-60/90 and M-3 scout cars; M-113 APC;
105mm and 155mm SP guns; 105mm, 155mm and 203mm how; 90mm SP ATk guns. Navy: 47,500 (including 6,000 marines).
4 submarines.
1 helicopter carrier.
1 cruiser.
13 destroyers/fast frigates.
8 frigates.
2 frigate-minelayers.
2 corvettes.
1 ASW patrol vessel.
3 torpedo boats.
17 minesweepers.
18 landing craft.
3 ASW hel and 1 light hel squadrons. Air Force: 33,500; 215 combat aircraft.
36 F-4E fighter-bombers.
30 Mirage-IIIE fighter-bombers.
70 F-5 fighter-bombers.
55 HA-200 fighter-bombers.
13 F-86F interceptors.
1 ASW squadron with 11 Hu-16B.
About 150 tpt aircraft and hel, including C-47, C-54, 12 Caribou and 21 Azor.
DEPLOYMENT (outside mainland Spain): Total strength: 41,000, including
mechanized and commando formations of the Spanish Foreign Legion, elements of 3 divisions and support units. Balearic Islands: 6,000. Canary Islands: 8,000. Ceuta: 8,000 incl 1 regt of the Foreign Legion. Melilla: 9,000 incl 1 regt of the Foreign legion. Spanish Sahara: 10,000 incl 2 regts of the Foreign Legion. Para-Military Forces: 65,000 Guardia Civil.
SWEDEN
Population: 8,200,000.
Military service: Army and Navy, 8 1/2-15 months; Air Force, 9-14 months.
Total armed forces: 22,200 regulars, 18,200 reservists and 50,300 conscripts,
plus 121,500 conscripts on annual refresher training (total mobilizable strength 750,000).
Estimated GNP 1971: $32.56 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 7,100 million Swedish kroner ($1,510 million). 5.17 kroner=$1 1July 1971. 4.72 kroner=$1 1July 1972. Army: 11,700 regulars, 13,700 reservists and 36,500 conscripts, plus 100,000 conscripts on 18-40 days annual refresher training.
6 armoured brigades.
20 infantry brigades.
4 Noorlands winter brigades.
50 independent battalions.
23 Local Defence Districts with 100 independent battalions and 4-500 independent companies.
30 non-operational armoured, infantry and artillery training units to provide basic arms training for conscripts.
Centurion and STRV-103 med tanks; STRV-74 lt tanks; 1 KV-91 armoured ATk guns; Pbv-302 APC;
105mm and 155mm SP how; 75mm, 105mm and 155mm how;
90mm ATk guns; SS-11, Bantam, Carl Gustav and Miniman ATGW; 57mm SP, 20mm, 40mm and 57mm AA guns; Redeye SAM;
Iroquois and Jetranger hel. Navy: 4,700 regulars, 2,600 reservists and 7,400 conscripts plus 14,000 conscripts on annual refresher training.
22 submarines.
2 missile destroyers with Rb-08 SSM.
4 missile destroyers with Seacat SAM.
2 destroyers.
5 fast anti-submarine frigates.
17 heavy torpedo boats.
16 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
2 minelayer/submarine depot ships.
18 coastal minesweepers.
17 inshore minesweepers (8 less than 100 tons).
20 mobile and 45 static coastal artillery batteries with 75mm, 105mm, 120mm, 152mm and 210mm guns and Rb-08 and Rb-52 (SS-11) SSM.
10 Vertol and 10 AB-206A helicopters. Air Force: 5,800 regulars, 1,900 reservists and 6,400 conscripts, plus 7,500 conscripts on refresher training; 400 combat aircraft.
(A combat squadron has up to 18 aircraft.)
10 attack squadrons with A-32A Lansen (with Rb-04E ASM) and AJ-37 Viggen (replacement of the Lansen by the Viggen started in 1971).
13 AWX squadrons with J-35 Draken F.
8 AWX squadrons with J-35 Draken AID.
2 recce/fighter squadrons with S-32C.
3 recce/day fighter squadrons with S-35E.
5 tpt sqns with 2 C-130E and 7 C-47 Norseman, Beech Expediter, BAC Pembroke, DHC-2 Caribou and HS-104 Dove.
5 comm sqns with Saab 91 and 130 Saab 105 (suitable for light ground attack duties); 5 Bulldog (98 on order).
10 helicopter groups (3-4 aircraft each) with 10 Vertol-107, 6 Alouette II/III and 16 AB 204/206.
6 SAM squadrons with Bloodhound 2.
There is a fully computerized, fully automatic control and air surveillance system, Stril 60, co-ordinating all air defence components.
RESERVES: Voluntary defence organizations 500,000.
SWITZERLAND
Population: 6,400,000.
Military service: 4 months initial training, followed by reservist training of three weeks a year for 8 years, two weeks for 3 years and one week for 2 years.
Total armed forces: 5,500 regulars and 24,000 conscripts (total mobilizable strength 600,000; reservists can be fully mobilized within 48 hours).
Estimated GNP 1971: $24.5 billion.
Defence Budget 1972; 2,103 billion francs ($561 million). 4.08 francs=$1 1July 1971. 3.75 francs=$1 1July 1972. Army: 2,500 regular cadre (including Air Defence troops): 17,000 conscripts; 530,500 reservists.
1 corps (Alpine defence) of 3 mountain divisions.
3 corps, each of an armoured division and 2 infantry divisions.
17 frontier, fortress or 'redoubt' brigades.
300 Centurion and 150 Pz-61 med tks; 200 AMX 13 lt tks; 1,000 M-113 APC;
150 155mm SP how; 800 105mm guns and hows. Air Force:* 3,000 regular; 7,000 conscripts; 40,000 reservists (maintenance is by civilians); 315 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 15 aircraft.)
(Swiss Air Force and Air Defence Troops are an integral part of the army, but are listed here separately for purpose of comparison.)
13 ground support squadrons with Venom FB 50.
2 interceptor squadrons with Mirage IIIS.
5 interceptor squadrons with Hunter F-58 (with Sidewinder AAM).
1 reconnaissance squadron with Mirage IIIRS.
20 transports including 3 Ju-52/3 and 6 Do-27.
80 helicopters including 60 Alouette II/III.
2 SAM battalions with Bloodhound 2.
40 AA batteries with Oerlikon twin 35mm cannon.
RESERVES: 570,500.
YUGOSLAVIA
Population: 21,000,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 15 months; Navy, 18 months.
Total armed forces: 229,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $12.6 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 8 billion dinars ($485 million). 15 dinars = $1 1July 1971. 16.5 dinars=$1 1July 1972. Army: 190,000.
9 infantry divisions.
1 tank division.
9 armoured brigades.
24 independent infantry brigades.
1 airborne brigade.
Several hundred T-54/55, T-34 and M-47 and about 650 M-4 med tks; some PT-76 lt tks;
M-3, BTR-50P, BTR-60P and BTR-152 APC;
SU-100 SP guns; 105mm and 155mm hows; 50mm, 57mm, 75mm and 76mm ATk guns;
ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns; SA-2 SAM. Navy: 19,000.
5 submarines.
1 destroyer.
19 coastal escorts.
30 MCM ships.
10 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
65 motor torpedo boats (55 less than 100 tons).
30 landing craft.
1 marine infantry brigade.
25 coastal artillery batteries. Air Force: 20,000; 342 combat aircraft. (A combat squadron has 15 aircraft.)
12 GA sqns with F-84, Kraguj and Jastreb.
8 fighter/interceptor sqns with 50 F-86D/E and 82 MiG-21.
2 reconnaissance sqns with RT-33.
60 Galeb trainers.
25 Li-2, Beaver and C-47 and 13 Il-14 tpts.
50 Whirlwind, Mi-4 and Mi-8, and some Alouette III helicopters.
8 SAM batteries with SA-2. Para-Military Forces: 19,000 Frontier Guards; 1,000,000 Territorial defence force (planned to increase to 3,000,000).
Bilateral Agreements with External Powers The Soviet Union has military assistance agreements and a 15 year treaty of friendship and co-operation, signed in May 1971, with Egypt. A similar treaty, though with less comprehensive defence provisions, was concluded with Iraq in April 1972. Important military assistance has also been provided to Algeria, Sudan, Syria, the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
The United States has varying types of security assistance agreements and provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. She provides, in addition, a significant amount of military equipment on a cash sales basis to many countries, notable Spain, Israel, Iran and Jordan. For grant military aid purposes Greece and Turkey are considered forward defence areas and Spain is considered a base rights country under a basing agreement concluded in August 1970. A naval facilities agreement was signed with Bahrain in late 1971. Communication bases are maintained in Morocco under informal arrangements.
Britain has defence commitments to Cyprus and is responsible for the defence of Gibraltar. A new seven-year agreement with Malta, signed on 26 March 1972, permits Britain to base forces on the island for British and NATO purposes. Britain concluded a treaty of friendship with Bahrain in August 1971 and is also an important arms supplier for Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the Union of Arab Emirates, Oman and Jordan.
The People's Republic of China has supplied arms to Albania and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and has a treaty of friendship with the Arab Republic of Yemen. France has a pilot-training agreement with Morocco and supplies arms to a number of countries, particularly Libya.
Multilateral Agreements including external powers The members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) are Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, with the United States as an associate. All sit on the Military, Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees and on the Permanent Military Deputies Group. The Treaty provides for mutual cooperation for security and defence but has no central command structure, nor forces allocated to it. For the local powers, the economic organization of Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), which has evolved independently out of CENTO, may today be more important.
Arrangements within the region (between Arab states) Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Arab Emirates, Arab Republic of Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen are members of the League of Arab States. Among its subsidiary bodies are the Arab Defence Council set up in 1950 and the Unified Arab Command organized in 1964.
Defence agreements were concluded by Egypt with Syria in November 1966 and Jordan in May 1967, to which Iraq later acceded. These arrangements provided for the establishment of a Defence Council and a Joint Command. The loosely associated (and now defunct) Eastern Front Command, comprising Iraq, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Army and Syria, was reorganized in December into separate Jordanian and Syrian commands. Iraq and Syria concluded defence pacts in May 1968 and July 1969. The Union of Arab Republics formed by Libya, Syria and Egypt in April 1971, provides for a common defence policy and a Federal Defence Council. The proposed union between Egypt and Libya, announced in August 1972 and to be effective in September 1973 will presumably affect existing defence arrangements.
Ближний Восток и Средиземноморье
Двусторонние соглашения с внешними державами Советский Союз имеет соглашения о военной помощи и 15-летний договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве, подписанный в мае 1971 года с Египтом. Аналогичный договор, хотя и с менее всеобъемлющими оборонными положениями, был заключен с Ираком в апреле 1972 года. Важная военная помощь была также оказана Алжиру, Судану, Сирии, Йеменской Арабской Республике и Йеменской Народно-Демократической Республике.
Соединенные Штаты имеют различные виды соглашений об оказании помощи в обеспечении безопасности и предоставляют значительную военную помощь на безвозмездной или кредитной основе Греции, Турции, Португалии, Испании, Ливану, Иордании и Израилю. Они предоставляет, кроме того, значительное количество военной техники на кассовой основе для продажи во многие страны, наиболее известны Испания, Израиль, Иран и Иордания. Для целей предоставления военной помощи Греция и Турция считаются передовыми районами обороны, а Испания считается страной с базовыми правами в соответствии с соглашением о базировании, заключенным в августе 1970 года. В конце 1971 года с Бахрейном было подписано соглашение о военно-морских объектах. В Марокко базы связи поддерживаются в рамках неофициальных договоренностей.
Великобритания имеет оборонные обязательства перед Кипром и отвечает за оборону Гибралтара. Новое семилетнее соглашение с Мальтой, подписанное 26 марта 1972 года, позволяет Великобритании базировать силы на острове для британских целей и целей NATO. Великобритания заключила договор о дружбе с Бахрейном в августе 1971 года, а также является важным поставщиком оружия для Ирана, Кувейта, Бахрейна, Катара, Союза Арабских Эмиратов, Омана и Иордании.
Китайская народная республика поставила оружие Албании и Йеменской Народно-Демократической Республике и заключила договор о дружбе с Арабской Республикой Йемен. Франция заключила с Марокко соглашение об экспериментальной подготовке и поставляет оружие в ряд стран, в частности в Ливию.
Многосторонние соглашения, включая внешние державы Членами Центральной Организации Договора (CENTO) являются Великобритания, Иран, Пакистан и Турция, с Соединенными Штатами в качестве ассоциированного члена. Включает военный, экономический и борьбы с подрывной деятельностью комитеты и постоянную военную группу депутатов. Договор предусматривает взаимное сотрудничество в области безопасности и обороны, но не имеет центральной структуры командования и выделенных ему сил. Для местных властей экономическая организация регионального сотрудничества в целях развития (RCD), которая возникла независимо от CENTO, может сегодня иметь более важное значение.
Договоренности в регионе (между арабскими государствами) Алжир, Бахрейн, Египет, Ирак, Иордания, Йемен, Катар, Кувейт, Ливан, Ливия, Марокко, Оман, Саудовская Аравия, Судан, Сирия, Тунис, Союз Арабских Эмиратов, Арабская Республика и Народная Демократическая Республика являются членами Лиги арабских государств. Его вспомогательным органом являются арабский Совет обороны созданный в 1950 году и Объединенное Арабское Командование организованное в 1964 году.
Оборонные соглашения были заключены Египтом с Сирией в ноябре 1966 года и Иорданией в мае 1967 года, к которым позднее присоединился Ирак. Эти меры предусматривали создание Совета обороны и Объединенного командования. Слабо ассоциированное (и ныне несуществующее) командование Восточного фронта в составе Ирака, Иордании, Армии Освобождения Палестины и Сирии было реорганизовано в декабре в отдельные Иорданское и Сирийское командования. Ирак и Сирия заключили договоры об обороне в мае 1968 года и июле 1969 года. Союз арабских республик, образованный Ливией, Сирией и Египтом в апреле 1971 года, предусматривает общую оборонную политику и Федеральный Совет обороны. Предложенный союз между Египтом и Ливией, объявленный в августе 1972 года и вступивший в силу в сентябре 1973 года, предположительно затронет существующие оборонные договоренности.
ALGERIA
Population: 15,200,000.
Military service: 6 months.
Total armed forces: 60,200.
Estimated GNP 1971: $4.66 billion.
Defence budget 1971: 490 million dinars ($99.200.000). 4.94 dinars=$1 1July 1971. 4.5 dinars=$1 1July 1972. Army: 53,000.
4 motorized infantry brigades.
1 parachute brigade.
3 independent tank battalions.
50 independent infantry battalions.
12 companies of desert troops.
5 independent artillery battalions.
200 T-34, 340 T-54 and 50 T-55 med tks; 50 AMX-13 lt tks; 350 BTR-152 APC;
25 SU-100 and 6 JSU-152 SP guns; 85mm guns; 122mm and 152mm hows; 140mm and 240mm RL. Navy: 3,200.
6 SO-1 submarine chasers.
2 fleet minesweepers.
1 coastal minesweeper.
6 Komar- and 3 Osa-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
12 P-6 torpedo boats. Air Force: 4,000; 181 combat aircraft.
30 Il-28 light bombers.
25 MiG-15 and 70 MiG-17 FGA.
30 MiG-21 interceptors.
26 Magister armed trainers.
8 An-12, 12 Il-18 transports.
4 Mi-1, 42 Mi-4, 6 Hughes 269A and 2 SA-330 helicopters.
1 SAM battalion with SA-2. Para-Military Forces: 8,000 Gendarmerie with 50 AML armoured cars.
EGYPT
Population: 34,900,000.
Military service: 3 years.
Total armed forces: 325,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.91 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: £E 649.5 million ($1,510 million). £E 0.43=$1. Army: 285,000.
3 armoured divisions.
3 mechanized infantry divisions.
5 infantry divisions.
2 parachute brigades.
16 artillery brigades.
28 commando battalions.
50 JS-3 hy tks; 1,500 T-54/55, 10 T-62 and 400 T-34 med tks; 100 PT-76 lt tks;
2,000 BTR-40, BTR-50P, BTR-60P, OT-64 and BTR-152 APC;
about 150 SU-100 and ISU-152 SP guns; about 1,500 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns and hows; 40 203mm hows;
57mm, 85mm and 100mm ATk guns; Snapper ATGW;
24 FROG-3, some FROG-1 and 25 Samlet short-range SSM;
ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns. Navy: 15,000 (including coastguard).
12 submarines (6 W- and 6 R-class - ex-Soviet).
5 destroyers (including 4 ex-Soviet Skory-class).
2 corvettes.
12 SO-1 submarine chasers.
9 fleet minesweepers.
2 inshore minesweepers.
12 Osa- and 6 Komar-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
20 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
12 landing craft. Air Force: 25,000; 768 combat aircraft.* (*About 150 aircraft are estimated to be in storage.)
200 MiG-17 fighter bombers.
18 Tu-16 Badger medium bombers.
10 Il-28 Beagle light bombers.
220 MiG-21 Fishbed interceptors.
120 Su-7 Fitter fighter-bombers.
200 MiG-17 fighter bombers.
200 MiG, Yak and L-29 trainers.
About 40 Il-14 lt and 20 An-12 med tpts.
180 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. Air defence is provided by 100 SAM sites, each of 6 SA-2 and SA-3 launchers;
20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns;
all integrated, through a warning and command network, with 9 Air Force squadrons of MiG-21 interceptors.
Soviet-manned equipment co-ordinated with the air defence system includes some
65 SAM batteries with SA-2, SA-3, SA-4 and possibly SA-6 missiles,
6 interceptor squadrons of MiG-21J and MiG-21D, some Su-11 and a few MiG-23*.
(*At 1July 1972. Since that date there have been substantial Soviet withdrawals, involving forces operating SAM sites
and interceptors. The majority of the Soviet-manned aircraft appear to have left Egypt.)
DEPLOYMENT: Sudan: Elements with Tu-16 and MiG-21. Para-Military Forces: about 100,000 National Guard, including Frontier Corps, Defence and Security.
IRAN
Population: 30,500,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 191,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $12.1 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 70,151 million rials ($915 million). 75.75 rials=$1 1July 1971. 76.6 rials=$1 1July 1972. Army: 160,000.
2 armoured divisions.
5 infantry divisions (some mechanized).
1 independent armoured brigade.
1 SAM battalion with HAWK.
400 M-47 and 460 M-60A1 med tks; 100 M-24 lt tks;
400 M-113, 300 BTR-50 and 400 BTR-60 APC;
75mm, 105mm and 155mm hows; 40mm, 57mm and 85mm AA guns; SS-11, SS-12, TOW, ATGW.
(800 Chieftain tks on order; delivery started in 1972.)
8 Huskie, 52 AB-205 and 24 AB-206A helicopters.
8 C-45, 20 Li-8, 20 Cessna 185, 10 O-2A lt ac. Navy: 9,000.
1 destroyer.
2 SAM frigates (with Seacat).
4 corvettes.
24 patrol boats.
4 coastal minesweepers.
2 inshore minesweepers.
4 landing craft.
8 SRN-6 and 2 BH-7 Wellington hovercraft (less than 100 tons).
4 AB-205, 12 AB-206A, 6 AB-212 and 2 SH-3D helicopters. Air Force: 22,000; 160 combat aircraft.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-4D, with Sidewinder and Sparrow AAM.
6 fighter-bomber squadrons with F-5.
9 RT-33 reconnaissance aircraft.
Transports include 5 C-47, 26 C-130E and 6 Beaver.
Helicopters include 4 Huskie, 10 AB-206, 16 Super-Frelon, 2 CH-47C Chinook.
Tigercat SAM (Rapier SAM are being delivered). Para-Military Forces: 40,000 Gendarmerie with 14 AB-206 helicopters.
IRAQ
Population: 9,750,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 101,800.
Estimated GNP 1971: $3.66 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970-71: 84,700,000 dinars ($237,160,000). 0.36 dinars=$1 1July 1971. 0.33 dinars=$1 1July 1972. Army: 90,000.
1 tank division.
1 mechanized division.
2 inf divs (each of 4 bdes, 3 arty and 1 para bn).
2 mountain divs.
800 T-54/55 and 60 T-34 med tks; 45 PT-76, 20 M-24 lt tks;
50 AML-245 armd cars; 60 Ferret scout cars; 300 BTR-152 and other APC;
300 120mm and 130mm guns. Navy: 2,000.
3 SO-1 submarine chasers.
12 P-6 torpedo boats.
4 patrol boats (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 9,800; 189 combat aircraft.
9 Tu-16 medium bombers.
48 Su-7 fighter-bombers.
32 Hunter FGA.
80 MiG-21 interceptors.
20 MiG-17 fighters.
4 Mi-1, 30 Mi-4, 12 Mi-8 hel.
4 An-2, 7 An-12, 10 An-24, 8 Il-14, 2 Tu-124, 2 Heron tpt ac. Para-Military Forces: 10,000 National Guard, 3,800 security troops and 4-5,000 others.
ISRAEL
Population: 3,155,000.
Military service: men 36 months, women 20 months (excl Arab population). Annual training for reservists thereafter to age limits.
Total armed forces: 25,000 regular, 52,000 conscripts; (mobilization to 300,000 in 72 hours).
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.2 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73; 5,300 million Israel pounds ($1,247 million). 3.5 Israel pounds=$1 1July 1971. 4.25 Israeli pounds=$1 1July 1972. Army: 11,500 regular, 50,000 conscripts (including 12,000 women); 275,000 on mobilization.
4 armoured brigades.*
5 mechanized brigades.*
5 infantry brigades.*
1 parachute brigade.
3 artillery brigades.
*Not all fully activated.
450 M-48 (with 105mm guns), 250 Ben Gurion (Centurion with French 105mm gun), 700 Centurion,
200 Isherman (with 105mm gun) and Super Sherman, 100 TI-67 (T-54/55 with 105mm gun) and some M-60 med tks;
AML-60, 15 AML-90 and some Staghound armd cars;
about 1,000 M-2 and M-3 half-tracks; M-113 APCs;
352 105mm and 155mm, and some 175mm SP how; 155mm how on Sherman chassis;
900 120mm and 160mm mortars on AMX-chassis;
122mm guns and how; 130mm guns; 240mm RL (captured equipment);
90mm SP ATk guns and 106mm jeep-mounted recoilless rifles; Cobra, and weapons carrier-mounted SS-10/11 ATGW;
20mm, 30mm and 40mm AA guns.
(The 280-mile range Jericho SSM is believed to be in production, but has not yet been reported deployed operationally.)
RESERVES: would increase above formations to 10 armoured, 9 mechanized infantry and 5 parachute brigades. Navy: 3,500 regular, 1,000 conscripts; 5,000 on mobilization.
2 submarines.
1 destroyer (plus 1 awaiting disposal).
12 FPB (with Gabriel SSM).
4 motor torpedo boats.
12 small patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
10 landing craft (3 less than 100 tons).
Naval commandos: 500. Air Force: 10,000 regular, 1,000 conscripts; 20,000 on mobilization; 432 combat aircraft.
10 Vautour light bombers.
90 F-4E fighter-bomber/interceptors.
50 Mirage IIIC fighter-bomber/interceptors (some with R530 AAM).
125 A-4E/H Skyhawk fighter-bombers.
27 Mystere IVA fighter bombers (in reserve).
30 Ouragan fighter-bombers (used mainly for training).
9 Super Mystere interceptors.
6 RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft.
85 Magister trainers with limited ground attack capability.
10 Stratocruiser transports (incl 2 tankers).
20 Noratlas, 10 C-47, 2 C-130E transports.
12 Super Frelon, 10 CH-53C, 30 AB-205 and 20 Alouette helicopters.
8 SAM batteries with 48 HAWK. Para-Military Forces: 4,000 Border Guards and 15,000 nahal militia.
JORDAN
Population: 2,460,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 69,250.
Estimated GNP 1971: $0.81 billion.
Defence budget 1971: 32 million dinars ($90,400,000). 0.36 dinar=$1. Army: 65,000.
1 armoured division.
1 mechanized division.
1 infantry division.
1 independent infantry brigade.
1 Royal Guards battalion (armoured).
1 special forces battalion.
3 artillery regiments.
190 M-47 and M-48, 14 M-60 and 140 Centurion med tks; 130 Saladin armd cars; 140 Ferret scout cars;
280 M-113 and 120 Saracen APC; 130 25-pounder guns, 50 105mm and 155mm howitzers, 10 155mm guns,
200 M-42 SP AA guns. Navy: 250. 11 small patrol craft. Air Force: 4,000; 50 combat aircraft.
2 ground-attack squadrons with 35 Hunter.
1 interceptor squadron with 15 F-104A.
4 C-47 and 2 Dove transports.
Helicopters include 7 Alouette III. Para-Military Forces: 37,500: 7,500 Gendarmerie; 30,000 National Guard.
LEBANON
Population: 2,950,000.
Voluntary military service (proposals have been made to introduce compulsory military training).
Total armed forces: 14,250.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.61 billion.
Defence budget 1972: £L 212,700,000 ($709,000,000).
£L 3.25=$1 1July 1971. £L 3=$1 1July 1972. Army: 13,000.
2 tank battalions.
2 reconnaissance battalions.
1 commando battalion.
9 infantry battalions.
3 artillery battalions.
40 Charioteer med tks; 40 AMX-13 and 20 M-41 lt tks; M-706, M-6 and AEC Mark-3 armd cars;
M-113 and M-59 APC; 155mm how; 15 M-42 SP AA guns. Navy: 250.
2 patrol vessels.
6 small inshore patrol craft.
1 landing craft. Air Force: 1,000; 18 combat aircraft.
8 Hunter FGA.
1 interceptor squadron with 10 Mirage III-C with R-530 AAM.*
5 transports.
1 helicopter sqn with 3 Alouette II and 5 Alouette III.
Some French early warning/ground control radars. Para-Military Forces: 5,000 Gendarmerie.
LIBYA
Population: 2,100,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 25,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $3.17 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 40 million Libyan dinars ($120 million). 0.36 Libyan dinar=$1 1July 1971. 0.33 Libyan dinar=$1 1July 1972. Army: 20,000.
1 armoured brigade.
2 mechanized infantry brigades.
1 National Guard brigade.
1 commando battalion.
3 artillery battalions.
2 anti-aircraft artillery battalions.
6 Centurion Mk5, 200 T-54/55 and 15 T-34 med tks;
40 Saladin armd cars; Shorland and Ferret scout cars; Saracen and 70 M-113A1 APC;
70 122mm, 75 105mm and 18 155mm hows; L40/70 Bofors AA guns; 300 Vigilant ATGW.
5 AB-206, 7 OH-13 and 4 Alouette III helicopters. Navy: 2,000.
1 corvette.
3 FPB each with 8 SS-12(M) SSM
2 inshore minesweepers.
1 logistics support ship.
9 patrol craft.
(1 fast frigate is due for delivery in 1972). Air Force: 3,000; 22 combat aircraft.
1 interceptor squadron with 10 F-5A.
1 fighter squadron with 12 Mirage IIIB/E.
8 C-130E and 9 C-47 medium transports.
2 AB-206, 3 OH-13, 10 Alouette III and 6 Super Frelon helicopters.
3 T-33 trainers.
(45 of a total order of 110 Mirage III have been delivered.)
MOROCCO
Population: 16,500,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total armed forces: 53,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $3.45 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 568 million dirham ($124 million). 5.06 dirham=$1 1July 1971. 4.6 dirham=$1 1July 1972. Army: 48,000.
1 armoured brigade.
3 motorized infantry brigades.
1 light security brigade.
1 parachute brigade.
9 independent infantry battalions.
1 Royal Guards battalion.
2 camel corps battalions.
3 desert cavalry battalions.
5 artillery groups.
2 engineer battalions.
120 T-54 med tks; 120 AMX-13 lt tks;
36 EBR-75, 50 AML-245 and M-8 armd cars; 40 M-3 half-track and 95 Czech APC;
25 SU-100, AMX-105 and 50 M-56 90mm SP guns; 75mm and 105mm hows;
6 Alouette II/III hels. Navy: 1,500 (including 500 marines).
1 frigate.
2 coastal escorts.
1 patrol boat.
11 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
1 landing ship. Air Force: 4,000; 48 combat aircraft.
20 F-5A and 4 F-5B interceptors.
24 Magister armed trainers.
35 T-6 and 25 T-28 trainers.
10 C-47 and 11 C-119 transports.
OH-13, 12 AB-205 and 6 HH-43 hels.
(12 MiG-17 fighter-bombers are in storage.) Para-Military Forces: 23,000: 2,250 Gendarmerie including 2 mobile security battalions; 750 Royal Guards; 20,000 Auxiliaries.
OMAN
Population: 750,000.
Voluntary military service.* (*A number of expatriate personnel serve on contract or on secondment.))
Total armed forces: 6,000.
0.416 rial saidi=$1 1July 1971. 0.413 rial saidi=$1 1July 1972. Army: about 5,500.
4 infantry battalions.
3 artillery batteries (of 3 guns).
Saladin armoured cars; 25-pounder and 5.5-inch guns. Navy: about 200.
1 patrol craft (yacht).
Armed dhows. Air Force: about 300 (including 146 contract personnel); 15 combat aircraft.
1 strike squadron with 9 BAC-167.
6 T-52 armed trainers.
1 air support squadron with 2 Caribou, 8 Skyvan and 4 Beaver.
1 helicopter squadron with 8 AB-205 and 4 AB-206A.
1 transport flight with 3 Viscount.
SAUDI ARABIA
Population: 7,960,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 40,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $4.3 billion.
Defence budget 1970-71: saudi riyals 1,723 million ($383,000,000). 4.5 riyals=$1 1July 1971. 4.2 riyals=$1 1July 1972. Army: 36,000.
4 infantry brigades.
10 SAM battalions with HAWK.
25 M-47 med tks; 60 M-41 lt tks; (AMX-30 tks on order.)
200 AML-60 and AML-90, some Staghound and Greyhound armd cars; Ferret scout cars.
DEPLOYMENT: 4,000 in Jordan. Navy: 1,000.
2 torpedo boats.
12 FPB.
9 patrol boats.
8 SRN-6 hovercraft. Air Force: 3,500; 71 combat aircraft.
1 fighter-bomber sqn with 15 F-86 (27 F-5B and 30 F-5E are on order).
2 ground-attack sqns with 21 BAC-167.
2 interceptor sqns with 3 F-52 and 32 F-53 Lightning.
10 C-130 and 2 C-140B transports.
1 Alouette III, 1 AB-204, 8 AB-205 and 20 AB-206 helicopters.
13 T33 trainers, 1 Cessna 310K and 6 172G light aircraft. Para-Military Forces: 10,000 National Guard (formerly known as the 'White Army')
SUDAN
Population: 16,450,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 36,300.
Estimated GNP 1970: $1.83 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: £500,000,000 or on secondment. ($1,428 million). £Sudan 0.35=$1. Army: 35,000.
1 armoured brigade.
6 infantry brigades.
1 parachute brigade.
3 artillery regiments.
3 air defence artillery regiments.
1 engineer regiment.
20 T-34/85, 60 T-54, 50 T-55 and some T-59 med tks;
50 Saladin and 45 Commando armd cars; 60 Ferret scout cars; 50 BTR-50 and BTR-152, 49 Saracen and 60 OT-64 APC;
55 25-pounder, 40 105mm and some 122mm guns and hows; 20 120mm mortars;
80 Bofors 40mm and some Soviet 85mm AA guns.
DEPLOYMENT: 2,000 in Egypt. Navy: 600.
6 coastal patrol boats.
2 landing craft. Air Force: 700; 40 combat aircraft.
16 MiG-21 interceptors.
8 MiG-17 fighter-bombers.
5 BAC-145 Mk 5, 8 Jet Provost Mk 52 and 3 Provost Mk 51 light attack aircraft.
3 Pembroke, 3 F-27 Troopship and 5 AN-24 transports.
10 Mi-8 helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 3,000: 1,000 National Guard; 2,000 Border Guard.
SYRIA
Population: 6,450,000.
Military service: 30 months.
Total armed forces: 111,750.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.8 billion.
Defence Budget 1972: £Syr 960 million ($206,452,000). £Syrian 3.8=$1 1July 1971. £Syrian 4.65=$1 1July 1972. Army: 100,000.
2 armoured divisions.
1 mechanized division.
2 infantry divisions.
1 parachute battalion.
5 commando battalions.
7 artillery regiments.
8 SAM batteries with SA-2 and SA-3.
About 30 JS-3 hy tks; 240 T-34 and 900 T-54/55 med tks; some PT-76 lt tks; 50 SU-100 SP guns;
500 BTR-50/60, BTR-152 APC; 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns; SA-2;, ATGW;
37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns. Navy: 1,750.
2 minesweepers.
2 coastal patrol vessels.
6 Komar-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
12 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 10,000 men; 210 combat aircraft.
80 MiG-17 day fighter/ground attack aircraft.
30 Su-7 fighter-bombers.* (*Some are in storage)
100 MiG-21 interceptors.* (*Some are in storage).
8 U-14 and 6 C-47 transports.
4 Mi-1, 10 Mi-4 and some Mi-8 helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 9,500: 8,000 Gendarmerie; 1,500 Internal Security Camel Corps.
TUNISIA
Population: 5,360,000.
Military service: 1 year (selective).
Total armed forces: 24,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.33 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1972: 13.8 million dinars ($28,728,000). 0.52 dinars=$1 1July 1971. 0.48 dinars = $1 1July 1972. Army: 20,000.
1 armoured battalion.
5 infantry battalions.
1 commando battalion.
1 Sahara battalion.
1 artillery group.
About 50 AMX-13 and M-41 lt tks; 20 Saladin and some M-8 armd cars;
105mm SP and 155mm guns; 40mm Bofors AA guns. Navy: 2,000.
1 corvette.
2 coastal escorts.
2 patrol boats with SS-12 (M) SSM.
4 patrol boats (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 2,000; 12 combat aircraft.
12 F-86 fighters.
8 MB-326, 12 T-6 and 12 Saab 91-D trainers.
3 Flamant light transports.
8 Alouette II helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 10,000; 5,000 Gendarmerie organized in 6 battalions; 5,000 National Guard.
For the armed forces of smaller states see table overleaf
* Forces from outside Africa stationed in African countries, or in colonies or metropolitan territories, are shown under the heading 'deployment' in the country sections for the deploying countries, France, Portugal and Spain. See also The Military Balance 1971-1972, pp. 64-65 for the Overseas Deployment of Forces.
Multilateral Agreements The Organization of African Unity (OAU), constituted in May 1963, includes all internationally recognized independent African states except South Africa. Its Defence Commission is responsible for defence and security co-operation, and the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members.
There is a regional defence pact between France, Congo (Brazzaville), the Central African Republic and Chad, and a five-party defence agreement between France, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta which has set up the 'Conseil de defense de l'Afrique equatoriale'.
Bilateral Agreements The United States has varying types of security assistance agreements and provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to Ethiopia, Liberia and Zaire. For grant military assistance purposes, Ethiopia, where the United States has a large communications centre, is considered a base rights-country.
Though the Soviet Union is not known to have defence agreements with countries in the area, Soviet military assistance has been given to Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria and the Somali Republic.
China has a military assistance agreement with Congo (Brazzaville) and may have formal arrangements covering military assistance and training with Tanzania.
Britain maintains defence agreements with Kenya and Mauritius, and an agreement with South Africa, covering the use of the Simonstown naval base.
France has defence agreements with Cameroon, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Senegal and Togo; technical military assistance agreements with Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta; and mutual facilities agreements with Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Niger.
Portugal directly assures the defence of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, and Spain of Spanish Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla. All of these are administratively regarded as overseas provinces except Ceuta and Melilla, which are treated as integral parts of Spain.
Страны Африки к югу от Сахары*
* Силы из-за пределов Африки, дислоцированные в африканских странах или в колониях или на столичных территориях, показаны под заголовком " deployment" в отделах стран дислокации, Франции, Португалии и Испании. См. также Военный баланс 1971-1972 годов, стр. 64-65 для развертывания сил за рубежом.
Многосторонние договоренности В состав Организации африканского единства (ОАЕ), учрежденной в мае 1963 года, входят все международно признанные независимые африканские государства, за исключением Южной Африки. Его комиссия по обороне отвечает за сотрудничество в области обороны и безопасности, а также за защиту суверенитета, территориальной целостности и независимости своих членов.
Существует региональный оборонный пакт между Францией, Конго (Браззавиль), Центральноафриканской Республикой и Чадом, а также пятистороннее оборонное соглашение между Францией, Дагомеей, кот-Д'Ивуаром, Нигером и Верхней Вольтой, в соответствии с которым был учрежден "Совет по защите прав человека".
Двусторонние соглашения Соединенные Штаты имеют различные виды соглашений об оказании помощи в обеспечении безопасности и предоставляют значительную военную помощь на безвозмездной или кредитной основе Эфиопии, Либерии и Заиру. Для целей предоставления военной помощи Эфиопия, где Соединенные Штаты имеют крупный центр связи, считается страной, обладающей базовыми правами.
Хотя Советский Союз, как известно, не имеет соглашений об обороне со странами региона, советская военная помощь была оказана Гвинее, Мали, Мавритании, Нигерии и сомалийской Республике.
Китай имеет соглашение о военной помощи с Конго (Браззавиль) и может иметь официальные договоренности, охватывающие военную помощь и подготовку с Танзанией.
Великобритания поддерживает оборонные соглашения с Кенией и Маврикием, а также соглашение с Южной Африкой, охватывающее использование военно-морской базы Симонстаун.
Франция имеет соглашения об обороне с Камеруном, Габоном, Малагасийской Республикой, Мавританией, Сенегалом и Того; соглашения о военно-технической помощи с Камеруном, Центральноафриканской Республики, Чадом, Конго (Браззавиль), Дагомеей, Габоном, Кот-д'Ивуаром, Малагасийской Республикой, Мавританией, Нигером, Сенегалом, Того и Верхней Вольтой; и договоры взаимных услуг с Дагомеей, Габоном, Кот-д'Ивуаром, Мавританией и Нигером.
Португалия непосредственно обеспечивает оборону Анголы, Мозамбика и Португальской Гвинеи, а Испания - испанской Сахары, Сеуты и Мелильи. Все они административно рассматриваются как заморские провинции, за исключением Сеуты и Мелильи, которые рассматриваются как неотъемлемые части Испании.
ETHIOPIA
Population: 26,000,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces : 44,570.
Estimated GNP 1971 : $US 2.55 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: E$93,091,000 ($US 40,500,000). $E2.5=$1 1July 1971. $E2.3=$1 1July 1972. Army: 40,940.
4 infantry divisions of 8,000 men each (incl Imperial Guard).
1 tank battalion.
1 airborne infantry battalion.
1 armoured car squadron.
4 artillery battalions.
5 air defence batteries.
2 engineer battalions.
30 M-41 med tks; 20 M-24 lt tks; about 40 APC; 6 AB-204B helicopters. Navy: 1,380.
1 coastal minesweeper.
1 training ship (ex-seaplane tender).
5 patrol boats.
4 harbour defence craft (less than 100 tons).
4 landing craft (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 2,250; 46 combat aircraft.
1 bomber squadron with 4 Canberra B-2.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with 12 F-86F.
1 ground attack squadron with 6 T-28A (COIN).
1 ground-attack squadron with 9 Saab-17.
1 fighter squadron with 15 F-5A.
1 tpt sqn with 6 C-47, 2 C-54, 4 C-119G and 3 Dove.
3 trg sqns with 20 Safir, 15 T-28A and 11 T-33.
5 Alouette II, 2 Mi-6, 2 Mi-8 and 6 AB-204B helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 20,400.
Territorial Army active strength, 9,200; mobile emergency police force 6,800; frontier guards 1,200; commando force 3,200.
GHANA
Population: 9,600,000
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 18,600.
Estimated GNP 1971: $2.82 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: 39,500,000 cedi ($30,000,000). 1.02 cedi=$1 1 My 1971. 1.3 cedi=$1 1July 1972. Army: 16,500.
2 brigades comprising 7 inf bns and support units.
2 reconnaissance squadrons.
Saladin armd cars; Ferret scout cars; heavy mortars. Navy: 1,000.
2 corvettes.* (There is a substantial shortage of spares for all naval craft.)
1 coastal minesweeper.
2 inshore minesweepers.
2 seaward defence vessels.
3 P-20 class (ex-Soviet) patrol boats (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 1,100; no combat aircraft. .
1 transport squadron with 7 Otter.
1 transport squadron with 8 Caribou and 3 Heron.
1 comms and liaison squadron with 11 Beaver.
3 Whirlwind, 2 Wessex and 3 Hughes 269A hel.
6 MB-326 and 9 Chipmunk trainers.
NIGERIA
Population: 57,900,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 274,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $9.9 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: £N 250,000,000 ($757,600,000). £N 0.36=$1 1July 1971. £N 0.33=$1 1July 1972. Army: 262,000.
3 infantry divisions.
3 reconnaissance regiments.
3 artillery regiments.
Saladin and 20 AML-60/90 armd cars; Ferret scout cars; Saracen APC;
25-pounder, 76mm, 105mm and 122mm guns. Navy: 5,000.
1 ASW frigate.
1 corvette. (A second corvette to be delivered late 1972.)
3 P-6 torpedo boats (ex-Soviet).
6 seaward defence boats.
1 landing craft. Air Force: 7,000; 38 combat aircraft.
6 Il-28 medium bombers.
12 MiG-17fighter-bombers.
10 L-29 Delfin and 10 P-149D armed trainers.
2 MiG-15 trainers.
Other aircraft include 6 C-47, 6 Fokker F-27 Friendship tpts; 20 Do-27/28 comms aircraft;
8 Whirlwind and Alouette II hel.
RHODESIA
Population: 5,600,000 (258,750 white population).
Military service: 12 months (white population).
Total armed forces: 4,700.
Estimated GNP 1971: $US 1.44 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970-71: $R17,879,000 ($US 25,000,000). $R0.71=$1 1July 1971. $R0.81=$1 1July 1972. Army: 3,500 Regular; 10,000 Territorial Force.
2 infantry battalions (one has Ferret scout cars).
2 Special Air Service squadrons.
1 artillery battery.
1 engineer squadron.
20 Ferret scout cars; Model 56 105mm pack hows.
There is an establishment for 3 brigades, 2 based on regular infantry battalions, which would be brought up to
strength by mobilizing the Territorial Force. Air Force: 1,200; 45 combat aircraft.
1 light bomber sqn with 10 Canberra B-2.
1 FGA sqn with 12 Hunter F5A-9.
1 FGA sqn with 11 Vampire FB-9.
1 recce sqn with 12 T-52 Jet Provost.
1 transport sqn with 4 C-47 and 1 Beech 55 Baron.
9 Aermacchi-Lockheed AL-60F5 and 3 Canberra T-4 trainers.
11 helicopter sqns with 12 Alouette III.
RESERVES: 10,000 Territorial Force.
The white population completing conscript service is assigned for three years' part-time training to territorial units,
which include active territorial battalions based on the cities and reserve territorial battalions based on country districts.
The establishment of the Army Reserves is 8 infantry battalions, 1 field artillery battery and 1 engineer squadron.
Ground personnel servicing regular Air Force units are Air Force reservists or non-white civilian employees. Para-Military Forces: 8,000 active; 35,000 reservists.
The British South African Police (BSAP) have some military equipment such as small arms and would be responsible for much of
the internal security in the event of civil unrest or military threat from outside.
The white population forms only about a third of the active strength but nearly three-quarters of the Police Reserves.
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
Population: 2,930,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 13,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $0.18 billion.
Defence budget 1971: 81,253,000 shillings ($11,400,000). 7.14 Somali shillings=$1 1July 1971. 7.1 Somali shillings=$1 1July 1972. Army: 11,200.* (*Spares are short and not all equipment is serviceable.)
4 tank battalions.
9 mechanized infantry battalions.
1 commando battalion.
About 150 T-34 med tks; 60 BTR-40 and 250 BTR-152 APC; 100mm guns. Navy: 300. 6 patrol boats (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 2,000; 21 combat aircraft.
2 MiG-15 and 19 MiG-17 fighters.
2 MiG-15/MiG-17UTI trainers.
Tpts include 1 C-45, 3 C-47, 3 An-2 and 1 An-24. Para-Military Forces: 500 border guards.
SOUTH AFRICA
Population: 21,050,000 (4,000,000 white population).
Military service: 9-12 months in Citizen Force.
Total armed forces: 17,300 regular; 92,000 Citizen Force.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1-8.4 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 361,546,000 rand ($448,300,000). 0.71 Rand=$1 1July 1971. 0.81 Rand=$1 1July 1972. Army: 10,000 regular.
100 Centurion Mark 5, 20 Comet med tks; 800 AML-60 and AML-90, and 50 M-3 armd cars;
50 Ferret scout cars; 250 Saracen APC.
RESERVES: 80,000 Citizen Force, in 11 territorial commands. Navy: 2,300 regular.
3 submarines.
2 destroyers with Wasp ASW helicopters.
4 ASW frigates with Wasp ASW helicopters.
1 escort minesweeper.
3 coastal minesweepers.
5 seaward defence boats.
1 fleet replenishment tanker.
RESERVES: 9,000 trained reserves in Citizen Force (with 5 frigates and 7 minesweepers). Air Force: 5,000 regular; 166 combat aircraft.
1 bomber sqn with 9 Canberra B-2.
1 light bomber sqn with 14 Buccaneer Mk-50.
1 fighter-bomber sqn with 20 Mirage III-EZ (AS-20-30 ASM).
1 fighter squadron with 21 F-86 Sabre.
1 interceptor sqn with 16 Mirage IIICZ (R-530 AAM).
75 MB-326 Impala armed trainers.
1 reconnaissance sqn with 4 Mirage IIIRZ.
1 maritime recce sqn with 7 Shackleton.
2 transport sqns with 9 Transall, 20 C-47, C-54, and 7 C-130B/E.
1 Viscount medium and 9 P-166 light transports.
60 Alouette II/III, 8 Wasp, 16 Super Frelon and 16 SA-330 Puma helicopters (of an order for 20).
Other aircraft include 200 Harvard armed trainers.
The Cactus (Crotale) short-range SAM system is being introduced and some units may now be operational.
RESERVES: 3,000 Citizen Air Force, operates 8 Impala squadrons,
200 Harvard armed trainers, and some C-47 transports and Cessna 185. Para-Military Forces: 75,000 Kommandos organized and trained as a Home Guard.
TANZANIA
Population: 13,900,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 11,100.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.3 billion.
Defence budget 1968-69:190,300,000 shillings ($26,640,000). 7.14 shillings=$1 1July 1971. 7.1 shillings=$1 1July 1972. Army: 10,000.* (*Spares are short and not all equipment is serviceable.)
4 infantry battalions.
20 Chinese T-59 med tks; 14 Chinese T-62 lt tks; some BTR-40 and -152 APC; Soviet field artillery and Chinese mortars. Navy: 600.
6 patrol boats. Air Force: 500; no combat aircraft.
1 An-2, 5 DHC-3 Otter and 12 DHC-4 Caribou transports.
7 Piaggio P-149 trainers. Para-Military Forces: A police marine unit.
UGANDA
Population: 10,450,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 12,600.
Estimated GNP 1970: $1.06 billion.
Defence Budget 1968-69: 120,540,000 shillings ($16,875,000). 7.14 shillings=$1 1July 1971. 7.1 shillings=$1 1July 1972. Army: 12,000.
2 brigades each of 2 infantry battalions.
2 border guard battalions.
1 mechanized battalion.
1 parachute/commando battalion.
1 artillery regiment.
12 M-4 med tanks; 15 Ferret scout cars; 36 OT-64B APC (perhaps half are operational); (36 Saladin on order). Air Force: 600; 21 combat aircraft.
1 fighter squadron with 7 MiG-15 and MiG-17.
14 Magister armed trainers.
2 AB-206 and 2 Scout helicopters.
1 Caribou transport; P-149 and 12 L-29 Delfin trainers; 7 Piper light aircraft.
ZAIRE REPUBLIC (CONGO (Kinshasa))
Population: 23,300,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 50,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: $1.9 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 42 million francs ($84,000,000). 0.5 zaire francs=$1. Army: 49,000.
1 armoured car regiment.
1 mechanized battalion.
14 infantry battalions.
7 parachute battalions.
4 other battalions.
The above, together with support units, form 1 parachute division and 7 brigade groups.
60 AML armd cars; M-3 and 30 Ferret scout cars (less than half operational). Coast, River and Lake Guard: 200.
1 river boat.
1 patrol boat.
6 patrol craft. Air Force: 800; 41 combat aircraft.
1 fighter wing with 15 MB-326GB; 21 AT-6G and 5 T-28 armed trainers.
1 Logistics wing with 9 C-47, 4 C-54, 2 DC-6 and 3 C-130 transports.
1 training wing with 8 T-6 and 12 SF-260M trainers.
1 helicopter sqn with 1 Alouette II, 14 Alouette III and 7 SA-330 Puma. Para-Military Forces: 8 National Guard and 6 Gendarmerie battalions.
Chinese defence policy operates at the two extremes of People's War and nuclear deterrence. The former aims by mass-mobilization of the country's population to repel any conventional land invasion, the latter to deter strategic nuclear attack.
China's three million regular forces are equipped and trained for the environment of People's War. Infantry and artillery units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) account for most of the manpower and 130 of the 150 divisions (10 more than last year). There are only 5 armoured divisions. The naval and air elements of the PLA have been increased but have still little more than a tenth of the total manpower compared with over a third in the Soviet Union. They are organized mainly to support defensive operations. The PLA lacks the facilities and logistic support for protracted large-scale military operations outside China but is gradually acquiring such means and is improving its general conventional forces which, in terms of equipment and general mobility, compare poorly with major industrial countries and specifically with the Soviet Union.
There is now series production in China of the Tu-16 medium bomber, MiG-19 and-21, the F-9 twin-jet Chinese designed fighter, T-59 medium, T-62 light and T-60 amphibious tanks (the last an adaptation of the Soviet PT-76) and APC. Medium-range diesel submarines (copied from Soviet R-class) and missile-equipped destroyers and patrol boats are being produced for the Chinese navy. China's apparent attempt to build her first nuclear-powered attack submarine (armed with conventional torpedoes) continues. The country is divided into 11 Military Regions. The PLA is not, however, deployed evenly, nor are equipment levels standard; it has a wide range of administrative and other non-military duties. Most of the PLA regular formations are concentrated in the coastal provinces, in the Yangste and Yellow River basins, and in the North-East. Little movement of forces has been reported since the northward shift of some units in 1969-70 following the Sino-Soviet border incidents. 15,000 to 20,000 construction troops and engineers are estimated to be in North Vietnam and Northern Laos.
The High Command of the PLA was thrown into disarray in September 1971 by the disappearance from the political scene of Defence Minister Lin Piao, the Chief of the General Staff and three other Service Commanders, and it was subsequently asserted that they were killed in an air crash in Mongolia while attempting to flee the country after an abortive coupd'etat. No replacements have yet been announced publicly. This most serious internal political crisis is likely to have undermined morale in the officer corps, besides causing a hiatus in defence planning. It is not possible as yet to assess the effects on the PLA's combat efficiency.
Bilateral Agreements China has a 30-year Treaty of Alliance and Friendship with the Soviet Union signed in 1950 which contains mutual defence obligations, but this may no longer be in force. China has a mutual defence agreement with North Korea dating from 1961 and an agreement to provide free military aid.
There is probably a well-defined though unpublicized defence commitment to North Vietnam and certainly an agreement to give military aid, last renewed in June 1972. Chinese military aid has been offered to an increasing number of countries, in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and East Europe in the past year. The main recipients over the last few years have been Tanzania and Pakistan but supplies to the latter seem to have tapered off since the Indo-Pakistan War and the establishment of Bangladesh. China has non-aggression pacts with Afghanistan, Burma and Cambodia.
Nuclear Weapons Three nuclear tests were conducted during the past year, all in the low to intermediate range (20- 200 kilotons). One, on 18 March 1972, was not announced by China. Since 1964 fourteen tests have been carried out, with the probable intention of developing a MT bomb or warhead. China has her own sources of natural uranium and the plant for its enrichment to weapons-grade, and may have accumulated sufficient fissile material for about 150 fusion and fission weapons.
As a means of delivery both aircraft and missiles are available. The F-9 fighter could be suitable for tactical missions and for longer ranges there are some 100 Tu-16 medium bombers, with a radius of action of about 1,600 miles. Some 20-30 MRBM now appear to have been deployed, mainly in North-Eastern China. An IRBM with a range of 1,500 to 2,500 miles (sufficient to reach Moscow and most parts of Asia) has been developed and may have been deployed. A modest force of these two classes of missile could now be under the control of the Second Artillery, which is believed to be the PLA's missile arm. A longer-range IRBM or an ICBM may be under development and a full-range ICBM test, which would require impact areas in the Indian or Pacific Oceans, seems probable before long. An instrumentation ship which could be used for monitoring such a test has been built.
КИТАЙ
Китайская оборонная политика основана на двух крайностях - народной войне и ядерном сдерживании. Первое направлено на массовую мобилизацию населения страны для отражения вторжения обычных сухопутных войск, второе - на сдерживание стратегического ядерного нападения.
Три миллиона регулярных войск Китая оснащены и обучены для условий народной войны. Пехотные и артиллерийские подразделения Народно-освободительной армии (НОАК) составляют большую часть живой силы и 130 из 150 дивизий (на 10 больше, чем в прошлом году). Есть только 5 бронетанковых дивизий. Военно-морской и воздушный компоненты НОАК были увеличены, но по-прежнему составляют немногим более одной десятой общей численности личного состава по сравнению с более чем одной третью в Советском Союзе. Они организованы главным образом для поддержки оборонительных операций. НОАК не располагает средствами и материально-технической поддержкой для проведения длительных крупномасштабных военных операций за пределами Китая, но постепенно приобретает такие средства и совершенствует свои обычные силы общего назначения, которые с точки зрения оснащенности и общей мобильности слабо сопоставимы с крупными промышленно развитыми странами и, в частности, с Советским Союзом.
В настоящее время в Китае серийно производятся средний бомбардировщик Ту-16, МиГ-19 и МиГ-21, двухдвигательный китайский истребитель F-9, средний танк Т-59, легкий танк Т-62 и танк-амфибия Т-60 (последний - адаптация Советского ПТ-76) и БТР. Для ВМФ Китая производятся дизельные подводные лодки средней дальности (копия с Советского R-класса), ракетные эсминцы и патрульные катера. Очевидная попытка Китая построить свою первую атомную подводную лодку (вооруженную обычными торпедами) продолжается. Страна разделена на 11 военных округов. Однако НОАК развертывается неравномерно, равно как и уровни оснащения не являются стандартными; она выполняет широкий круг административных и других невоенных обязанностей. Большинство регулярных формирований НОАК сосредоточено в прибрежных провинциях, в бассейнах рек Янцзы и Хуанхэ, а также на северо-востоке. Небольшое перемещение сил было отмечено на севере и смена некоторых частей в 1969-70 после китайско-советских пограничных инцидентов. По оценкам, от 15 000 до 20 000 строительных войск и инженеров находятся в Северном Вьетнаме и Северном Лаосе.
Верховное командование НОАК были приведено в беспорядок в сентябре 1971 с исчезновение с политической сцены министр обороны Линь Бяо, начальник Генерального штаба и трех других командующих, как впоследствии утверждали, они погибли в авиакатастрофе в Монголии при попытке бежать из страны после неудачной попытки переворота. Никаких замен пока публично не объявлено. Этот наиболее серьезный внутриполитический кризис, вероятно, подорвал моральный дух офицерского корпуса, а также привел к перерыву в оборонном планировании. Оценить влияние на боеспособность НОАК пока не представляется возможным.
Двусторонние соглашения У Китая есть 30-летний договор о Союзе и дружбе с Советским Союзом, подписанный в 1950 году, который содержит взаимные оборонные обязательства, но он может больше не действовать. Китай имеет соглашение о взаимной обороне с Северной Кореей 1961 года и соглашение о предоставлении бесплатной военной помощи.
Существует, вероятно, хорошо определенное, хотя и неопубликованное оборонное обязательство перед Северным Вьетнамом и, конечно, соглашение о предоставлении военной помощи, последнее возобновлено в июне 1972 года. В прошлом году китайская военная помощь предлагалась все большему числу стран Азии, Африки, Ближнего Востока и Восточной Европы. Основными получателями в течение последних нескольких лет были Танзания и Пакистан, но поставки в последние, похоже, сократились после индо-пакистанской войны и создания Бангладеш. Китай заключил пакт о ненападении с Афганистаном, Бирмой и Камбоджой.
Ядерное оружие За прошедший год было проведено три ядерных испытания, все они проводились в диапазоне от 20 до 200 килотонн. Один из них, 18 марта 1972 года, не был объявлен Китаем. С 1964 года было проведено 14 испытаний с вероятным намерением разработать мегатонную бомбу или боеголовку. Китай имеет свои собственные источники природного урана и завод по его обогащению до оружейного, и, возможно, накопили достаточно расщепляющегося материала для о 150 зарядов.
В качестве средства доставки доступны как самолеты, так и ракеты. Истребитель F-9 может быть пригоден для тактических задач, а для более дальних дистанций - около 100 средних бомбардировщиков Ту-16, с радиусом действия около 1600 миль. Сейчас каких-то 20-30 БРСД были развернуты, главным образом в Северо-Восточном Китае. БРСД с дальностью от 1500 до 2500 миль (достаточно, чтобы достичь Москвы и большей части Азии) были разработаны и может быть развернуты. Небольшие силы этих двух классов ракет теперь могут находиться под контролем Второй артиллерии, которая, как полагают, является ракетным войсками НОАК. Возможно, разрабатывается более дальняя БРСД или МБР, а полномасштабное испытание МБР, для которого потребуются районы действия в Индийском или Тихом океанах, представляется вероятным в скором времени. Был построен приборный корабль, который можно было бы использовать для мониторинга таких испытаний.
CHINA
Population, GNP .and -Defence Expenditure - see note on facing page.
Military service: Army, 2 years; Air Force, 3 years; Navy, 4 years.
Total regular forces: 2,880,000 (including construction engineer troops). 2.46 renminbi=$1 1July 1971. 2.27 renminbi=$1 1July 1972. Strategic Forces IRBM: 15-20.
MRBM: 20-30.
Aircraft: up to 100 Tu-16. Army: 2,500,000 (including construction engr tps).
5 armoured divisions.
120 infantry divisions.
3 cavalry divisions.
2 airborne divisions.
About 20 artillery divisions.
These are supported by signals, engineer, railway and motor transport units.
Heavy equipment consists of Soviet items supplied up to 1960 including
IS-2 tks and 152mm and 203mm artillery; Soviet T-34 and T-54, and Chinese T-59 (version of T-54) med tks;
T-60 (PT-76 type) amphibious tks; T-62 lt tks; and APC; SP arty incl SU-76, SU-100 and ISU-122.
DEPLOYMENT:
China is now divided into 11 Military Regions (MR), as Inner Mongolia has been incorporated in the Peking MR and
Tibet in the Chengtu MR.
The military commander of each Region commands the regular air and naval forces assigned to it, and the civilian militia.
The MR are in turn divided into Military Districts (MD), with usually two or three Districts to a Region.
It is believed that basically one Army is assigned to each MD, giving a total of about 30 Armies.
An Army generally consists of three infantry divisions, three artillery regiments and, in some cases, three armoured regiments.
Of the 5 armoured divisions in the PLA, 2 or 3 are probably kept in the Peking and Shenyang Regions.
The geographical distribution of the divisions (excluding artillery) is believed to be:
North and North-East China (Shenyang* and Peking* MR): 40 divisions.
East and South-East China (Tsinan, Nanking and Foochow MR): 25 divisions.
South-Central China (Canton (Includes Hainan island) and Wuhan MR): 20 divisions.
Mid-West China(Lanchow MR): 15 divisions.
West and South-West China (Sinkiang,* Chengtu* and Kunming MR): 30 divisions.
Laos and North Vietnam: Some construction engineer troops and supporting elements, in all 15-20,000 men.
(*There are in addition, 2 or 3 divisions of border troops in each of these MR.) Navy: 160,000 (including Naval Air Force and 28,000 Marines).
1 G-class submarine (with ballistic missile tubes)*. (*China is not known to have any missiles for this boat.)
32 fleet submarines. (Also about 10 older, training vessels.)
3 coastal submarines.
4 destroyers.
9 destroyer escorts.
14 patrol escorts.
24 submarine chasers.
15 missile patrol boats.
30 minesweepers.
40 landing ships.
45 auxiliary minesweepers.
220 MTB and hydrofoils (less than 100 tons).
320 motor gunboats (Many less than 100 tons).
530 landing ships/landing craft (Many less than 100 tons).
DEPLOYMENT:
North Sea Fleet: 240 vessels.
The main bases are at Tsingtao and Lushun; deployed along the coast from the mouth of the Yalu river in the north to Lienyunkang in the south.
East Sea Fleet: 700 vessels.
Bases are at Shanghai and Chou Shan; deployed along the coast from Lienyunkang in the north to Chaoan Wan in the south.
South Sea Fleet: 300 vessels.
Bases are at Huangpu and Chanchiang; deployed from Chaoan Wan in the north to the North Vietnamese frontier in the south.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: 20,000; over 500 shore-based combat aircraft, including about
100 Il-28 torpedo-carrying and some Tu-2 light bombers and substantial numbers of MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters.
Though under Navy command, the fighters are fully integrated into the air defence system. Air Force: 220,000 (including 85,000 air defence personnel); about 3,600 combat aircraft.
About 100 Tu-16 and a few Tu-4 medium bombers.
200 Il-28 and 100 Tu-2 light bombers.
About 1,700 MiG-15 and MiG-17; up to 1,000 MiG-19, 75 MiG-21 and some 200 F-9 fighters.
About 400 transport aircraft and 300 helicopters, including some An-2, Il-14 and Il-18 transports and Mi-4 helicopters
(these could be supplemented by about 350 aircraft of the Civil Air Bureau).
There is an air-defence system, initially developed to defend the eastern seaboard of China and now greatly expanded,
based on early warning/control radar, interceptor aircraft and several hundred SA-2 SAM deployed in up to 50 sites.
Para-Military Forces:
About 300,000 security and border troops, including 19 infantry-type divisions and 30 independent regiments stationed in the frontier areas;
the public security force and a civilian militia with an effective element of probably not more than 5 million;
production and construction corps in a number of Military Regions, including those adjoining the northern frontier.
POPULATION, GNP AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE Population Most calculations of the population of China have, until recently, been based on the figures officially published on 1 January 1958, when the total was given as 646,530,000. Estimates have reached as high as 850 million. In an atlas just published by the China Cartographic Institute, however, a population figure of 697,260,000 was given for 1970. If each of these Chinese figures is accepted the annual rate of increase between 1958 and 1970 is only 0.6 per cent, well below typical European rates, which seems improbable. One of the two figures would appear to be inaccurate and no satisfactory basis for calculation thus emerges from them.
Gross National Product Estimates of Chinese GNP have varied greatly. A Japanese estimate in 1971 was $75 billion. The Chinese Prime Minister mentioned a figure of S120 billion as the gross value of industrial, transport and agricultural production, though this is not, of course, quite the same as GNP. Recent British figures have been as high as $135 billion. It is difficult to choose from this very wide range.
Defence Expenditure China has not made public any Budget figures since 1960 and there is no general agreement on the amount or the percentage of GNP that China devotes to defence. Expenditure seems unlikely to be less than $8 to 10 billion, but some British estimates put the figure as high as $16 billion.
НАСЕЛЕНИЕ, ВНП И РАСХОДЫ НА ОБОРОНУ Население Большинство расчетов численности населения Китая до недавнего времени основывались на цифрах, официально опубликованных 1 января 1958 года, когда общая численность населения составляла 646 530 000 человек. Оценочно увеличилась на 850 миллионов. В атласе только что опубликованные в Китае картографический институт, однако, численность населения в 697,260,000 было дано в 1970 году. Если принять каждый из этих показателей по Китаю, то ежегодные темпы роста в период 1958-1970 годов составят лишь 0,6%, что значительно ниже типичных европейских показателей, что представляется маловероятным. Одна из этих двух цифр представляется неточной, и поэтому из них не вытекает удовлетворительная основа для расчетов.
Валовой национальный продукт Оценки китайского ВНП сильно варьировались. По японским оценкам, в 1971 году она составляла 75 млрд. долл. Премьер-министр Китая назвал цифру в 120 миллиардов как валовую стоимость промышленного, транспортного и сельскохозяйственного производства, хотя это, конечно, не совсем то же самое, что ВНП. Недавние британские цифры достигли 135 миллиардов долларов. Трудно выбрать из этого очень широкого диапазона.
Оборонные расходы Китай не публиковал никаких бюджетных показателей с 1960 года, и нет общего согласия относительно суммы или процентной доли ВНП, которые Китай выделяет на оборону. Расходы вряд ли будут меньше, чем $8 до $ 10 миллиардов, но некоторые британские оценкам, этот показатель достигает 16 миллиардов долларов.
Bilateral Agreements The United States has bilateral defence treaties with Japan, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. She has a number of military arrangements with other countries of the region. She provides significant military aid on either a grant or credit basis to the Republic of China, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand and South Vietnam. She sells military equipment to many countries, notably Australia, the Republic of China and Japan. For grant military assistance purposes, Cambodia, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China are considered forward defence areas. Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam receive grant military aid assistance direct from the US Department of Defence budget, the only countries in the world to do so. There are military facilities agreements with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. There is a major base at Guam. Anew communication station is being constructed on Diego Garcia Island in the Chagos Archipelago under agreements signed in 1971 with Britain.
The Soviet Union has treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with India, Bangladesh, Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Military assistance agreements exist with Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Important Soviet military aid is also given to Nepal and Afghanistan.
Multilateral Agreements In 1954 the United States, Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand signed the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, which came into force in 1955 and brought into being SEATO. They committed themselves to consult with a view to joint defence in the event of direct or in direct aggression against a member country or against the so-called 'protocol states' of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. However, since 1955 and 1956 respectively, Cambodia and Laos have not accepted the protection of SEATO. The treaty area is the general area of South East Asia and the South-West Pacific, below latitude 21R30' North. SEATO has no central command structure and forces remain under national control. In 1969 Britain ceased to declare ground forces to the contingency plans for SEATO and France has no forces declared. Pakistan had already announced her progressive disengagement from the Alliance before the Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971, as a result of which Bangladesh became an independent state, and withdrew from membership in July 1972.
Australia, New Zealand and the United States are the members of a tripartite treaty known as ANZUS, which was signed in 1951 and is of indefinite duration. Under this treaty each agrees to 'act to meet the common danger' in the event of armed attack on either metropolitan or island territory of any one of them, or on armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Britain have agreed five-power defence arrangements, ANZUK, relating to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, which came into effect on 1November 1971. These arrangements, which replaced the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement of 1957, state that, in the event of any armed attack or threat of attack externally organized or supported against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should betaken, jointly or separately. Britain, Australia and New Zealand maintain land and naval forces in Singapore and Australia air forces in Malaysia and Singapore.
ДРУГИЕ АЗИАТСКИЕ СТРАНЫ И АВСТРАЛИЯ
Двусторонние соглашения США имеют двусторонние оборонные договоры с Японией, КНР, Республикой Корея и Филиппинами. Имеет ряд военных договоренностей с другими странами региона. Они оказывают значительную военную помощь на безвозмездной или кредитной основе Китайской Республике, Камбодже, Индии, Индонезии, Республике Корея, Лаосу, Малайзии, Пакистану, Сингапуру, Таиланду и Южному Вьетнаму. Они продают военную технику во многие страны, в частности в Австралию, Китайскую Республику и Японию. Для целей предоставления военной помощи Камбоджа, Республика Корея и Китайская республика считаются передовыми районами обороны. Лаос, Камбоджа, Таиланд и Южный Вьетнам получают безвозмездную военную помощь непосредственно из бюджета Министерства обороны США - единственные страны мира, которые делают это. Имеются соглашения о военных объектах с Австралией, Республикой Корея, Филиппинами и Японией. На Гуаме находится крупная база. Новая станция связи строится на острове Диего-Гарсия архипелага Чагос в соответствии с соглашениями, подписанными в 1971 году с Великобританией.
Советский Союз имеет договоры о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи с Индией, Бангладеш, Монголией и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой. Существуют соглашения о военной помощи со Шри-Ланкой (Цейлон) и Народно-Демократической Республикой Вьетнам. Важные советские военные поставки также Непалу и Афганистану.
Многосторонние договоренности В 1954 году Соединенные Штаты, Австралия, Великобритания, Франция, Новая Зеландия, Пакистан, Филиппины и Таиланд подписали Договор о коллективной обороне в Юго-Восточной Азии, который вступил в силу в 1955 году и положил начало SEATO. Они обязались проводить консультации в целях совместной обороны в случае прямой или непрямой агрессии против страны-члена или против так называемых "протокольных государств" Камбоджи, Лаоса и Южного Вьетнама. Однако, в 1955 и 1956 соответственно, Камбоджа и Лаос еще не приняли покровительство SEATO. Договорным районом является общая территория Юго-Восточной Азии и юго-западной части Тихого океана, расположенная ниже 21R30' северной широты. SEATO не имеет центральной структуры командования, и силы остаются под национальным контролем. В 1969 году Великобритания прекратила объявлять сухопутных войск планы для SEATO и Франция не имеет силы объявили. Пакистан уже объявил о своем постепенном выходе из союза до индо-пакистанской войны в декабре 1971 года, в результате которой Бангладеш стала независимым государством, и вышел из него в июле 1972 года.
Австралия, Новая Зеландия и Соединенные Штаты являются членами трехстороннего договора, известного как ANZUS, который был подписан в 1951 году и действует бессрочно. В соответствии с этим договором каждый из них соглашается "действовать в ответ на общую опасность" в случае вооруженного нападения на метрополию или островную территорию любого из них или на вооруженные силы, морские или воздушные суда в Тихом океане. Австралия, Малайзия, Новая Зеландия, Сингапур и Великобритания согласовали соглашения об обороне пяти держав, ANZUK, касающиеся обороны Малайзии и Сингапура, которые вступили в силу 1 ноября 1971 года. Этот договор, который заменил англо-малазийский оборонительный договор 1957 г., предполагает, что, в случае какого-либо вооруженного нападения или угрозы нападения извне против Малайзии или Сингапура, пять правительства будут консультироваться друг с другом, чтобы решить, какие меры следует брать совместно или отдельно. Великобритания, Австралия и Новая Зеландия поддерживают сухопутные и военно-морские силы в Сингапуре и ВВС Австралии в Малайзии и Сингапуре.
AFGHANISTAN
Population: 17,900,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 84,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.6 million.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 1,600 million afghanis ($35,500,000). 45 afghanis=$1. Army: 78,000.
2 armoured divisions.
4 infantry divisions.
1 infantry brigade group (Royal Bodyguard).
T-34 and T-54 med tks; Snapper ATGW. Air Force: 6,000; 120 combat aircraft.
3 light bomber squadrons with Il-28.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with Su-7.
4 fighter-bomber squadrons with MiG-15/17.
3 interceptor squadrons with MiG-21.
2 squadrons with Yak-12, An-2, Il-14 transports.
1 squadron with Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters.
SA-2 SAM. Para-Military Forces: 21,000 Gendarmerie.
AUSTRALIA
Population: 13,000,000.
Military service: Two years* selective.
Total armed forces: 88,110.
Estimated GNP 1971: $US 43.21 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: $A1.257 million ($US 1.500 million). $A0.89=$US 1 1July 1971. $A0.84=$US 1 1July 1972. Army: 47,760 (Conscripts 18,960).
1 tank regiment.
3 cavalry regiments.
9 infantry battalions.
2 battalions of the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR).
1 Special Air Service (SAS) regiment.
1 medium artillery regiment.
3 field artillery regiments.
1 light anti-aircraft regiment.
1 aviation regiment.
6 signals regiments.
3 field engineer regiments.
7 construction and survey squadrons.
1 Logistic Support Force.
143 Centurion med tks; 265 Ferret scout cars; 758 M-113 APC;
260 105mm how including M-56 105mm pack how;
47 Sioux and Alouette III hels; 26 light aircraft.
DEPLOYMENT: 1 bn gp and 1 sig regt in Singapore;
2 PIR bns in Papua-New Guinea.
RESERVES: 27,100. The Citizen Military Force of 26,500 is intended to form 24 infantry battalions with supporting arms and services;
Emergency Reserve 600. Navy: 17,500.
4 Oberon-class submarines.
1 aircraft carrier.
3 ASW destroyers with Tartar SAM and Ikara ASW msls.
4 destroyers.
6 destroyer escorts with Ikara.
4 coastal minesweepers.
2 minehunters.
20 patrol boats.
1 fast troop transport (ex-aircraft carrier).
1 destroyer tender.
FLEET AIR ARM
2 fighter-bomber sqns with A-4G Skyhawk.
2 ASW sqns with S-2E Tracker.
2 ASW helicopter sqns with Wessex 31B.
1 Helicopter sqn with Iroquois and Scout.
1 training sqn with Aermacchi MB-326H, TA-4G and A-4G.
RESERVES: 6,350. Navy Citizen Military Force:
5,400; Emergency Reserve 950. Air Force: 22,850; 210 combat aircraft.
1 bomber squadron with Canberra B-20
2 fighter squadrons with F-4E.
4 interceptor/strike squadrons with Mirage IIIO.
1 MR squadron with 10 P-3B Orion and 1 MR squadron with 12 P-2H Neptune.
75 MB-326 trainers.
2 tpt sqns with 24 C-130, 1 tpt sqn with 2 BAC-III, 10 HS-748 and 3 Mystere 20 and 2 tpt sqns with 24 Caribou.
2 helicopter squadrons with Iroquois.
(24 F-111C are on order.)
DEPLOYMENT: 2 sqns of Mirage IIIO in Malaysia/Singapore.
RESERVES: 1,520. Citizen Air Force 780; Emergency Reserve 740.
BURMA
Population: 28,900,000.
Muitary service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 148,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $3.5 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: 490 million kyat ($90,700,000). 4.77 kyat=$1 1July 1971. 5.4 kyat=$1 1July 1972. Army: 135,000.
6 regional commands comprising approximately
70 infantry battalions.
3 infantry divisions under central control.
The army is largely an infantry force, with some artillery, engineer and signals battalions.
It is organized chiefly for counter-insurgency and internal security duties.
Comet med tks; Humber armd cars; Ferret scout cars; mainly American, British and Yugoslav light arms. Navy: 6,000.
1 frigate.
1 escort minesweeper.
2 coastal escorts.
5 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
34 river and patrol gunboats.
7 motor gunboats (less than 100 tons).
About 100 river craft. Air Force: 7,000; 21 combat aircraft.
18 AT-33 and 3 Vampire armed trainers.
18 C-47, 8 Otter, 6 Beech-18 and 5 Cessna tpts.
5 Sioux, 9 Huskie, 6 Alouette III and 10 Shawnee helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 25,000.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)
Population: 14,700,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.1 billion.
Total armed forces: 500,000.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 24,500 million new Taiwan dollars ($601,250,000). $NT 40=$1. Army: 350,000.
12 heavy divisions.
6 light divisions.
2 armoured brigades.
1 armoured infantry regiment.
2 airborne brigades.
4 Special Forces Groups.
1 SAM battalion with HAWK.
1 SAM bn and 1 SAM bty with Nike-Hercules.
M-47 and M-48 med tks; M-24 and M-41 lt tks;
M-18 tk destroyers; LVT-4 and M-113 APC;
105mm and 155mm guns; SAM.
DEPLOYMENT: 60,000 on Quemoy; 20,000 on Matsu. Navy: 35,000.
11 destroyers.
18 destroyer escorts.
6 escorts.
12 submarine chasers.
8 patrol vessels.
3 fleet minesweepers.
15 coastal minesweepers.
2 inshore minesweepers.
21 tank landing ships.
9 medium landing ships.
30 landing craft. Marine Corps: 35,000.
2 divisions. Air Force: 80,000; 237 combat aircraft.
80 F-100A/D fighter-bombers.
70 F-5A tactical fighters.
55 F-104A/G interceptors.
20 F-86F interceptors.
8 RF-104G and 4 RF-101 recce aircraft.
About 95 C-46, C-47 and C-119 transports.
100 trainers.
10 UH-19 helicopters.
INDIA
Population: 571,000,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 960,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $49.4 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 14,084 million rupees ($1,817 million). 7.5 rupees=$1 1July 1971. 7.75 rupees=$1 1July 1972. Army: 840,000.
2 armoured divisions.
3 independent armoured brigades.
13 infantry divisions.
10 mountain divisions.
6 independent infantry brigades.
2 parachute brigades.
About 20 AA artillery units.
200 Centurion Mk 5/7, 250 Sherman,450 T-54 and T-55 and 300 Vijayanta med tks; 150 PT-76 and 140 AMX-13 lt tks;
OT-62 and Mk 2/4A APC;
about 3,000 guns, mostly 25-pounders, but incl Model 56 105mm pack how and about 350 100mm and 140 130mm guns;
SS-11 and ENTAC ATGW. Navy: 28,000.
1 16,000-ton aircraft carrier.
4 submarines (ex-Soviet F-class).
2 cruisers.
3 destroyers.
8 destroyer escorts (incl 5 ex-Soviet Petya-class).
8 frigates.
6 Osa-class patrol boats.
9 patrol boats (4 less than 100 tons).
8 minesweepers (4 inshore).
1 landing ship.
2 landing craft.
11 seaward defence boats (6 less than 100 tons).
The naval air forces include 33 Sea Hawk attack and 17 Alize maritime patrol aircraft, and 2 Sea King and 10 Alouette III helicopters.
10 Sea Hawk, 5 Alize and 2 Alouette can be carried in the aircraft carrier at any one time. Air Force: 92,000; 650 combat aircraft. (8 to 25 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
4 light bomber squadrons with Canberra.
6 fighter-bomber squadrons with Su-7.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with HF-24 Marut 1A.
7 fighter-bomber squadrons with Hunter F-6.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with Mystere IV.
8 interceptor squadrons with MiG-21.
8 interceptor squadrons with Gnat.
1 reconnaissance squadron with Canberra PR-57, Mystere IV and Dakota.
1 maritime recce sqn of L-1049 Super Constellation.
13 tpt sqns with C-47, C-119, Il-14, An-12, Otter, HS-748 and Caribou.
About 12 sqns of Mi-4, Alouette III and Mi-8 hels.
About 20 SA-2 SAM sites. Para-Military Forces: About 100,000, in Border Security Force.
INDONESIA
Population: 128,500,000.
Selective military service.
Total armed forces: 317,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $12.3 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 119 billion rupiahs ($286,700,000). 378 rupiahs=$1 1July 1971. 415 rupiahs=$1 1July 1972. Army: 250,000.
15 inf bdes, formed from about 100 inf bns.
8 armoured battalions.
1 paracommando regiment (RPKAD).
The KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command) consists of about six bdes and includes paratroops and armour, artillery and engineers.
About one-third of the army is engaged in civil and administrative duties.
Stuart, AMX-13 and PT-76 lt tks; Saladin armd cars; Ferret scout cars; Saracen and BTR-152 APC;
artillery includes Soviet 57mm AA guns and associated radar. Navy: 34,000 (incl 14,000 Marines).* (*Only a very small part of the navy is operational.)
12 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class).
1 cruiser (ex-Soviet Sverdlov-class).
4 destroyers (ex-Soviet Skory-class).
11 frigates (including 7 ex-Soviet Riga-class).
18 coastal escorts (14 ex-Soviet, 4 ex-USA).
12 Komar-class patrol boats with Styx SSM.
8 patrol boats.
21 motor torpedo boats.
6 fleet minesweepers.
20 coastal minesweepers (6 ex-USA).
18 motor gunboats.
25 seaward defence boats (less than 100 tons).
6 landing ships.
7 landing craft.
2 Marine brigades.
NAVAL AIR ARM This has been reduced to a few helicopters and is virtually non-operational Air Force: 33,000; about 120 combat aircraft.*
(*Most of the Soviet-supplied combat aircraft, and the SA-2 have not been used for some years. Few can be regarded as operational.)
22 Tu-16 and 10 Il-28. 5 B-25 and 4 B-26 light bombers.
13 F-51D light-strike aircraft.
About 4 MiG-15, 8 MiG-17 and 15 MiG-21 interceptors (mostly in storage).
About 50 tpts including Il-14, C-130B, C-47, An-12 and Skyvan.
About 30 hels, including Mi-4, Mi-6 and Bell H-13/204.
At least 3 SA-2 sites (non-operational). Para-Military Forces:A police Mobile Brigade of about 20,000; about 100,000 Militia.
JAPAN
Population: 105,800,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 260,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $255 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 800 billion yen ($2,600 million). 360 yen=$1 1July 1971. 308 yen=$1 1July 1972. Army: 180,000.
1 mechanized division.
12 infantry divisions (7,000-9,000 men each).
1 airborne brigade.
1 artillery brigade.
1 signal and 5 engineer brigades.
1 helicopter brigade.
3 SAM groups with HAWK (90 launchers).
380 Type 61 and 15 M-4 med tks; 30 M-24 and 140 M-41 lt tks; Type 60 APC;
30 M-52 105mm and 10 M-44 155mm; 203mm how; Type 60 twin 106mm SP recoilless rifles; Type 64 ATGW;
125 aircraft and 220 helicopters.
RESERVES: 35,250. Navy: 39,000.
11 submarines.
1 SAM destroyer with Tartar.
27 destroyers.
12 destroyer escorts/frigates.
20 submarine chasers.
2 minelayers.
42 coastal minesweepers.
5 motor torpedo boats (2 less than 100 tons).
3 tank landing ships.
1 medium landing ship.
6 landing craft.
42 small landing craft (less than 100 tons).
Naval air component: 200 combat aircraft.
9 maritime recce sqns with SP-2H, S-2F, P-2J, PS-1 and others.
About 60 helicopters incl S-61, S-62, Vertol 107, CM-34 and UH-19.
RESERVES: 300. Air Force: 41,000; 406 combat aircraft. (18-25 aircraft in a combat squadron.)
7 fighter-bomber squadrons with 230 F-86F.
7 interceptor squadrons with 160 F-104J.
1 reconnaissance squadron with 16 RF-86F (8 of 14 RF-4EJ to be delivered in 1972-73).
3 transport squadrons with 30 C-46, 13 YS-11 and 12 MU-2.
26 helicopters incl S-62 and V-107.
360 trainers incl 55 T-l, 170 T-33, 105 T-34 and 12 F-104 DJ.
4 SAM bns with Nike-Hercules (100 launchers).
A Base Air Defence Ground Environment with 24 control and warning units. Military service: Voluntary; conscription authorized, but not yet in force.
THE KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)
Population: 7,250,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.5 billion.
Total armed forces: 205,200.
Defence budget 1971: 18,650 million riels ($336 million). 55.5 riels=$1. Army: 200,000.
9 static and 3 mobile divs (each of 3 bdes of 4 bns).
300 infantry and commando 'battalions'(companies).
1 tank regiment.
1 armoured car battalion.
3 parachute battalions.
12 field artillery batteries.
20 M-24 and 40 AMX-13 lt tks; 20 M-8 and M-20 armd cars; M-3 scout cars; BTR-152 APC;
105mm hows and Soviet 76mm and 122mm guns; 40mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm AA guns. Navy: 1,400.
2 coastal escort vessels.
2 support gunboats.
2 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
6 various types of patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
4 landing craft of various types. Air Force: 3,800; 15 combat aircraft.
15 T-28 Trojan ground-attack aircraft.
19 C-47, 1 C-54, 2 An-2, and 1 Il-14 transports.
3 MiG-15UTI, 10 GY-80 Horizon and 4 Yak-18 trainers.
5 Alouette II, 8 Alouette III, 1 Mi-4, 2 H-34 and 5 UH-1 helicopters.
Para-Military Forces:150,000.
KOREA--DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)
Population: 14,300,000.
Military service: Army 3 years, Navy and Air Force 4 years.
Total armed forces: 402,500.
Estimated GNP 1971-72: $2.8 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 1,139 million won ($443,100,000). 2.57 won=$1. Army: 360,000.
2 armoured divisions.
20 infantry divisions.
4 independent infantry brigades.
750 T-34 and T-54 med tks; PT-76 lt tks; 950 BA-64, BTR-40 and BTR-152 APC; 200 SU-76 and SU-100 SP guns;
2,000 AA guns incl ZSU-57;
6,000 other guns and mortars up to 152mm calibre;
FROG SSM; SA-2 SAM. Navy: 12,500.
3 submarines (ex-Soviet W-class).
6 Komar and 4 Osa-class FPB with Styx SSM.
3 torpedo boats.
50 high-speed torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
2 fleet minesweepers.
14 patrol vessels (4 less than 100 tons).
35 motor gunboats.
Samlet SSM. Air Force: 30,000; 578 combat aircraft.
70 Il-28 light bombers.
28 Su-7.
380 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers.
100 MiG-21 and some MiG-19 interceptors.
About 40 An-2, Li-2, Il-12 and Il-14 transports.
20 Mi-4 helicopters.
70 Yak-11, Yak-18, MiG-15 and Il-28 trainers. Para-Military Forces: 30,000 security forces and border guards; a civilian militia with a claimed strength of 1,500,000.
KOREA - REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH)
Population: 32,000,000.
Military service: Army/Marines, 2 years; Navy and Air Force, 3 years.
Total armed forces: 634,750.
Estimated GNP 1971: $8.1 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1972: 171 billion won ($427,500,000). 314 won=$1 1July 1971. 400 won=$1 1July 1972. Army: 560,000.
29 infantry divisions (10 in cadre only).
2 armoured brigades.
80 artillery battalions.
1 SSM battalion with Honest John 2 SAM bns with HAWK and 1 with Nike-Hercules.
M-4 and M-48 med tks; Stuart and M-24 lt tks; M-10 and M-36 tk destroyers; M-8 armd cars and M-113 APC;
guns up to 175mm; SSM; SAM.
DEPLOYMENT: 2 inf divs and some engineer units in South Vietnam. Navy: 16,750.
3 destroyers.
3 destroyer escorts.
4 frigates.
6 escort transports.
11 coastal escorts.
12 patrol boats.
10 coastal minesweepers.
20 landing ships. Marine Corps: 33,000.
1 division. Air Force: 25,000; 235 combat aircraft.
18 F-4D fighter-bombers.
110 F-86F fighter-bombers.
77 F-5 tactical fighters.
20 F-86D AWX (with Sidewinder AAM).
10 RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft.
35 transports including C-46, C-47 and C-54.
Helicopters include 6 H-19. Para-Military Forces: A local defence militia, Homeland Reserve Defence Force, 2,000,000.
LAOS
Population: 3,050,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $0.25 billion. 500 kip=$1. 1. ROYAL LAO FORCES
Military service: conscription, term unknown.
Total strength: 74,200.
Estimated defence expenditure 1969-70: 8.5 billion kip ($17,000,000). Army: 72,000.
58 infantry battalions.
1 artillery regt of 4 bns.
M-24 and PT-76 lt tks; M-8 armd cars; M-3 scout cars; BTR-40 and M-113 APC;
85mm guns and 75mm, 105mm and 150mm hows. Navy: about 500.
4 river squadrons consisting of:
26 patrol craft and lighters, 12 landing craft (all under 100 tons, most not operational). Air Force: 1,700; about 65 combat aircraft.
65 T-28A/D light-strike aircraft.
30 C-47 and AC-47 transports and gunships.
About 11 UH-34D and Alouette II/III hels. Para-Military Forces and Irregulars: 36,000. 2 . PATHET-LAO FORCES Total strength about 30,000 men (incl dissident neutralists).
PT-76 lt tks; BTR-40 armd cars; 105mm hows.
The Pathet-Lao are believed to be integrated with about 63,000 regular North Vietnamese combat and logistics troops,
and have received arms and ammunition of Soviet and Chinese origin.
The Pathet-Lao and North Vietnamese control all the eastern half of Laos, and most of the North.
MALAYSIA
Population: 11,200,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 50,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $US 4.36 billion.
Defence budget 1972: $M875 million ($US 314,700,000). $M3.06=$US1 1July 1971. $M2.78= $US1 1July 1972. Army: 43,000.
7 infantry brigades, consisting of:
27 infantry battalions.
3 reconnaissance regiments;
3 artillery regiments.
1 special service unit.
3 signal regiments.
Engineer and administrative units.
Ferret scout cars; 100 Commando APC; 105mm how; 40mm AA guns.
RESERVES: about 50,000. Navy: 3,500.
2 ASW frigates (1 with Seacat SAM).
6 coastal minesweepers.
4 fast patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
24 other patrol boats (less than 100 tons) (4 more to be delivered in 1972).
1 landing ship.
A number of river craft.
RESERVES: 600. Air Force: 4,000; 30 combat aircraft.
16 CA-27 Sabre fighter-bombers.
20 CL-41G Tebuan light training and strike aircraft.
8 Herald and 12 Caribou transports.
5 Dove, 2 HS-125 and 2 Heron liaison aircraft.
23 Alouette III and 14 S-61A helicopters. '
(15 SA Bulldog trainers are on order.) Para-Military Forces: 50,000, 10 bns field police.
MONGOLIA
Population: 1,500,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 29,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $0.84 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 170 million tugrik ($42,500,000). 4 tugrik=$1. Army: 28,000. 2 infantry divisions.
40 T-34 and 100 T-54/55 med tks; 10 SU-100 SP guns; 40 BTR-60 and 50 BTR-152 APC;
100mm and 130mm guns; 152mm gun/hows;
37 mm and 57mm AA guns. Air Force: 1,000 men; no combat aircraft.
Operates in support of the Army, and employs some Soviet technical advisers.
30 An-2, Il-14 and An-24 transports.
Yak-11 and Yak-18 trainers.
10 Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters.
1 SAM battalion with SA-2. Para-Military Forces: about 18,000 security police.
NEW ZEALAND
Population: 2,910,000.
Voluntary military service, supplemented by selective national service of 12 weeks for the Army.
Total armed forces: 12,637.
Estimated GNP 1971: $US 7.47 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: $NZ 128.175.000. ($US 152,600,000). $NZ 0.89= $US1 1July 1971. $NZ 0.84= $US1 1July 1972. Army: 5,449.
1 infantry battalion.
1 artillery battery.
Regular troops also form the nucleus of a Combat Brigade Group, a Logistic Group and a Reserve Brigade Group.
These units would be completed by the mobilization of Territorials.
10 M-41 lt tks; 9 Ferrets cout cars; 41 M-113 APC;
10 5.5-inch med guns, 28 105mm hows, 16 25-pdr guns.
DEPLOYMENT: 1 infantry bn (less 1 company) in Singapore.
RESERVES: 11,405 Territorials. Navy: 2,966.
4 frigates with Seacat SAM (2 with Wasp hels).
2 escort minesweepers.
1 survey ship.
1 research ship.
11 patrol craft (less than 100 tons).
RESERVES: 273 men, 5 patrol craft. Air Force: 4,222; 29 combat aircraft.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with 10 A-4K and 4 TA-4K Skyhawk.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with 10 BAC 167.
5 P-3B Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
5 C-130, 9 Bristol Freighter, Dakota and Devon med transports.
13 Iroquois and 11 Sioux helicopters.
DEPLOYMENT: 1 transport squadron in Singapore (Bristol Freighter tpts and Iroquois hels).
(*This entry relates only to the former West Pakistan except for the figure for GNP, which, since it is for 1971,
also covers the former East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.
No entry is included for the armed forces of Bangladesh because of the difficulty in establishing firm figures for them,)
Population: 51,300,000.
Military service: 2 years selective.
Total armed forces: 395,000*. (* including some 90,000 prisoners of war.)
Estimated GNP 1971: $17 billion*.
Defence budget 1972-73: 4.46 billion rupees ($405,500,000). 4.76 rupees=$1 1July 1971. 11 rupees=$1 1 My 1972. Army: 278,000 (including 25,000 Azad Kashmir troops).
2 armoured divisions.
10 infantry divisions.
1 independent armoured brigade.
1 air defence brigade.
135 M-47, 65 M-48, 50 T-55 and 200 T-59 med tks; 140 M-24, 50 M-41 and 20 PT-76 lt tks; 250 M-113 APC;
about 900 guns incl 25-pounder, 105mm and 155mm hows and 130mm guns; Cobra ATGW;
H-13 hels. Navy: 10,000.
3 submarines.
1 light cruiser/training ship.
4 destroyer escorts.
2 fast frigates.
6 coastal minesweepers.
1 patrol boat.
2 UH-19 air-sea rescue helicopters. Air Force: 17,000; 200 combat aircraft. (With the exceptions noted, combat squadrons have between 12 and 16 aircraft.)
2 light bomber squadrons with B-57B.
2 fighter-bomber squadrons with Mirage IIIE.
6 fighter-bomber/interceptor squadrons with F-86.
4 fighter/ground attack squadrons with MiG-19.
1 interceptor squadron with F-104A.
1 recce squadron with 4 RT-33A, 2 RB-57 and 4 F-104B.
Transports include 8 C-130B and 1 F-27.
35 Sioux, Huskie, Alouette III and Mi-8 helicopters.
PHILIPPINES
Population: 39,000,000.
Selective military service.
Total armed forces: 31,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $7.4 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: 647,893,000 pesos ($92,300,000). 6.43 pesos=$1 1July 1971. 6.8 pesos=$1 1July 1972. Army: 16,000.
2 light infantry divisions (under strength).
2 infantry brigades.
15 engineer construction battalions.
M-4 med tks; M-24 and M-41 lt tks; M-113 APC. Navy: 6,000(including marines and naval engineers).
1 destroyer escort.
4 coastal escorts.
7 patrol vessels.
5 submarine chasers.
35 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
2 coastal minesweepers.
11 landing ships.
1 marine battalion.
5 engineer construction battalions. Air Force: 9,000; 82 combat aircraft.
20 F-5 fighter/ground support aircraft.
40 F-86F day-fighters.
12 T-28 ground support aircraft.
10 T-33 armed trainers.
Transports include 28 C-47 and 1 F-27.
About 15 helicopters, incl UH-1H and H-34.
RESERVES: 17,000. Para-Military Forces: 23,000 Philippine Constabulary and about 400 armed civilian self defence units.
SINGAPORE
Population: 2,150,000.
Military service: 24-36 months.
Total armed forces: 17,100.
Estimated GNP 1971: $US 2.5 billion.
Defence budget 1972-73: $S693 million ($US 249,300,000). $S3.06=$1 1July 1971. $S2.78=$1 1July 1972. Army: 16,000.
1 armoured brigade (3 armoured regiments).
2 infantry bdes incl 6 infantry bns, 1 artillery,
1 engineer and 1 signals bn.
75 AMX-13 tks; V-200 Commando APC; 25-pounder guns; 32 106mm recoilless rifles; 120mm mortars.
RESERVES: 9,000. Navy: 600.
1 seaward defence boat.
6 fast patrol boats.
1 landing ship.
2 landing craft. Air Force: 500; 48 combat aircraft.
1 FGA/recce squadron with 16 Hunter (a further 20 on order).
1 armd trainer squadron with 16 BAC-167 and 16 SF-260.
1 tpt/liaison sqn with 8 Cessna-172 and 2 Airtourer 1 helicopter SAR sqn with 8 Alouette III.
Trainers include Hunter T7, Provost, 6 WA-7, 4 Airtourer.
28 Bloodhound SAM launchers. Para-Military Forces: 2 police companies.
SRI LANKA (CEYLON)
Population: 13,000,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 12,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $19.2 million.
Defence budget 1970-71: 170 million rupees ($28,700,000). 5.9 rupees=$1 1July 1971. 6.4 rupees=$1 1July 1972. Army: 8,500.
2 brigades each of 3 battalions.
6 Saladin armd cars, 12 Ferret scout cars.
RESERVES: 12,000. Navy: 2,300.
1 frigate.
27 small patrol craft.
1 hydrofoil. Air Force: 1,700; 5 combat aircraft.
5 MiG-17 fighters.
1 MiG-15 trainer and 6 Jet Provost.
7 Bell 206, 6 Bell 6-47 and 2 Ka-26 helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 12,800.
THAILAND
Population: 37,950,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 150,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.6 billion.
Defence budget 1971-72: 5,268 million baht ($249,700,000). 20.8 baht=$1 1July 1971. 21.1 baht=$1 1July 1972. Army: 100,000.
4 infantry divisions (including 3 tank battalions).
1 regimental combat team.
1 SAM battery with HAWK.
M-24 and M-41 lt tks; M-8 armd cars; M3A1 scout cars; M-2, M-16 and about 200 M-113 APC;
105mm and 155mm hows;
16 FH-1100 and 6 OH-23F hels. Navy: 20,000 (including 6,500 marines).
1 destroyer escort.
2 frigates (3 more are on order).
1 escort minesweeper.
17 patrol vessels.
4 coastal minesweepers.
2 coastal minelayers.
11 gunboats (1 less than 100 tons).
3 patrol gunboats.
8 landing ships.
8 landing craft.
1 maritime recce squadron with HU-16 and S-2. Air Force: 30,000; 144 combat aircraft.
11 F-5A and F-5B fighter-bombers.
20 F-86F day fighters.
2 RT-33A reconnaissance aircraft.
55 T-28D, 40 T-6 and 16 OV-10 COIN aircraft.
25 C-47 and 13 C-123B transports.
About 60 hels, including 35 CH-34 and 23 UH-1H.
4 battalions of airfield defence troops. Para-Military Forces: 10,000 Volunteer Defence Corps; 8,000 Border Police; Village Militia.
VIETNAM--DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (NORTH)
Population: 23,300,000.
Military service: 3 years minimum.
Total armed forces: $13,250.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 2,150 million dong ($584 million). 3.68 dong=$1 1July 1971. 3.6 dong=$1 1July 1972. Army: 500,000.
15 infantry divisions* plus an additional 2 training divisions.
(*Infantry divisions normally total about 12,000 men including 3 infantry and 1 support regiment.)
1 artillery division (of 10 regiments).
2 armoured regiments (a third may be forming).
About 20 independent infantry regiments.
46 SAM battalions (each with 6 SA-2 launchers).
12 AA (artillery) regiments.
20 T-34 and 75 T-54 med tks; 100 PT-76 Type 60 lt tks; BTR-40 APC;
SU-76 and ISU-122 SP guns; 75mm, 105mm, 122mm, 175 130mm and 152mm guns;
57mm, 75mm, 82mm and 107mm recoilless rifles; 82mm, 100mm, 107mm, 120mm and 160mm mortars;
107mm, 122mm and 140mm RL; Sagger ATGW;
12.7mm, 37mm, 14.5mm, 57mm, KS-12 85mm and KS-19 100mm AA guns and ZSU-57-2 AA SP guns;
Strela SAM, Firecon AA radar.
DEPLOYMENT: About 200,000 in South Vietnam, 63,000 in Laos and 40,000 in Cambodia. Navy: 3,250 regular, 2,000 reserves.
3 coastal escorts.*
24 motor gunboats (less than 100 tons).t
15 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).t
About 12 small patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
10 Mi-4 SAR helicopters. Air Force: 10,000; 228 combat aircraft.
8 Il-28 light bombers. (Ex-Sov)
60 MiG-21F/PF interceptors with Atoll AAM. (Ex-Sov)
30 MiG-19 interceptors. (Ex-Ch)
130 MiG-15/17 interceptors.
20 An-2, 4 An-24, 12 Il-14 and 20 Li-2 transports. (Ex-Sov)
12 Mi-4 and 5 Mi-6 helicopters. (Ex-Sov)
About 50 training aircraft.
RESERVES: 6,000. Para-Military Forces: 16,000 Frontier, Coast Security and People's Armed Security Forces;
about 1,500,000 Regional Armed Militia.
VIETNAM - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (SOUTH)
Population: 19,300,000.
Military service: 2 years minimum.
Total armed forces: 503,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $4.7 billion.
Defence budget 1972: S183 billion piastres ($435,700,000). 275 piastres=$1 1July 1971. 420 piastres=$1 1July 1972. Army: 410,000.
11 infantry divisions*
1 airborne division (3 brigades).
6 independent armoured cavalry regiments.
3 independent infantry regiments.*
27 ranger battalions.*
(*With normally 3 regiments, each of 4 battalions, to an infantry division, there are some 150 infantry battalions in the regular army,
but most units are below establishment; the actual strength of a battalion averages 500, and a regiment 2,000.)
1 special forces group.
35 artillery battalions.
M-47 and M-48 med tks; M-24, M-41 and AMX-13 lt tks; Commando and Greyhound armd cars;
M-3 scout cars; M-59 and M-113 APC; 105mm and 155mm guns; 155mm SP guns; 175mm how;
AA guns; TOW ATGW. Navy: 39,000. 7 destroyer escorts.
70 fast patrol boats.
20 coastal gunboats.
11 minesweeping craft.
20 landing ships.
15 utility landing craft.
15 minesweeping craft
160 minor landing craft (Less than 100 tons.)
500 river patrol boats.
About 350 motorized junks. Marine Corps: 13,000.
1 division. Air Force: 41,000; 275 combat aircraft. (Combat squadrons have from 15-20 aircraft.)
1 tactical fighter squadron with F-5.
5 fighter-bomber squadrons with A-37.
3 fighter-bomber squadrons with Skyraider.
Some RC-47 reconnaissance aircraft.
80 armed light aircraft.
16 AC-47 and 16 AC-119 armed transport aircraft.
20 C-47, 16 C-119 and 465 C-123 transports.
465 UH-1 and 15 CH-47 hels.
250 miscellaneous training aircraft. Para-Military Forces:
Regional Forces - 280,000, forming about 1,700 rifle companies, at the disposal of the provincial governors;
Popular Forces - 240,000, a home guard of about 7,500 platoons, with light arms;
People's Self Defence Force - 1,400,000; part-time village militia.
Police Field Force - 35,000, including special internal security units with armoured vehicles and helicopters.
Continental Treaties and Agreements In March and April 1945, the Act of Chapultepec was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. This Act declared that any attack upon a member-party would be considered an attack upon all, and provided for the collective use of armed force to prevent or repel such aggression.
In September 1947 all the parties to the Chapultepec Act- except Ecuador and Nicaragua - signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, otherwise known as the Treaty of Rio. (Cuba withdrew from the Treaty in March 1960.) This Treaty constrained signatories to the peaceful settlement of disputes between themselves, and provided for collective self-defence should any member-party be subject to external attack.
The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), drawn up in 1948, embraced declarations based upon the Treaty of Rio. The member-parties* - the signatories to the Act of Chapultepec plus Barbados, El Salvador, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago - are bound to peaceful settlement of internal disputes, and to collective action in the event of external attack upon one or more signatory states.
(* Legally, Cuba is a member of the OAS, but has been excluded - by a decision of OAS Foreign Ministeis - since January 1962. Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago signed the Charter in 1967.)
The United States is also a party to two multilateral defence treaties: the Act of Havana, 1940, signed by representatives of all the then 21 American Republics, which provides for the collective trusteeship, by American nations, of European colonies and possessions in the Americas, should any attempt be made to transfer the sovereignty of these colonies from one non-American power to another; and the Havana Convention, which corresponds with the Act of Havana, signed in 1940 by the same states, with the exception of Bolivia, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay.
A Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed in February 1967 by 22 Latin American countries; 19 countries have ratified or acceded to it. An Agency has been set up by the contracting parties to ensure compliance with the treaty.
Other Agreements In July 1965, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua agreed to form a military bloc for the co-ordination of all resistance against possible Communist aggression.
The United States has bilateral military assistance agreements with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. She also has a bilateral agreement with Cuba, for jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo Bay.*
(*This agreement was confirmed in 1934. In 1960 the United States stated that it could be modified or abrogated only by agreement between the parties, and that she had no intention of agreeing to modification or abrogation.)
The Soviet Union has no defence agreements with any of the states in this area, although in recent years has supplied military equipment to Cuba.
Britain assures the defence of British Honduras, France of French Guiana and the Netherlands of Surinam (Dutch Guiana).
Латинская Америка
Континентальные договоры и соглашения В марте и апреле 1945 года Акт Чапультепека был подписан Аргентиной, Боливией, Бразилией, Венесуэлой, Гватемалой, Гаити, Гондурасом, Доминиканской Республикой, Колумбией, Коста-Рикой, Кубой, Мексикой, Никарагуа, Панамой, Парагваем, Перу, Соединенными Штатами, Уругваем, Чили и Эквадором. В этом законе провозглашалось, что любое нападение на участника будет считаться нападением на всех, и предусматривалось коллективное применение вооруженной силы для предотвращения или отражения такой агрессии.
В сентябре 1947 года все участники закона Чапультепека, за исключением Никарагуа и Эквадора, подписали Межамериканский договор о взаимной помощи, известный также как Рио - де - Жанейрский договор. (Куба вышла из договора в марте 1960 года.) Настоящий договор ограничивает подписавшие его стороны мирным урегулированием споров между собой и предусматривает коллективную самооборону в случае, если какой-либо член организации подвергается внешнему нападению.
Устав Организации Американских Государств (ОАГ), составленный в 1948 году, приняли заявления, на основании договора от Рио. Стороны-члены* - подписавшие закон О Чапультепеке плюс Барбадос, Сальвадор, Тринидад и Тобаго и Ямайка - обязаны добиваться мирного урегулирования внутренних споров и предпринимать коллективные действия в случае внешнего нападения на одно или несколько подписавших его государств.
(*Юридически Куба является членом ОАГ, но была исключена - по решению Министерства иностранных дел ОАГ - с января 1962 года. Барбадос и Тринидад и Тобаго подписали Хартию в 1967 году.)
США также является участником двух многосторонних оборонных договоров: акт Гаване, 1940, подписанный представителями всех 21 Американской Республики, которая предусматривает коллективную опеку, американских наций, европейских колоний и владений в Америке, если попытка будет предпринята, чтобы передача суверенитета этих колоний от одного неамериканского власть другому; и Гаванскую Конвенции, которой соответствует акт Гаване, подписанный в 1940-х годах в тех же Штатах, за исключением Боливии, Чили, Кубы и Уругвая.
Договор о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке был подписан в феврале 1967 года 22 латиноамериканскими странами; 19 стран ратифицировали его или присоединились к нему. Договаривающиеся стороны создали агентство для обеспечения соблюдения договора.
Другие договоры В июле 1965 года, Сальвадор, Гватемала, Гондурас и Никарагуа договорились создать военный блок для координации сопротивления против возможной коммунистической агрессии.
Соединенные Штаты имеют двусторонние соглашения о военной помощи с Аргентиной, Боливией, Бразилией, Венесуэлой, Гватемалой, Гондурасом, Доминиканской Республикой, Колумбией, Мексикой, Никарагуа, Панамой, Парагваем, Перу, Сальвадором, Уругваем, Чили и Эквадором. Она также заключила двустороннее соглашение с Кубой о юрисдикции и контроле над заливом Гуантанамо.*
(*Это соглашение было подтверждено в 1934 году. В 1960 году Соединенные Штаты заявили, что она может быть изменена или аннулирована только по соглашению между сторонами и что она не намерена соглашаться на изменение или аннулирование.)
Советский Союз не имеет оборонных соглашений ни с одним из государств в этой области, хотя в последние годы поставляет Кубе военную технику.
Великобритания обеспечивает оборону британского Гондураса, Франции Французской Гвианы и Нидерландов Суринама (голландской Гвианы).
ARGENTINA
Population: 24,166,000.
Military service: Army and Air Force, 1 year; Navy, 14 months.
Total armed forces: 135,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $31.4 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 3.47 billion pesos ($694 million). 5 pesos=$1. Army: 85,000.
1 armoured brigade.
1 horsed cavalry brigade.
5 infantry brigades.
2 mountain brigades.
1 airborne brigade.
10 artillery regiments.
M-4 Sherman medium tks; 90 AMX-13 lt tks; M-113 APC;
105mm and 155mm guns; 105mm pack how and 24 French Mk F3 and 155mm SP hows; recoilless rifles; Cobra ATGW; Tigercat SAM.
RESERVES: Trained army reserves number about 250,000, of which about 200,000 are National Guard and 50,000 Territorial Guard. Navy: 33,000 (including the Naval Air Force and Marines).
1 aircraft carrier.
4 submarines (2 in reserve; 2 more are under construction).
3 cruisers.
8 destroyers (2 more under construction).
4 frigates.
2 corvettes.
6 coastal minesweepers.
5 landing ships.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: 3,000; 47 combat aircraft.
10 F-9B Panther fighters.
16 A-4B Skyhawk fighter bombers.
6 MB-326GB armed trainers (6 more on order).
6 S-2A Tracker, 6 P-2V5 Neptune and 3 PBY-5 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
15 C-47 and C-54 transports.
About 60 trainers, including T-28, TF-95 Cougar and Beech C-45.
6 Bell 47D, 4 UH-19, 6 Alouette III and 4 SH-3 Sea King helicopters (2 Westland Lynx on order).
Seacat SAM.
MARINES: 5,000.
1 field artillery bn (with 105mm how).
1 AA bn. Air Force: 17,000; 72 combat aircraft.
12 Canberra bombers.
47 A-4B Skyhawk fighter-bombers.
20 F-86F Sabre jet fighters.
40 MS-760, 60 T-34 trainers.
3 C-130E, 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 8 F-27, 20 C-47, 6 C-45 and 4 DC-6 transports;
20 Dove, 16 Dinfia Guarani II, 35 Dinfia and 14 Aero Commander 500U communication aircraft.
45 light communication aircraft.
3 Bell UH-1D, 8 UH-1H; 12 Hughes OH-6A, 2 500-S and 6 Sikorsky S-55 helicopters.
Para-Military Forces:19,000. Gendarmerie: 11,000 men, under Army command, used mainly for frontier duties.
The National Maritime Prefecture: 8,000, performs coastguard duties and is subordinate to the Navy.
BOLIVIA
Population: 5,200,000.
Military service: 12 months selective.
Total armed forces: 21,800.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.06 billion.
Defence Expenditure 1971: 203 million pesos ($17,100,000). 11.88 pesos=$1. Army: 20,000.
12 infantry regiments.
1 motorized regiment.
3 ranger battalions. .
1 paratroop regiment.
3 artillery regiments.
M-113 APC; light mortars and artillery. Air Force: 1,800; 25 combat aircraft.
12 F-51D Mustang fighters.
13 T-6D armed trainers.
20 transports 16 C-47, C-54, Beech C-45.
6 Cessna 172, 7 PT-19, 8 Fokker T-21 and 7 Cessna 185 communication aircraft.
About 15 helicopters, including Hughes 500M and OH-23C/D. Para-Military Forces: About 5,000 armed police and frontier guards.
BRAZIL
Population: 100,000,000.
Military service: 1 year.
Total armed forces: 198,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $40.1 billion.
Defence budget 1971: 6 billion cruzeiros ($1 billion). 5.3 cruzeiros=$1 1July 1971. 5.9 cruzeiros=$1 1July 1972. Army: 120,000.
1 armoured division.*
4 mechanized divisions.*
7 infantry divisions.*
1 airborne division.
(* Some of these divisions are being re-organized into 'independence' brigades.)
150 M-4 Sherman and 40 M-47 Patton med tks; M-3 Stuart and 100 M-41 Walker Bulldog lt tks;
120 Veteli Al Cutia recce/APC/armd car; 40 M-113 and M-59 APC.
1 helicopter COIN squadron with 7 Bell 206A and 8 Bell UH-1D. Navy: 43,000 (including 10,000 marines).
1 aircraft carrier.
3 submarines (3 more on order).
2 cruisers.
11 destroyers (1 with Seacat SAM).
6 coastal patrol vessels.
10 corvettes.
4 coastal minesweepers.
11 seaward and river patrol craft.
15 Whirlwind, 5 Wasp and Widgeon, 2 Bell 47, 13 Hughes 269A, 9 Hughes 200, 6 Hughes 500, and 3 SH-3D helicopters. Air Force: 35,000; 231 combat aircraft.
15 B-26K light bombers.
15 A-4F Skyhawk fighter/bombers (16 Mirage IIIEBR on order).
15 TF-33, 60 AT-37C, 60 AT-6G and 18 AT-28 armed trainers.
13 Tracker, 14 Neptune, 12 Albatross and 9 PBY-5 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
3 ground support squadrons with O-l Bird Do, T-6 Texan, L-6 Paulistinha, L-42 Regente and T-37C (operate in conjunction with the Army).
About 180 transports, including C-45, C-47, DC-6B, C-115, HS-125, 17 C-130 and C-119F,
HS-748, BAC-111 and Viscount, 5 Pilatus Porters and a few B-25 Mitchell communication aircraft. (12 Fokker F-27/F28 on order.)
About 250 trainers, including 112 EMB-326GB, 7 Magister, 70 Fokker S-11/12 and T-11 Kansan.
Helicopters include LOH-6A, Alouette II and FH-1100 LOH. Para-Military Forces: Various public security forces total about 150,000. There are State militias in addition.
CHILE
Population: 10,200,000.
Military service: 1 year.
Total armed forces: 47,500.
Estimated GNP 1971: $7.05 billion.
Defence budget 1972: 5,053 million escudos ($180 million). 14 escudos=$1 1July 1971. 28 escudos=$1 1July 1972. Army: 24,000.
6 cavalry regiments (2 armoured, 4 horsed).
16 infantry regiments (incl 10 motorized).
5 artillery regiments.
Some anti-aircraft and support detachments.
76 M-4 Sherman med tks; M-3 Stuart lt tks; some APC; Model 56 105mm pack how. Navy: 15,000.
2 submarines.
3 cruisers.
4 destroyers.
4 destroyer escorts.
4 motor torpedo boats.
5 patrol vessels.
(2 Oberon-class submarines and 2 Leander-class frigates with Seacat SAM are on order.)
4 AB-206A and 2 Bell 47 helicopters. Air Force: 8,500; 41 combat aircraft.
12 B-26 light bombers.
18 Hunter F-71 and 11 F-80C fighters.
45 T-34, 10 T-37B, 8 T-33A and 5 Vampire trainers.
About 90 transports, including 20 C-45, 25 C-47, 20 DHC-2 Beaver, 12 DHC-3 Otter, 8 DHC-6 Twin Otter, and 4 DC-6.
5 Twin Bonanza, 10 Cessna 180, 4 Cessna O-l and 20 T-6 liaison aircraft.
30 helicopters, including 7 Bell 47, Sikorsky UH-19, 16 Hiller UH-12E and 2 Bell UH-1D. Para-Military Forces: Public security forces 25,000.
COLOMBIA
Population: 22,300,000.
Military service: 1 year.
Total armed forces: 63,200.
Estimated GNP 1970: $7.05 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 1,885 million pesos ($86 million). 19.4 pesos=$1 1July 1971. 22 pesos=$1 1July 1972. Army: 50,000 (can be raised to 300,000 on full mobilization).
8 infantry brigades.
Presidential Guard anti-guerrilla battalion.
Motorized infantry, artillery and engineer units.
M-3 Stuart light tanks; armoured cars; lt arty. Navy: 7,200.
3 destroyers.
4 destroyer transports.
8 coastal patrol vessels.
5 river gunboats.
14 patrol motor launches (less than 100 tons). Air Force: 6,000; 40 combat aircraft.
8 B-26 light bombers.
14 Mirage 5 and 4 Mirage III fighters.
6 F-86F Sabre fighters.
8 PBY-5 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
2 C-130 Hercules and about 50 other tpt aircraft, incl C-54, C-47, DHC-3 Otter, Aero Commander and DHC-2 Beaver. Para-Military Forces: 35,000; National Police Force.
CUBA
Population: 8,650,000.
Military service: 3 years.
Total armed forces: 108,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: $4.5 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 290 million pesos ($290,000,000). 1 peso=$1. Army: 90,000.
15 infantry 'divisions' (brigades).
2 armoured brigades.
8 independent 'brigades' (battalion groups).
Over 600 tks including hy tks, T-34 and T-54/55 med tks, and PT-76 lt tks;
200 BTR-40, BTR-60 and BTR-152 APC;
100 SU-100 assault guns; 122mm and 152mm guns;
30 FROG-4 and 20 Salish SSM;
57mm, 76mm and 85mm ATk guns; Snapper ATGW.
RESERVES: 90,000. Navy: 6,000.
4 frigates.
2 escort patrol vessels.
18 submarine chasers.
18 Komar-class patrol boats with SSM.
2 Osa-class patrol boats with SSM.
24 motor torpedo boats.
50 Samlet coastal defence SSM. Air Force: 12,000 (including the Air Defence Forces); 185 combat aircraft.
20 MiG-15 fighter-bombers.
50 MiG-21 interceptors.
40 MiG-19 interceptors.
75 MiG-17 interceptors.
About 50 transport aircraft, mostly Il-14, An-24 and An-2.
Trainers include 30 MiG-15UTI and Zlin-326.
About 25 Mi-4 and 30 Mi-1 helicopters.
24 sites with 144 SA-2 SAM. Para-Military Forces: 10,000 State Security troops; 3,000 border guards.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Population: 4,400,000.
Military service : selective.
Total armed forces: 15,800.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.6 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 37 million pesos ($37 million). 1 peso=$1. Army: 9,000.
4 infantry brigades.
1 artillery regiment.
1 anti-aircraft regiment.
Reconnaissance, engineer and signals units.
20 AMX-13 lt tks, some armd cars and light artillery.
3 Cessna 170 light aircraft. Navy: 3,800.
3 frigates.
2 corvettes.
2 fleet minesweepers.
3 patrol vessels.
1 landing ship.
2 landing craft. Air Force: 3,000; 45 combat aircraft.
3 B-26 light bombers.
20 Vampire Mark I fighter-bombers.
20 F-51D Mustang fighter-bombers.
2 PBY-5A Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
20 tpts, including 5 C-45, 5 C-46 and 3 DHC-2 Beaver.
30 trainers, including T-6 Texan, T-11 Kansan, BT-13 Valiant and PT-17 Kaydet.
2 Bell OH-13, 2 Sikorsky H-19, 2 Hiller UH-12 and 6 OH-6A helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 10,000 Gendarmerie.
ECUADOR
Population: 6,500,000.
Selective military service for 2 years.
Total armed forces: 20,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $1.5 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 662 million sucres ($26,500,000). 25 sucres=$1. Army: 12,800.
3 mechanized battalions.
11 infantry battalions.
1 parachute battalion.
3 artillery groups.
2 anti-aircraft battalions.
4 engineer battalions.
M-3 Stuart, M-41 Bulldog and 41 AMX-13 lt tks; Panhard AML-245 armd cars; some APC. Navy: 3,700.
3 destroyer escorts.
2 coastal escorts.
2 motor gunboats.
3 motor torpedo boats.
6 patrol craft.
2 landing ships. Air Force: 3,500; 25 combat aircraft.
5 Canberra bombers.
10 F-80C Shooting Star fighter-bombers.
8 Meteor FR-9 interceptors.
2 PBY-5 Catalina maritime patrol aircraft.
1 tpt sqn with 6 C-45, 8 C-47 and 2 C-118;
25 trainers including T-6, T-33 and 12 T-41.
3 Bell helicopters. Para-Military Forces: 5,800.
MEXICO
Population: 52,200,000.
Military service: voluntary, with part-time conscript militia.
Total armed forces: 73,200 regulars; 250,000 conscripts.
Estimated GNP 1971: $32.0 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971: 2,719 million pesos ($216 million). 12.5 pesos=$1. Army: 54,000, plus 250,000 part-time conscripts.
1 mechanized brigade group (Presidential Guard).
1 infantry brigade group.
1 parachute brigade.
Zonal Garrisons including:
21 independent cavalry sqns.
50 independent infantry battalions.
3 artillery regiments.
Anti-aircraft, engineer and support units.
50 med tks; M-3 Stuart lt tks; 100 armd cars; 75mm and 105mm hows. Navy: 13,200 (including Naval Air Force and marines).
2 destroyers.
7 frigates.
2 gunboats.
16 escort and fleet minesweepers.
16 patrol boats.
2 troop transports.
22 naval aircraft, including 5 maritime patrol PBY-5 Catalina;
6 Bell H-13 and 4 Alouette III helicopters. Marines: 1,566 men; organized in 14 companies. Air Force: 6,000; 27 combat aircraft.
12 Vampire fighter-bombers.
15 T-33A fighter-bomber/trainers.
130 trainers, including 45 T-6 Texan, 13 AT-11 Kansan, 32 T-28 Trojan and 10 T-34 Mentor.
(The T-6, T-11 and T-28 aircraft can be used for ground support.)
About 40 transports, including 6 C-47, 5 C-54 and 2 C-118, 3 Islander and 1 Jetstar.
About 30 helicopters, including 8 Alouette II, 18 Bell 47 and 1 UH-12E.
PARAGUAY
Population: 2,600,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 13,700.
Estimated GNP 1971: $656 million.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 1,982 million guaranis ($15,200,000). 130 guaranis=$1. Army: 11,000.
1 cavalry brigade.
6 infantry regiments.
5 motorized engineer battalions.
3 artillery batteries.
M-4 Sherman med tks. Navy: 1,900 (including marines).
1 helicopter carrier.
2 river gunboats.
3 patrol boats.
2 patrol launches.
3 river patrol boats.
Air Force: 800; 6 combat aircraft.
About 20 trainers incl T-6 Texan (some fitted for bombs), PT-17 Kaydet and MS-760.
10 C-47 and 3 Hiller EC-2 transports.
20 helicopters, including 4 Bell 47C, 3 UH-12E and 12 Bell UH-13. Para-Military Forces: 8,500 security forces.
PERU
Population: 14,430,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 54,000.
Estimated GNP 1971: $6.35 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: 7,463 million soles ($164 million). 45.5 soles=$1. Army: 39,000.
1 armoured brigade.
7 infantry brigades.
1 commando brigade.
Mountain, parachute, artillery and engineer battalions.
60 M-4 Sherman med tks; 100 AMX-13 lt tks;
50 M3A1 White scout cars; some 105mm and 155mm guns.
Piper Cherokee lt ac; 8 Bell 47G helicopters. Navy: 8,000.
4 submarines.
2 cruisers.
4 destroyers.
3 destroyer escorts.
2 submarine chasers.
6 fast patrol craft.
2 coastal minesweepers.
3 patrol boats.
7 river gunboats.
4 landing ships.
8 Bell 47G helicopters. Air Force: 7,000; 91 combat aircraft.
20 Canberra light bombers. (The above aircraft form three combat groups of two or three squadrons each.)
14 Mirage 5 fighters.
10 F-86F and 6 Hunter F-52 fighters.
20 T-33A armed trainers.
1 photo-recce squadron with 10 C-60.
1 maritime recce squadron with 6 PV-2 Harpoon.
5 HU-16A Albatross maritime patrol aircraft.
Tpt and comms aircraft, incl 9 C-130, 9 DHC-2 Beaver, 19 C-47, 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 18 Beech Queen Air and 16 DHC-5 Buffalo.
Trainers incl 2 Hunter T-62, 15 T-6 Texan, 6 T-34 Mentor, 26 T-37B and 25 Cessna T-41A.
Helicopters include 4 Bell 47G, 6 Alouette II/III and 9 UH-1D Iroquois. Para-Military Forces: 20,000 Guardia Civil.
NOTES
a. ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile (range 4,000+ miles);
IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile (range 1,500-4,000 miles);
MRBM = medium-range missile (range 500-1,500 miles);
SRBM = short-range ballistic missile (range under 500 miles);
SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
Long-range cruise missile =range over 250 miles.
b. Operation range depends upon the payload carried; use of maximum payload may reduce missile range by up to 25 per cent.
c. MT = megaton = million tons of TNT equivalent (MT range = 1 MT or over);
KT = kiloton " thousand tons of TNT equivalent (KT range " less than 1 MT); figures given are estimated maxima.
d. Numerical designations of Soviet missiles (e.g. SS-7) are of US origin; names (e.g. Saddler) are of NATO origin.
e. SS-9 missiles have also been tested with (i) three warheads of 4-5 MT each.
(ii) a modified payload for use as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) or fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS).
f. SS-11 missiles have also been tested with three smaller warheads.
g. Including those deployed within IRBM/MRBM fields.
h. A mobile IRBM (SS-XZ Scrooge) has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
i. A mobile missile (SS-14 Scapegoat), apparently with MRBM range, has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
j Dual-capable (i.e. capable of delivering conventional weapons or nuclear weapons).
k. Most of all Polaris A3 missiles have been modified to carry three warheads.
l. All aircraft listed are dual-capable and many, especially in the categories of strike aircraft, would be more likely to carry conventional than nuclear weapons.
m. Long-range bomber = maximum range over 6,000 miles; medium-range bomber maximum range 3,500-6,000 miles,
primarily designed for bombing missions.
n. Theoretical maximum range, with internal fuel only, at optimum altitude and speed. Ranges for strike aircraft assume no weapons load.
Especially in the case of strike aircraft, therefore, range falls sharply for flights at lower altitude, at higher speed or with full weapons load
(e.g. the combat radius of A-7, at operational height and speed, with typical weapons load, is approximately 620 miles).
o. Mach 1 (M = 1.0) = speed of sound.
p. Names of Soviet aircraft (e.g. Bear) are of NATO origin.
q. Including approximately 22 B-52 D-F and 43 G-H aircraft in active storage.
r. Excluding approximately 50 Mya-4 aircraft configured as tankers.
s. Including approximately 300 Tu-16 aircraft in the Naval Air Force, configured for attacks on shipping, which could, in theory, deliver nuclear weapons.
t. The absence of numbers here reflects the uncertainty as to how many of these nuclear-capable aircraft actually have a nuclear role.
u. These aircraft are nuclear-capable but may not necessarily have a nuclear role.
NOTES
a. IRBM -- intermediate-range ballistic missile (range 1,500-4,000 miles);
SRBM - short-range ballistic missile (range under 500 miles);
SLBM = "submarine-launched ballistic missile.
b. All NATO vehicles are of American origin, with the exception of the SSBS IRBM and the MSBS SLBM, which are of French origin.
c. BR = Britain, FR = France, GE = West Germany, BU = Bulgaria, CZ =Czechoslovakia, EG = East Germany, PO = Poland.
d. Operational range depends upon the payload carried; use of maximum payload may reduce missile range by up to 24 per cent.
e. KT = kiloton - thousand tons of TNT equivalent (KT range = less than 1 MT); figures given are estimated maxima.
f. AU Warsaw Pact vehicles are of Soviet origin. Numerical designations (e.g. SS-lb) are of American origin; names (e.g. Scud A) are of NATO origin.
g. These SRBM are operated by West Germany but the nuclear warheads for them are in American custody.
Sergeant is dual-capable (i.e. capable of delivering conventional or nuclear weapons).
h. These dual-capable systems are operated by the countries shown but nuclear warheads for them are in Soviet custody.
i. Honest John is dual-capable and is operated by Belgium, Britain, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey,
but with the nuclear warheads held in American custody. In the case of Denmark, there are no nuclear warheads held on Danish soil.
France also operates Honest John but the nuclear warheads for it were withdrawn in 1966 and its nuclear role is to be taken over by the
French SRBM Pluton, which will have a French nuclear warhead.
j. The 203mm SP how is is dual-capable and is operated by Belgium, Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands but any nuclear warheads
for it are in American custody.
k. The 155mm SP how is primarily a conventional artillery weapon but is dualcapable. It is operated by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark,
West Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey but in very few cases is it likely to have a nuclear role, certainly not in the
case of Canada. Any nuclear warheads would be in American custody, none on Danish or Norwegian soil.
NOTES
a. All aircraft listed are dual-capable and many would be more likely to carry conventional than nuclear weapons.
b. Medium-range bomber = maximum range 3,500-6,000 miles, primarily designed for bombing missions.
c. Canberra, Vulcan and Buccaneer are of British origin; F-104 and F-4 are of American origin; Mirage is of French origin.
d. R = Britain, FR = France, BU = Bulgaria, CZ = Czechoslovakia, PO = Poland, RU = Rumania, GE ~ West Germany.
e. Theoretical maximum range, with internal fuel only, at optimum altitude and speed. Ranges for strike aircraft assume no weapons load.
Especially in the case of strike aircraft, therefore, range falls sharply for flights at lower altitude, at higher speed or with full weapons load
(e.g. combat radius of F-104, at operational height and speed, with typical weapons load, is approximately 420 miles).
f. Mach 1 (M=1.0) = speed of sound.
g. All Warsaw Pact aircraft are of Soviet origin. Names (e.g. Beagle) are of NATO origin.
h. The dual-capable F-104 is operated by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey,
but the Canadian aircraft no longer have a nuclear role. The warheads for all of these aircraft are held in American custody.
i. Nuclear warheads for these dual-capable aircraft are held in Soviet custody.
j. The absence of figures here reflects the uncertainty as to how many of these nuclear-capable aircraft actually have a nuclear role.
NOTES
* The GNP figures are estimated at current market prices and the percentages may differ from those published by national governments
and international organizations.
** The valuation of the Soviet GNP is calculated on the basis given on pp. 10-12 of The Military Balance, 1970-71.
A note on the conversion to $US of Soviet defence expenditure is on p. 9.
t including the former East Pakistan.
n.a. = not available.
NOTES:
*Figures are not comparable between countries mainly because reserve structures are not the same.
a. Estimated.
b. Total mobilizable strength: 750,000.
c. White population only.
a. Exchange rates used are the same as in the GNP table below except for the USSR, which are calculated on the basis explained in The Military Balance, 1970-1971, pp. 10-12. For a commentary on the adequacy of this basis, particularly in relation to comparative manpower costs, see p.9.
b. NATO definition of defence expenditure has been used.
a. Net Material Product converted at a constant exchange rate of 0.9 roubles=$1. The UN accounts definition has been used. This consists of: individual and collective consumption, net fixed capital formation and net exports of goods and productive services.
a. National Police Reserve.
b. Security Force.
c. Self Defence Forces.
d. Excluding forces enlisted outside Britain
ї Excluding China, which makes a copy of the Soviet T-54 known as the T-59 and a light tank, the T-62.
* A number have been rebuilt with 152mm combined gun and Shillelagh missile launcher and are designated M-60 Al El and E2.
** Also manufactured in Britain.
** A number of modified versions of the Sherman are still in active service throughout the world, some with larger guns.
f Combined gun and Shillelagh missile launcher.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had been in train since November 1969, produced their first formal agreements on 26 May 1972. Three documents were then signed in Moscow: a formal treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems; an interim agreement on the limitation for up to five years of offensive strategic missiles; and a protocol defining the effect of the latter upon submarine-launched missiles. At the same time, a memorandum of miscellaneous 'interpretations' and 'understandings' was initialled in Helsinki. At first sight, these texts may seem to provide the material with which to construct a 'balance' between the strategic nuclear forces of the two super-powers. They also, however, illustrate the need for extreme caution in assessing the American-Soviet strategic relationship in terms of any single quantitative standard.
Missile defence The treaty on ABM systems, as interpreted, is relatively simple in content and relatively clear in its effect upon the programmes of the signatories. At present, the Soviet Union has a small ABM system, consisting of 64 launchers with Galosh missiles, deployed around the Moscow area. The United States has not yet brought any part of its Safeguard ABM system into service but has been actively engaged in construction at two sites, in Montana and North Dakota, in preparation for deploying long-range Spartan and short range Sprint missiles in defence of Minuteman ICBM silos. Under the new treaty, each country is permitted to have two ABM 'deployment areas', one centred upon its capital and the other containing some part of its ICBM force. Each area may have a 150 km (94 miles) radius, with a centre point at least 1300 km (810 miles) from that of the other area, and may contain up to 100 ABM launchers and missiles. Each launcher must be static and land-based, and must be able to fire only one ABM missile and warhead. Within the capital defence area, there are restrictions on radar deployment, but not on radar size or numbers; within the ICBM-defence area, radar size and numbers are constrained, but not radar deployment. The restrictions on radars, together with a general treaty prohibition on moving towards nation-wide defences, are intended to ensure that, despite any increase in missile capability, the effective coverage of ABM systems will remain limited to relatively small sections of territory. No qualitative limits are, however, imposed upon ABM missiles themselves. In practice, these provisions mean that the Soviet Union will be able to expand its Moscow area system to not more than 100 launchers, as well as being allowed to construct another site to defend some of its ICBM, while the United States will be free to complete one of its ICBM-defence Safeguard sites (at Grand Forks, North Dakota), but must abandon all other sites, retaining only the option of constructing a second 100-missile site to protect Washington. At the same time, the United States can continue development, for example, of the Hardsite ABM system, with more and smaller radars than Safeguard, while the Soviet Union can, if it wishes, replace its Galosh missiles with the more advanced ABM vehicles which it has been testing for some time.
The ABM treaty, although subject to review at five-year intervals, is of unlimited duration. It thus implies a permanent situation of quantitative and functional symmetry between the two sides. The signatories have not, however, reached that position, and will not necessarily do so in the future. The United States will clearly complete its ICBM-defence site at Grand Forks, which is due to become operational in late 1974, but it cannot be assumed that the Administration will wish, or the Congress agree, to construct the second permitted site in the Washington area (which could not, in any event, be operational until 1977-78). Conversely, the Soviet Union will presumably expand its Moscow-area deployment to the total of 100 launchers now allowed, but it remains to be seen whether it will choose also to exercise its option to deploy a second site in defence of ICBM.
Offensive missiles The interim agreement on offensive strategic missiles and the accompanying protocol, both of which remain in force for five years, are shorter than the ABM treaty but also, despite the additional 'interpretations', less lucid. The agreement mentions no numbers; it decrees only that the total of ICBM and SLBM launchers which each country may have will be based upon the numbers operational or under construction on 26 May 1972 in the case of SLBM and 1July 1972in the case of ICBM. Provided that no additional modern 'heavy' ICBM (such as the Soviet SS-9) are deployed, modernization and replacement of submarines, launchers and missiles is freely permitted. In addition, ICBM launchers deployed before 1964 may be exchanged for an equal number of new SLBM launchers, as may launchers on (undefined) 'older' submarines. The protocol, elaborating this, states that the United States may have not more than 710 SLBM launchers and not more than 44 'modern' ballistic missile submarines, while the Soviet Union may have up to 950 SLBM launchers and not more than 62 'modern' submarines.
The apparent intention of this agreement is to permit the United States its existing total of 1,054 ICBM and 656 SLBM (41 submarines), out of which 54 Titan 2 ICBM may be exchanged in future for an equal number of new SLBM in up to three submarines, bringing the sub-totals to 1,000 and 710 respectively.*
(* In principle, the United States could presumably also acquire new SLBM in replacement for any Minuteman 1 ICBM deployed before 1964 and still in service. However, that would entail either scrapping an equivalent number of its present SLBM or retaining an equivalent number of Titan 2 ICBM in service.)
On the other side, the Soviet Union may have the 1,618 ICBM and 740 SLBM on some 56 nuclear-powered submarines (including about 46 of the modern Y-class) which are now operational or under construction. (Of these, about 1,530 ICBM and 560 SLBM are already in service, 66 of the SLBM being in diesel-powered submarines.) It will also be free to build 210 additional SLBM launchers to replace the 210 SS-7 and SS-8 ICBM deployed before 1964 and still in service or, as a partial alternative, to replace its remaining launchers in older submarines with an equal number of launchers in new nuclear-powered boats, all within the overall limit of 950 SLBM and 62 modern submarines. Both sides may, in general, replace old launchers or warhead systems with new, subject only to the ban on additional 'heavy' ICBM of the SS-9 type. Thus, within the numerical limits now set, the United States is free to continue the replacement of Minuteman 1/2 and Polaris with the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon MIRV systems, as it is to continue development of the new Trident SLBM system (formerly known as ULMS: Undersea Long-Range Missile System), while the Soviet Union has a parallel freedom to continue development of systems such as its new 3,000-mile range SS-N-8 SLBM.
'Balances' DELIVERY VEHICLES
Whatever qualitative changes take place during the five-year term of the agreement, the permitted quantitative levels of missile launchers favour the Soviet Union, which, if it retains its diesel-powered submarines in service, may have 2,424 launchers, including up to 950 SLBM, as opposed to a total for the United States, both present and potential, of 1,710, including up to 710 SLBM. This obviously permits an even wider margin in favour of the Soviet Union than that secured by its present total of some 2,090 launchers. Several important qualifications are, however, relevant.
First, the Soviet Union, in order to reach the maximum permitted level of 950 SLBM, will have to make a choice between two obvious courses: (i) scrapping its diesel-powered missile submarines and replacing all 210 'old' ICBM with new SLBM, bringing its overall launcher total down to 2,358, and (ii) exchanging 144 'old' ICBM and all the 66 SLBM on diesel-powered submarines for new SLBM, leaving 66 'old' ICBM to be retained or replaced by new 'light' ICBM. Although course (ii) offers an advantage in terms of total launcher figures, course (i), with its slight reduction in that total, might turn out to be the more economical.
Second, the interim agreement fixes limits by reference to launchers now operational or under construction, but takes no account of new construction which might otherwise have begun during its five-year term. The Soviet Union has been building new SLBM launchers at a rate of about 128 a year and has previously demonstrated an ability to add some 250 ICBM to its force annually. Thus, in another five years, the Soviet Union might, in theory, have had some 1,200 SLBM launchers and nearly 2,800 ICBM, as opposed to the much lower figures now established. Meanwhile, the United States, having no active programme for an increase in its SLBM or ICBM launchers by 1977-78, would have remained at the current level of 656 SLBM and 1,054 ICBM. It can at least be argued, therefore, that the agreement has substantially constrained the potential Soviet advantage in launcher totals.
Third, the figures above, like the interim agreement, make no mention of intercontinental bombers. The United States now has some 455 of these (including B-52 bombers in active reserve but excluding FB-111 medium bombers), as compared with 140 slower and shorter-range bombers for the Soviet Union, of which 100 are propeller-driven. Moreover, American long-range bombers can carry substantially greater weapons loads than their Soviet counterparts; in all, the American force has a payload capacity of some 30-5 million pounds, as compared with only about 4-8 million pounds for the Soviet Union. At present, that means that these American bombers can, in theory, deliver some 2,000 weapons on Soviet targets, whereas the Soviet strategic bomber force can carry only about 420. Within five years, as the United States completes the equipment of its bomber force with the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) which is now in production, the number of nuclear weapons which its strategic aircraft can carry might rise to something over 7,500.
WARHEADS AND TARGETS
A wider-reaching qualification is that the interim agreement takes no account of warhead, as opposed to missile, figures. The United States is already far advanced in its MIRV programme, having deployed some 200 Minuteman 3 ICBM with up to three warheads each and some 160 Poseidon SLBM able to carry about 10 warheads each. When Polaris A3 missiles with MRV are also taken into consideration, the smaller American ICBM/SLBM force can now, in theory, deliver approximately 4,300 warheads on about 3,550 notionally separate aiming points. The Soviet Union may have begun to deploy packages of three MRV on some of its SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM, although positive evidence for this is understandably lacking, but it has not yet tested MIRV and its current ICBM/SLBM force is still capable of threatening a theoretical maximum of only about 2,090 separate aiming points. When long-range bombers are also taken into account, the present strategic offensive forces of the United States could, in theory, attack about 5,580 aiming points, while their Soviet equivalents could attack only 2,510. By the expiry of the interim agreement, the United States, having completed the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon programmes and having exercised its option to replace Titan 2 ICBM with additional Poseidon submarines, could have a missile force capable, in theory, of attacking over 7,700 aiming points, while the Soviet Union, unless it could develop and deploy effective MIRV by that time, would still be able to threaten only about 2,420 with its own missiles.
All of these theoretical totals are actually biased in favour of the Soviet Union, since, in practice, the distance from its submarines' bases to their patrol stations and the shorter range of their missiles mean that, at most, 40 per cent of Soviet SLBM can be in firing position at any time, as compared with some 60 per cent for the US SLBM force. In fact, the current SLBM launcher totals of the two sides might more realistically be estimated, in terms of missiles in firing positions, as about 400 for the United States and about 220 for the Soviet Union, with notional figures of 425 (USA) and 380 (USSR) for the upper limits set by the new interim agreement. That means that current American strategic missile forces can realistically threaten to launch some 3,150 warheads at about 2,710 aiming points, while parallel Soviet forces have only about 1,750 available warheads matched to separate aiming points. Even if the Soviet Union builds up to its permitted maximum of SLBM, it will still, without MIRV, be able to fire only a maximum of about 1,850 warheads at the same number of aiming points, compared with a potential American total of about 5,650 warheads deliverable on some 5,450 aiming points.
MEGATONNAGE
Gross launcher totals aside, it is only in the size of its individual missile warheads that the Soviet Union is clearly superior to the United States. Each of the 309 Soviet SS-9 ICBM permitted by the interim agreement can carry a single warhead with an explosive yield of 25 MT, whereas the largest American ICBM, the 54 Titan2, can deliver only 10 MT each. Indeed, the majority of Soviet strategic missiles are designed to carry rather larger warheads than their American counterparts, a fact which becomes more obvious as the deployment of American MIRV entails a reduction in total explosive yield at the same time that it brings an increase in the total number of potential aiming points. Taking ICBM and SLBM together, the maximum yield of the warheads deliverable by current American missiles might be estimated as about 2,400 MT, whereas the parallel Soviet force apparently has a maximum theoretical capacity of some 11,400 MT. It is only fair to add that there is an even larger gap in the reverse direction in the case of strategic bombers, since US long-range bombers might have a theoretical capacity to deliver something like 16,500 MT, whereas Soviet bombers could deliver only some 3,600 MT. Nevertheless, it is the ostensible Soviet 'megatonnage' advantage in the field of strategic missiles which has inevitably attracted attention in Western countries.
These figures of relative explosive yield are, in fact, grossly misleading. In the first place, all such calculations habitually assume that both missiles and aircraft will carry weapons of the maximum megatonnage possible and that all weapons will be permanently available in firing position. Each is an unreasonable assumption; apart from the point made earlier about the operational availability of SLBM in particular, all nuclear weapons are bound to be carefully matched to the characteristics of their potential targets, few of which will demand the maximum possible explosive yield. It is highly likely that the vast majority of bomber aircraft would carry only a small fraction of their possible megatonnage, and probable that many missiles, especially of such large size as the SS-9 and Titan 2, will similarly be equipped with warheads of an explosive yield well below the maximum. In the second place, megatonnage is itself an almost totally meaningless criterion. It provides a measurement of the explosive yield of nuclear weapons but gives no direct indication of their relative destructive power, especially when unrelated to the accuracy with which they are delivered. Whereas doubling accuracy may increase target damage by 3-4 times, increasing the yield of a single weapon from 1 MT to 2 MT gives it much less than twice the destructive power. Moreover, further increases in yield secure progressively diminishing increments of real effect. Merely to compare the gross, cumulative megatonnage of two strategic forces, without considering the actual destructive potential of the individual weapons concerned, thus yields nothing of practical significance whatever.
A somewhat better standard of comparison than that offered by megatonnage is provided by 'megaton equivalents', the megaton equivalent (MTE) of any nuclear weapon being taken as the two-thirds power of its explosive yield expressed in megaton units (Y2/3 or yT2).*
(* US Secretaries of Defense have, in the past, expressed the requirements for deterrence in terms of megaton equivalents rather than megatonnage and have implied that 'assured destruction' of the Soviet Union would be the result of delivering not more than 400 megaton equivalents on its territory.)
Even this is unsatisfactory, since it overestimates the potential damage effects of many weapons on many types of target, but it does, at least, provide a partial corrective. Measured by this standard, the strategic forces of the two super-powers are far less asymmetrical than the consideration of cumulative megatonnage would imply. At present, the maximum potential of US missiles (ICBM and SLBM) might, in fact, be estimated as 2,300 MTE, as opposed to about 5,600 MTE for all Soviet missiles, while the maximum potential of US and Soviet bomber aircraft would respectively be some 7,900 MTE and 1,700 MTE. Again, of course, these theoretical figures give a much inflated idea of the destructive power of weapons actually deployed in firing positions.
CONCLUSION
From all this, it is evident that a large number of quite different 'balances' might be struck between the offensive strategic forces now constrained by SALT agreements. What should also be clear is that the proliferation of such 'balances' demonstrates not only the limited utility of any single criterion but also the frailty of all such crude No quantitative comparisons. Each category- delivery vehicles, weapons, aiming points and destructive power-suffers from particular weaknesses. Not all delivery vehicles and weapons will, at any moment, be serviceable, reliable and in positions from which they can reach their targets. Many targets would each have to be covered by a number of separate weapons. Neither force would ever find it useful to exploit' its theoretical destructive power to the maximum. Obviously, therefore, all the figures quoted above are over-estimates. More significantly, however, they tend to conceal the most important fact of all: that, while the United States and the Soviet Union are entirely unable to disarm each other by a first strike against strategic forces, each has within its armoury a number and variety of both delivery vehicles and weapons capable of destroying any conceivable combination of second-strike targets within the other's territory. The SALT treaty on ABM systems, by permitting a level of ABM deployment which, at least in the case of cities, is little more than symbolic, perpetuates that fact, while the interim agreement on offensive missiles embodies a mutual recognition of it. The fact itself is the most persuasive interpretation of strategic 'sufficiency'. Whatever detailed calculations may be constructed, neither superpower can consider itself to have any significant advantage over the other in terms of freedom to engage in nuclear war without incurring obliteration.
Переговоры об ограничении стратегических вооружений (ОСВ) между Соединенными Штатами и Советским Союзом, которые проходили подготовку с ноября 1969 года, привели к заключению их первых официальных соглашений 26 мая 1972 года. Затем в Москве были подписаны три документа: официальный договор об ограничении систем противоракетной обороны (ПРО); временное соглашение об ограничении на срок до пяти лет наступательных стратегических ракет; и протокол, определяющий замены последних на ракеты подводных лодок. В то же время в Хельсинки был парафирован меморандум о различных "толкованиях" и "договоренностях". На первый взгляд может показаться, что эти тексты служат материалом для построения "баланса" между стратегическими ядерными силами двух сверхдержав. Вместе с тем они также свидетельствуют о необходимости проявлять крайнюю осторожность при оценке американо-советских стратегических отношений с точки зрения какого-либо единого количественного стандарта.
Противоракетная оборона Договор по системам ПРО в его толковании относительно прост по содержанию и относительно ясен по своему воздействию на программы подписавших его сторон. В настоящее время Советский Союз располагает небольшой системой ПРО, состоящей из 64 пусковых установок с ракетами Galosh, развернутых в Московской области. Соединенные Штаты еще не ввели в эксплуатацию какую-либо часть своей системы противоракетной обороны Safeguard, но активно занимаются строительством на двух объектах, в Монтане и Северной Дакоте, в рамках подготовки к развертыванию ракет большой дальности Spartan и ракет малой дальности Sprint для защиты шахт МБР Minuteman. В соответствии с новым договором каждой стране разрешается иметь два "района развертывания" ПРО, один из которых защищает столицу, а другой - на какую-то часть ее сил МБР. Каждый район может иметь радиус 150 км (94 мили) с центральной точкой не менее 1300 км (810 миль) от радиуса другого района и может содержать до 100 пусковых установок ракет ПРО. Каждая пусковая установка должна быть статичной и наземной и должна быть способна вести огонь только одной ракетой ПРО с одной боеголовкой. В пределах района обороны столицы действуют ограничения на размещение радиолокаторов, но не на их размер или численность; в пределах района МБР - обороны размеры и численность радаров ограничены, но не радиолокационное развертывание. Ограничения в отношении радаров наряду с общим договорным запретом на развитие к национальной обороны призваны обеспечить, чтобы, несмотря на любое увеличение ракетного потенциала, эффективный охват систем ПРО оставался ограниченным относительно небольшими участками территории. Однако сами ракеты ПРО не имеют качественных ограничений. На практике эти положения означают, что Советский Союз сможет расширить Московскую область системы не более чем до 100 пусковых установок, а также позволило построить другую систему, чтобы защитить некоторые из своих МБР, а США сможет завершить один из комплексов Safeguard защиты МБР (в Гранд-Форкс, Северная Дакота), но должен отказаться от всех других районов, сохранив лишь возможность строительства второй 100-ракетный комплекс для защиты Вашингтона. В то же время, США могут продолжить развитие, например, системы ПРО Hardsite с большим числом и радаров, меньших чем Safeguard, а СССР может при желании заменить Galosh более совершенными ракетами ПРО которые были испытаны в последнее временя.
Договор по ПРО, хотя и подлежит рассмотрению каждые пять лет, имеет неограниченный срок действия. Таким образом, это означает постоянную ситуацию количественной и функциональной симметрии между двумя сторонами. Однако подписавшие его стороны не достигли разрешенных ограничений и не обязательно достигнут в будущем. Соединенные Штаты, несомненно, завершат строительство своего объекта ПРО в Гранд-Форксе, который должен вступить в строй в конце 1974 года, однако нельзя предположить, что администрация пожелает или Конгресс согласится построить второй разрешенный объект в районе Вашингтона (который в любом случае не мог быть введен в строй не ранее 1977-1978 годов). И наоборот, Советский Союз, вероятно, расширит свое развертывание в Московском районе до 100 пусковых установок, которые сейчас разрешены, но еще предстоит выяснить, решит ли он также осуществить свой вариант развертывания второго объекта для защиты МБР.
Наступательные ракеты Временное соглашение по наступательным стратегическим ракетам и прилагаемый к нему протокол, оба из которых остаются в силе в течение пяти лет, короче договора по ПРО, но и, несмотря на дополнительные "толкования", менее ясен. В соглашении не упоминается никакой численности; в нем говорится лишь о том, что общее число пусковых установок МБР и БРПЛ, которые могут иметь каждая страна, будет основываться на количестве, действующих или строящихся 26 мая 1972 года в случае БРПЛ и 1 июля 1972 года в случае МБР. При условии, что не будут развернуты дополнительные современные "тяжелые" МБР (типа советских SS-9), свободно разрешена модернизация и замена подводных лодок, пусковых установок и ракет. Кроме того, пусковые установки МБР, развернутые до 1964 года, могут быть обменены на равное число новых пусковых установок БРПЛ, как и пусковые установки на (неопределенных) "старых" подводных лодках. Протокол, разрешает, для Соединенные Штаты, не более 710 пусковых установок БРПЛ и не более 44 'современных' ракетных подводных лодок, в то время как СССР может иметь до 950 пусковых установок БРПЛ и не более 62 'современных' подводных лодок.
Очевидно данное соглашение позволяет США из существующих в общей сложности 1054 МБР, 656 БРПЛ и (41 подводные лодки), из которых 54 МБР Titan 2, могут быть обменены в будущем на такое же количество новых БРПЛ до трех подводных лодок, доведя промежуточные суммы до 1000 и 710 соответственно.*
(*В принципе, Соединенные Штаты могли бы также приобрести новую БРПЛ взамен любой МБР Minuteman 1, развернутой до 1964 года и все еще находящейся на вооружении. Однако это повлекло бы за собой либо списание эквивалентного количества его нынешних БРПЛ, либо сохранение эквивалентного количества МБР Titan 2 в эксплуатации.)
С другой стороны, Советский Союз может иметь 1618 МБР и 740 БРПЛ на 56 атомных подводных лодках (включая около 46 современных подводных лодок Y-класса), которые в настоящее время эксплуатируются или строятся. (Из них около 1530 МБР и 560 БРПЛ уже находятся на вооружении, 66 из них на дизельных подводных лодках.) Он также может построить 210 дополнительных пусковых установок БРПЛ для замены 210 SS-7 и SS-8 МБР, развернутых до 1964 которые по-прежнему в строю или, как частичная альтернатива, заменить оставшиеся пусковые установки старых подводных лодок равным количеством пусковых установок в новых атомных подводных лодок, все в рамках общего лимита 950 БРПЛ и 62 современных подводных лодок. Обе стороны могут, как правило, заменить старые пусковые установки или системы боеголовок новыми, при условии лишь запрета на дополнительные "тяжелые" МБР типа SS-9. Таким образом, в количественных ограничениях в настоящее время установлено, Соединенные Штаты Америки могут продолжать замену Minuteman 1/2 и Polaris на Minuteman 3 и Poseidon с системами РГЧИН, и для продолжения развития новой системы БРПЛ Trident (ранее известной как ULMS: подводные ракеты большой дальности), в то время как Советский Союз свободен для продолжения развития таких систем, своего нового с 3,000-мильной дальностью БРПЛ SS-N-8.
Баланс НОСИТЕЛИ
Все качественные изменения происходящие в течение пятилетнего срока действия договора, допускаемых количественных уровней ПУ ракет пользу Советского Союза, который, если он сохраняет свои дизельные подводные лодки в строю, могут иметь 2,424 пусковых установок, в том числе до 950 БРПЛ, в отличие от общей для Соединенных Штатов, как настоящих, так и потенциальных, от 1,710, в том числе до 710 БРПЛ. Очевидно, что это дает еще больший перевес в пользу Советского Союза, чем тот, который обеспечен его нынешним общим числом пусковых установок около 2090. Вместе с тем уместным является ряд важных оговорок.
Во-первых, Советский Союз, для того, чтобы достичь максимально допустимого уровня 950 БРПЛ, придется сделать выбор между двумя очевидными курсы: (i) слом своих дизельных ракетных подводных лодок и замены всех 210 "старых" МБР с новой БРПЛ, в результате чего его общее число ПУ будет 2,358, и (ii) обмен 144 "старых" МБР и 66 БРПЛ на дизельных подводных лодках на новые БРПЛ, оставшиеся 66 "старых" МБР должны быть сохранены или заменены новыми "легких" МБР. Хотя курс (ii) дает преимущество с точки зрения общего числа пусковых установок, курс (i), с его незначительным сокращением этого общего числа, может оказаться более экономичным.
Во-вторых, временное соглашение устанавливает ограничения в отношении пусковых установок, которые в настоящее время эксплуатируются или строятся, но не учитывает новое строительство, которое в противном случае могло бы начаться в течение его пятилетнего срока. Советский Союз строит новые пусковые установки БРПЛ со скоростью около 128 единиц в год и ранее демонстрировал способность ежегодно пополнять свои силы примерно 250 МБР. Таким образом, еще через пять лет Советский Союз мог бы теоретически иметь около 1200 пусковых установок БРПЛ и почти 2800 МБР, в отличие от гораздо более низких показателей, установленных в настоящее время. Между тем Соединенные Штаты, не имея активной программы увеличения своих пусковых установок БРПЛ или МБР к 1977-1978 годам, оставались бы на нынешнем уровне 656 БРПЛ и 1054 МБР. Таким образом, можно, по крайней мере, утверждать, что соглашение существенно ограничило потенциальное советское преимущество в пусковых установок.
В-третьих, в приведенных выше цифрах, как и во временном соглашении, ничего не говорится о межконтинентальных бомбардировщиках. Сейчас в США примерно на 455 из них (включая бомбардировщики B-52 в действующем резерве, но исключая средние бомбардировщики FB-111), по сравнению с 140 более медленных и с меньшей дальностью бомбардировщиков у СССР, из которых 100 являются винтовыми. Кроме того, американские дальние бомбардировщики могут нести значительно большую боевую нагрузку, чем их советские аналоги; в целом, американские силы имеют грузоподъемность около 30-5 миллионов фунтов, по сравнению с только около 4-8 миллионов фунтов для Советского Союза. В настоящее время это означает, что эти американские бомбардировщики теоретически могут доставить около 2000 единиц оружия по советским целям, тогда как советские стратегические бомбардировщики могут нести только около 420 единиц. В течение пяти лет, по мере того как Соединенные Штаты завершают оснащение своих бомбардировочных сил ракетами малой дальности (SRAM), которые сейчас находятся в производстве, количество ядерного оружия, которое может нести их стратегическая авиация, может возрасти до чего-то более 7500.
БОЕГОЛОВКИ И ЦЕЛИ
Более широкая оговорка заключается в том, что во временном соглашении не учитывается число боеголовок, а только ракет. США уже далеко продвинулся в своей программе РГЧ, развернув около 200 Minuteman 3 ракеты с тремя боеголовками каждая и около 160 БРПЛ Poseidon способны нести 10 боезарядов каждая. Когда ракеты Polaris A3 с MRV также принимаются во внимание, меньшие американские силы МБР/SLBM теперь могут теоретически доставлять около 4300 боеголовок примерно на 3550 условно отдельных прицельных точках. Советский Союз, возможно, начал развертывать пакеты из трех MRV на некоторых своих МБР SS-9 и SS-11, хотя положительных доказательств этого, по понятным причинам, не хватает, но он еще не испытал MIRV, и его нынешние силы МБР/БРПЛ по-прежнему способны угрожать теоретическому максимуму только около 2090 отдельных точек прицеливания. При учете дальних бомбардировщиков нынешние стратегические наступательные силы США теоретически могли бы атаковать около 5580 прицельных пунктов, в то время как их советские аналоги могли атаковать только 2510. По истечении срока действия временного соглашения, США, завершив Minuteman 3 и Poseidon программы и свое право на замену МБР Titan 2 на дополнительные Poseidon подводных лодок, имели бы ракетые силы, способные, в теории, атаковать более 7700 точек прицеливания, тогда как СССР, если он не сможет разрабатывать и развертывать эффективные РГЧ к тому времени, по-прежнему будут способны угрожать только о 2,420 своими ракетами.
Все эти теоретические итоги фактически предвзяты в пользу Советского Союза, поскольку на практике расстояние от баз подводных лодок до их позиций патрулирования и меньшая дальность их ракет означают, что не более 40% советских БРПЛ могут находиться в огневой позиции в любое время по сравнению с примерно 60% для американских сил БРПЛ. Таким образом, текущее число пусковых установок БРПЛ двух сторон было бы более реалистично оценить с точки зрения ракет на огневых позициях, как около 400 для Соединенных Штатов и около 220 для Советского Союза, с условными цифрами 425 (США) и 380 (СССР) для верхних пределов, установленных новым временным соглашением. Это означает, что нынешние американские стратегические ракетные силы могут реально угрожать запуском около 3150 боеголовок примерно по 2710 точкам прицеливания, в то время как параллельные советские силы имеют только около 1750 доступных боеголовок, соответствующих отдельным точкам прицеливания. Даже если Советский Союз будет наращивать свой разрешенный максимум БРПЛ, он все равно, без MIRV, сможет вести огонь только максимум около 1850 боеголовками с тем же количестве точек прицеливания, по сравнению с потенциальным американским итогом около 5650 боеголовок, доставляемых примерно на 5450 точек прицеливания.
МЕГАТОННАЖ
Не только по числу ПУ, но по размеру ее отдельных ракетных боеголовок Советский Союз явно превосходит Соединенные Штаты. Каждая из 309 советских МБР SS-9, разрешенных временным соглашением, может нести одну боеголовку мощностью 25 МТ, тогда как самая крупная американская МБР-54 Titan2 - может доставить только по 10 Мт каждая. Действительно, большинство советских стратегических ракет рассчитаны на несение более крупных боеголовок, чем их американские аналоги, что становится более очевидным по мере того, как развертывание американского MIRV влечет за собой снижение суммарной взрывной мощности при одновременном увеличении общего числа потенциальных точек прицеливания. Если взять МБР и БРПЛ вместе, то максимальная мощность боеголовок, доставляемых нынешними американскими ракетами, может быть оценена примерно в 2 400 МТ, тогда как параллельные советские силы, по-видимому, имеют максимальную теоретическую мощность около 11 400 МТ. Справедливости ради следует добавить, что для стратегических бомбардировщиков существует еще больший разрыв в обратном направлении, поскольку американские дальние бомбардировщики могут иметь теоретическую возможность доставить около 16 500 МТ, в то время как советские бомбардировщики могли доставить только около 3 600 МТ. Тем не менее, именно мнимое советское "мегатоннажное" преимущество в области стратегических ракет неизбежно привлекло внимание западных стран.
Эти цифры относительной взрывной мощности, по сути, вводят в заблуждение. Во-первых, все такие расчеты обычно предполагают, что и ракеты, и самолеты будут нести оружие максимальной возможного мегатоннажа и что все оружие будет постоянно находиться в огневой позиции. Каждое из них является необоснованным предположением; за исключением ранее сделанного замечания относительно оперативной доступности, в частности, БРПЛ, все ядерное оружие должно быть тщательно сопоставлено с характеристиками их потенциальных целей, немногие из которых потребуют максимально возможной взрывной мощности. Весьма вероятно, что подавляющее большинство бомбардировочных самолетов будет нести лишь небольшую часть их возможного мегатоннажа, и вероятно, что многие ракеты, особенно таких больших размеров, как SS-9 и Titan 2, будут аналогичным образом оснащены боеголовками взрывной мощности значительно ниже максимума. Во-вторых, мегатоннаж сам почти совершенно бессмысленный критерий. Он обеспечивает измерение взрывной мощности ядерного оружия, но не дает прямого указания на его относительную разрушительную мощь, особенно когда это не связано с точностью, с которой оно доставляется. В то время как удвоение точности может увеличить урон цели в 3-4 раза, увеличение мощности одного заряда с 1 МТ до 2 МТ дает гораздо меньше, чем в два раза разрушительную силу. Кроме того, дальнейшее повышение мощности обеспечивает постепенное снижение реального эффекта. Простое сравнение совокупного мегатоннажа двух стратегических сил без учета фактического разрушительного потенциала каждого конкретного вида вооружений не дает, таким образом, никакого практического значения.
Немного лучше стандарта сравнения, чем предлагает мегатоннаж обеспечивает мегатонный эквивалент (МТЕ) любого ядерного оружия как мощность в степени 2/3.*
(*В прошлом министры обороны США выражали требования к сдерживанию в мегатонным эквиваленте, а не мегатоннажа, и подразумевали, что "гарантированное уничтожение" Советского Союза будет результатом доставки на его территорию не более 400 мегатонного эквивалента.)
Даже это неудовлетворительно, поскольку оно переоценивает потенциальный ущерб, наносимый многими видами оружия многим целям, но, по крайней мере, обеспечивает частичную корректировку. Измеряемые этим стандартом, стратегические силы двух сверхдержав гораздо менее асимметричны, чем рассмотрение совокупного мегатоннажа. В настоящее время максимальный потенциал американских ракет (МБР и БРПЛ) фактически может быть оценен в 2300 МТЭ, в отличие от примерно 5600 МТЭ для всех советских ракет, в то время как максимальный потенциал американских и советских бомбардировщиков соответственно составит около 7900 МТЭ и 1700 МТЭ. Опять же, конечно, эти теоретические цифры дают сильно раздутое представление о разрушительной силе оружия, фактически развернутого на огневых позициях.
ВЫВОД
Из всего этого становится очевидным, что между наступательными стратегическими силами, сдерживаемыми ныне соглашениями ОСВ, может возникнуть большое количество совершенно разных "балансов". Должно быть также ясно, что увеличение числа таких "балансов" свидетельствует не только об ограниченной полезности какого-либо одного критерия, но и о слабости всех таких грубых количественных сопоставлений. Каждая категория - средства доставки, оружие, точки прицеливания и разрушительная сила - страдает от определенных недостатков. Не все средства доставки и оружие в любой момент будут исправными, надежными и в местах, с которых они могут достичь своих целей. Многие цели должны быть охвачены рядом отдельных видов оружия. Ни одна из сил никогда не найдет полезным использовать " свою теоретическую разрушительную силу до максимума. Поэтому очевидно, что все приведенные выше цифры являются завышенными. Что еще более важно, однако, они склонны скрывать самый важный факт из всех: что, хотя Соединенные Штаты и Советский Союз совершенно не в состоянии разоружить друг друга первым ударом по стратегическим силам, каждый из них имеет в своем арсенале ряд и разнообразие как средств доставки, так и оружия, способных уничтожить любую мыслимую комбинацию целей вторым ударом на территории другого. Договор по системам ПРО, допуская такой уровень развертывания ПРО, который, по крайней мере в случае городов, является не более чем символическим, закрепляет этот факт, в то время как временное соглашение по наступательным ракетам воплощает в себе взаимное признание этого факта. Сам факт является наиболее убедительной интерпретацией стратегической "достаточности". Какие бы подробные расчеты ни строились, ни одна сверхдержава не может считать себя обладающей каким-либо значительным преимуществом перед другой в плане свободы вести ядерную войну, не подвергаясь уничтожению.
Any assessment of the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact involves comparison of the strengths of both men and equipment, consideration of qualitative characteristics such as geographical advantages, deployment, training and logistic support, and differences in doctrine and philosophy. Certain qualitative factors are of special importance. For a variety of reasons the Soviet Union is likely to have within the theatre, or near by, forces which closely reflect their appreciations; on the other hand NATO, bound as it is by a multinational political process and by public pressures that do not exist in the Soviet Union, has tended to compromise its military requirements. Warsaw Pact equipment is standardized whereas that of NATO is not, imposing limits on interchange and flexibility. There is little depth in the NATO central area and this presents problems in its defence.
The appraisal which follows should be regarded as primarily a quantitative guide since there are difficulties in giving values, in so short a space, to qualitative factors and deciding on their relevance. It is military only and thus one-dimensional. Furthermore the situation is not a static one: any single presentation must have inadequacies. The comparisons necessarily over-simplify what is by its nature a complex problem.*
(*The characteristics of the military balance are central to any discussion of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and a brief note on this subject will be found at the end of this Appendix. A fuller treatment of the issues in MBFR is in Strategic Survey 1971,pp. 17-20.)
Land and air forces The three NATO major subordinate commands, Northern, Central and Southern Europe, at first seem to offer a convenient basis for making a direct comparison with the opposing forces of the Warsaw Pact but there are problems. The Northern European Command covers not only Norway but also the Baltic area including Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic Approaches. It is not possible to make precise calculations as to the Soviet formations that would be committed to the Baltic area rather than towards the NATO Central European Command. In both land and air forces there is a considerable degree of flexibility to do either: for the Warsaw Pact this sector is a coherent front. For this reason, Northern and Central Europe are grouped together in the tables which follow and Southern Europe is shown separately. Such a grouping conceals, however, a marked imbalance in North Norway.
If French formations (not part of NATO's integrated commands) are included they would add two mechanized divisions to the NATO totals. The appropriate forces of all of the Warsaw Pact countries are included, though the military values of some of them may be suspect for political reasons.
In Norway there are only Norwegian forces in peacetime, a brigade group being located in the north. The Soviet forces facing them, or which could be brought against them from North-Western Russia, probably amount to at least four divisions. This wide disparity highlights the problem of the defence of North Norway against surprise attack. To meet this difficulty a system of self defence, based on a powerful Home Guard and rapid mobilization, has been designed to take maximum advantage of the ruggedness of the country and the poor road and rail communications, but it is clear that defence against attack of any size depends on timely external assistance.
Two further imbalances are worth noting. The first, a legacy from the post-war occupation zones, is a certain maldeployment in the NATO Central European Command, where the well-equipped and strong American formations are stationed in the southern part of the front, an area which geographically lends itself to defence, while in the north German plain, across which the routes to allied capitals run, where there is little depth and few major obstacles, certain of the forces are less powerful. The second is that the whole of the Italian land forces, which are included in the table under Southern Europe, are stationed in Italy and thus are at some distance from the areas of potential confrontation.
MANPOWER
A comparison of formations is not by itself sufficient however, since NATO formations, though many of them are under-manned, are much larger than those of the Warsaw Pact.11 It is necessary to take account of this difference in size and also of the combat troops in formations higher than divisions and those men who directly support them. Figures calculated on this basis - and the calculation can only be an approximate and arbitrary one - give the following comparison for forces in peacetime (figures are in thousands):
a. Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which AFGENT and AFNORTH commanders have responsibility (see introduction to NATO section). France is not included nor are any allied ground forces in Portugal or Britain. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in western USSR and such troops as might be committed to the Baltic theatre of operations have, however, been included on the Warsaw Pact side.
b. Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish land forces (including those in Asian Turkey) and such American and British units as would he committed to the Mediterranean theatre of operations, and on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, and such Soviet units normally stationed In Hungary and southern USSR as might be committed to the Mediterranean theatre.
If French forces are counted, including those stationed in France, the NATO figure for Northern and Central Europe might be increased by perhaps 120,000.c
c. These are the two divisions stationed in Germany. There are four more in France.
REINFORCEMENTS
The mobilization of first line reserves and the movement of reinforcements to the theatre would materially alter the above figures. The immediate mobilization capacity of the Warsaw Pact is greater than that of the West: it has been estimated that the force of 31 Soviet divisions in Central Europe might be increased to 70 in well under a month, if mobilization were unimpeded. The Soviet Union, a European power and operating on interior lines, can bring up reinforcements overland, with heavy equipment, far faster than can the United States across the Atlantic. American ability to bring back quickly by air the dual-based brigades whose equipment is in Germany has been demonstrated and the C-5 aircraft, some 60 of which are now in service, has greatly increased the airlift. But this lift depends on a secure air environment, safe airfields to fly into, and the willingness to reinforce in a crisis situation at the risk of heightening tension by doing so. And reinforcing divisions would need sealift to move their heavy equipment.
Implicit in Western defence plans is the concept of political warning time, that there will be sufficient warning of a possible attack to enable NATO forces to be brought to a higher state of readiness and for reinforcement and mobilization to take place. Advantage here will always lie with an attacker, who can start mobilization first, hope to conceal his intentions and achieve some degree of tactical surprise. The point of attack can be chosen and a significant local superiority built up. The defender is likely to start more slowly and will have to remain on guard at all points.
A fair summary of the reinforcement position might be that the Warsaw Pact is intrinsically capable of a faster build up in the early stages, particularly if local or general surprise is achieved; that NATO can only match such an initial build up if it has, and takes advantage of, sufficient warning time; that the subsequent rate of build up favours the Warsaw Pact unless the crisis develops slowly enough to permit full reinforcement; in this last case the West would be in a position much more resembling equality. Alliance countries maintain more men under arms than the Warsaw Pact. For Army/Marines the figures(in thousands) are: NATO 3,091 (including France 328); Warsaw Pact 2,806. Of course large numbers of these men are outside Europe, as for example American forces in Asia and Soviet forces on their Far Eastern frontier.
EQUIPMENT
In a comparison of equipment one point stands out: the Warsaw Pact is armed almost completely with Soviet or Soviet-designed material and enjoys the flexibility, simplicity of training and economy that standardization brings. NATO forces have a wide variety of everything from weapons systems to vehicles, with consequent duplication of supply systems and some difficulties of inter-operability.
As to numbers of weapons, there are some notable differences, of which tanks are perhaps the most significant. The relative tank strengths are as follows:
c These are tanks with formations only and not total inventory; they exclude those in reserve or storage.
It will be seen that NATO has little more than a third as many operational tanks as the Warsaw Pact in Northern and Central Europe, though NATO tanks are generally more modern (except for the T-62, now in service in the Pact forces in some numbers). This relative weakness in tanks (and in other armoured fighting vehicles) reflects NATO's essentially defensive role and is offset to some extent by a superiority in ground anti-tank weapons. NATO probably also has more effective airborne anti-tank weapons, such as the missiles carried by fighter aircraft and helicopters. In conventional artillery the Warsaw Pact is much stronger though this advantage is partly redressed by the greater lethality of NATO ammunition and its greater logistic capability to sustain higher rates of fire. This capability stems from a significantly higher transport lift, about half as high again in a NATO division as compared with a Warsaw Pact one. NATO has, however, an inflexible logistic system, based almost entirely on national supply lines with little central co-ordination. It cannot now use French territory and has many lines of communication running north to south, near the area of forward deployment. Certain alliance countries are, furthermore, short of supplies for sustained combat.
AIRCRAFT
If NATO ground formations are to be able to exploit, by day as well as by night, the mobility they possess, they must have a greater degree of air cover over the battlefield than they now have. Such cover is provided by a combination of rapid warning and communications systems, surface-to-air weapons and fighter aircraft. In much of this ground-air environment NATO is well prepared, but in numbers of aircraft it is markedly inferior, as the table on p. 90 shows.
The division into the categories shown is only approximate since some aircraft can be adapted to more than one kind of mission. In general NATO has a higher proportion of multi-purpose aircraft of good performance over their full mission profiles, especially in range and payload. Both sides are modernizing their inventories but the Warsaw Pact has recently introduced new types, such as the MiG-23, possibly superior to any interceptor that NATO has in operational service. The two air forces have, however, different roles: long range and payload have lower priority for the Warsaw Pact. NATO, for example, has maintained a long-range deep-strike tactical aircraft capability; the Soviet Union has chosen to build a MRBM force which could, under certain circumstances, perform analogous missions.
The Warsaw Pact enjoys the advantage of interior lines of communication which make for ease of command and control and logistics. They have a relatively high capability to operate from dispersed natural airfields serviced by mobile systems, have far more airfields with more shelters and the great advantage of standard ground support equipment which stems from having only Soviet-designed aircraft. These factors make for much greater flexibility than NATO, with its many national sources of aircraft and wide variety of support equipment. NATO probably has some superiority in sophistication of equipment, the capability of its aircrews, which have in general higher training standards and fly more hours, and the versatility of its aircraft. The NATO countries also have a world-wide inventory of aircraft greater than that of the Warsaw Pact and in a situation where total reinforcement can be taken into account would have the greater capability. With all these different factors the relative capabilities are not measurable in precise terms but the Warsaw Pact advantage in numbers remains a very real one.
THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NATO has some 7,000 nuclear warheads, deliverable by a variety of vehicles, some 2,250 in all, aircraft, short-range missiles and artillery*.
(*These nuclear weapons are in general designed for use within the battlefield area or directly connected with the manoeuvre of combatant forces, which could be described as a 'tactical' use. The figure of 7,000 warheads includes however, a substantial number carried by, for example, aircraft such as the F-4 or F-104, which could be delivered on targets outside the battlefield area or unconnected with the manoeuvre of combatant forces and thus be put to 'strategic' use. There is inevitably some overlap when describing delivery vehicles, aircraft and missiles, capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads, as 'tactical' or 'strategic'. The total of 7,000 also includes nuclear warheads for certain air-defence missiles.
There are also nuclear mines. Yields are variable but are mainly in the low kiloton range. The ground-based missile launchers and guns are in formations down to divisions and are operated both by American and allied troops, but in the latter case warheads are under double key. The figure for Soviet warheads is probably about 3,500, delivered by roughly comparable aircraft and missile systems. Soviet warheads are thought to be somewhat larger, on average, than those of NATO. Some of the delivery vehicles, but not the warheads, are in the hands of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.)
This comparison of nuclear warheads must not be looked at in quite the same light as the conventional comparisons preceding it, since on the NATO side the strategic doctrine is not and cannot be based on the use of such weapons on this sort of scale. These numbers were accumulated to implement an earlier, predominantly nuclear, strategy and an inventory of this size now has the chief merit of affording a wide range of choice of weapons, yield and delivery system if controlled escalation has to be contemplated. A point that does emerge from the comparison, however, is that the Soviet Union has the ability to launch a battlefield nuclear offensive on a massive scale if it should choose, or to match any NATO escalation with broadly similar options.
CHANGES OVER TIME
The comparisons above are not very different from those of a year ago, but over a longer time-span the effect of small and slow changes can be marked and the balance can alter. In 1962 the American land, sea and air forces in Europe totalled 434,000; now the figure is 300,000. There were 26 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe in 1967; now there are 31.The numbers and quality of surface-to-air missiles in the Warsaw Pact forces have steadily grown, presenting now a most formidable defence, and Soviet tactical aircraft numbers have grown with them. The general pattern over the years has been a gradual shift in favour of the East.
Naval forces To compare the maritime strengths of the two sides, particularly on a regional basis, offers many difficulties. Naval power is highly flexible; ships move between fleets, fleets move over great distances: strategic and tactical functions are often speedily interchangeable. It is far from easy and often inappropriate to set ships off against each other numerically. The requirement for destroyers, for example, is not related to the number of enemy destroyers but to the need to maintain a presence and to escort surface vessels against submarine or air threat; in anti-submarine warfare, surface vessels, submarines and maritime aircraft operate as combined teams (though submarines now play an increasing part in countering other submarines).
Given these and many other reservations, some touched on later, the relative strengths of the more significant ships in the North Atlantic, Baltic and Mediterranean/Black Sea areas are listed below.' The figures must not be regarded as indicating any fixed or optimum fleet dispositions, but simply a typical strength; transfers to and from the Soviet or American Pacific fleets can and do take place (though the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will be dictated not only by the number of American ships in that area but also by the navies of China, Japan, Australia and perhaps other countries).
The figures do not include the French Navy which, as will be seen on p. 20, is a substantial force and quantitatively stronger than the Soviet Mediterranean squadron normally is.
g. Ships have not been divided between the three fleet areas but typical strengths for these fleets were given in The Military Balance 1970-71, pp. 96-97.
h. These ships have significant anti-ship weapons, in the Soviet case long-range SSM.
i. The missiles carried by these ships are primarily or exclusively for air defence (SAM).
The comparisons show marked and well known asymmetries. The United States Navy has powerful carrier-strike forces, with aircraft and missiles for air defence and anti-submarine warfare and with long range aircraft for the strike role against surface vessels and land targets, nuclear-armed if appropriate. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, has no attack carriers and relies on land-based aircraft for both air cover and strike, supplemented by ship-borne SAM and, of course, by the long-range SSM which a number of Soviet vessels carry and for which there is no Western equivalent. This lack of carrier-borne aircraft would in war or in time of tension effectively limit the radius of action of Soviet surface fleets, despite the fact that they are in other ways becoming increasingly self-sufficient; it means that they do not have a true world-wide maritime capability.
The Soviet Union has had to develop a counter to the strategic threat posed by strike carriers and missile submarines in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and has built large numbers of submarines for this purpose. Because of this the West has paid great attention to anti-submarine warfare and is probably ahead in this field, but this does not offset the sheer numbers of submarines that the Soviet Union deploys; to find and engage nuclear-powered boats is particularly difficult (the increased numbers of Soviet SSBN mean that more Western SSN are required to counter them). This imbalance is the more important because the West depends on major naval surface ships and on the carriage by sea of basic commodities: it is more vulnerable to submarine attack than is the Soviet Union.
The long-range SSM on Soviet cruisers, destroyers and submarines have some limitations and the modern horizon-range systems now entering service present a more serious problem.*
(* The effectiveness of these long-range SSM against ships is limited by their need for some form of external target location data.)
In narrow waters or in home defence the short-range SSM on the patrol boats are most effective and are backed up by missiles carried by naval aircraft and in shore batteries.
Any assessment of an overall balance is difficult to make. The differing roles in wartime must be taken into account: the Soviet fleets would be largely strategically-defensive, meeting the threat posed by Western carrier strike forces and missile submarines (though there would be large numbers of Soviet submarines left available for offensive purposes). The nature of the main deployment areas must also be considered. In the Mediterranean, for example, Soviet re-supply and reinforcement to and from the naval squadron could be extremely difficult. Of great importance would be the degree of availability to the Soviet Union of airfields in the Mediterranean countries. In the North Atlantic the United States can readily draw on reinforcements from the home base; the Soviet Union, by contrast, is much more limited in its strategic movement, and its main base in the Kola Peninsula area is very vulnerable.
The biggest imponderable is that of the nature and duration of any future conflict. If extended, then Soviet submarine strength would be a menace to Western shipping, world-wide, whereas the Soviet Union is much more self-sufficient. If short, then naval action is unlikely to be dominant; the outcome would be decided on land. There are too many variables to allow of comprehensive judgments but it seems fair to say that while the sea is still an area in which the West has superiority, the Soviet fleets are now able to offer a challenge at every level of military or politico-military action.
NEW CONSTRUCTION
This challenge has emerged in recent years and is the result of a Soviet shift to a more forward deployment rather than more rapid naval building in the East than the West. The following table, which lists the deliveries of new ships over 1,000 tons, of major conversions and of ocean-going submarines in the last ten calendar years, to the Warsaw Pact* and NATO navies, excluding France, helps to show the allocation of resources by the two sides. It certainly brings out the Soviet emphasis on the building of submarines, particularly marked since 1968, but as far as surface naval vessels are concerned it also shows that the NATO countries have generally been outbuilding the Warsaw Pact, quantitatively and often qualitatively. The ships to be delivered in the next few years will be the result of decisions taken some years ago and shipbuilding in individual NATO countries tends in any case to be somewhat of a cyclical affair.
(*In fact the Soviet Union, since the other Warsaw Pact countries received no new ships in the period.)
The pattern revealed by this table may not necessarily be maintained but there is no indication that Soviet naval building is falling and there is some upsurge in Western construction.
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) The characteristics of the military balance set out in the foregoing paragraphs are of central importance to any discussion or negotiation of mutual (and perhaps balanced) force reductions in Europe and will have to be taken into account by both sides if each is not to be placed, as a result of changes at a disadvantage. Most of the factors are variables and may change over time, but the geographical asymmetry is not: this point is critical. Though there are many uncertainties, quantitative, qualitative and methodological attaching to the calculation of the relative force capabilities of the two sides, discussion of the military desirability or otherwise of reductions and the form that reductions might take must reflect such calculation.
Military considerations are, of course, only part of the problem; political questions are of first importance. These include the extent to which reductions should consist of stationed or indigenous forces and their equipment; the areas of application; measures for the control of the process of reduction and of verification that it has taken place; and the effects on relationships within the alliances of any agreements reached.
Nevertheless a careful assessment of the military advantages and disadvantages of various kinds of reductions or measures is essential to prudent negotiation.
NOTES
a. The Soviet Navy has no attack carriers. The Moskva-class (see below) is an ASW cruiser.
b. Moskva-class. One of the NATO SAM cruisers has a similar but smaller capability but the remainder are not really comparable.
c. Kynda, Kresta, Kildin, Kanin and Krivak-classes. There is no comparable SSM ship in NATO fleets.
d. This NATO category covers a wide range of destroyers, the largest of which, the nuclear-powered DLGN would be classified by some navies as a light cruiser. In general the Warsaw Pact ships in this category are much smaller.
e. The small size of these Soviet escorts limits their world-wide value. Of the NATO ships compared here the greater proportion qualify in many respects for the heavier category E.
f. Including Commando Carriers and assault ships, all larger than Soviet vessels, which are in category H.
g. The Soviet building rate is now about 7 a year; the US figure about 6.
h. Over 700 tons only. NATO has built about a further 35 between 450-600 tons. About 25 of the Soviet submarines carry cruise missiles, usable against ships or land targets.
i. The Soviet building rate is about 8a year, perhaps more The US Polaris programme ended in 1967, but 10 boats have been converted to Poseidon.
ДОБАВЛЕНИЕ II: Баланс между NATO и Варшавским договором на ТВД Любая оценка военного баланса между NATO и Варшавским договором предполагает сопоставление сил сторон как людей, так и техники, рассмотрение качественных характеристик, таких как географические преимущества, развертывание, подготовка и материально-техническое обеспечение, а также различия в доктрине и философии. Особое значение имеют определенные качественные факторы. По различным причинам, для СССР, вероятно, на ТВД, или поблизости от него, силы, точно отражают их оценки; с другой стороны NATO, в силу многонационального политического процесса и общественного давления, которого не существует в Советском Союзе, как правило, идут на компромисс в своих военных требованиях. Техника Варшавского договора стандартизирована, а NATO - нет, что накладывает ограничения на обмен и гибкость. В центральной зоне NATO малая глубина обороны, и это создает проблемы.
Нижеследующая оценка должна рассматриваться в первую очередь как количественное руководство, поскольку существуют трудности с определением ценности качественных факторов и с определением их актуальности. Он только военный и поэтому однобокий. Кроме того, ситуация не является статичной: любая презентация должна иметь недостатки. Сравнения неизбежно чрезмерно упрощают то, что по своей природе является сложной проблемой.*
(*Характеристики военного баланса имеют центральное значение для любого обсуждения вопроса о взаимном и сбалансированном сокращении вооруженных сил (MBFR), и краткая записка по этому вопросу содержится в конце настоящего добавления. Полное освещение проблемы в MBFR в Strategic Survey 1971, с. 17-20.)
Сухопутные и воздушные силы Три главных подчиненных командования NATO - Северной, Центральной и Южной Европы - поначалу кажутся удобной основой для проведения прямого сравнения с противостоящими силами Варшавского договора, но есть проблемы. Североевропейское командование охватывает не только Норвегию, но и Прибалтику, включая Данию, Шлезвиг-Гольштейн и Балтийские проходы. Невозможно произвести точные расчеты в отношении советских формирований, которые были бы выделены Балтийскому региону, а не центрально-европейскому командованию NATO. Как в сухопутных, так и в воздушных силах существует значительная степень гибкости: для Варшавского договора этот сектор является согласованным фронтом. По этой причине Северная и Центральная Европа объединены в нижеследующий таблице, а Южная Европа показана отдельно. Однако такая группировка скрывает заметный дисбаланс в Северной Норвегии.
Если бы французские формирования (не входящие в состав интегрированных командований NATO) были включены, они добавили бы две механизированные дивизии к общим показателям NATO. Включены соответствующие силы всех стран Варшавского договора, хотя военные ценности некоторых из них могут вызывать подозрения по политическим причинам.
В Норвегии есть только норвежские силы в мирное время, бригадная группа находится на севере. Советские войска, стоящие перед ними или которые могут быть привлечены против них из Северо-Западной России, вероятно, составляют не менее четырех дивизий. Это большое неравенство является проблемой защиты Северной Норвегии от внезапного нападения. Для решения этой проблемы была разработана система самообороны, основанная на мощном ополчении и быстрой мобилизации, с тем, чтобы в максимальной степени использовать в своих интересах укрепление страны и плохое состояние автомобильных и железнодорожных коммуникаций, однако ясно, что защита от нападений любого масштаба зависит от своевременной помощи извне.
Следует отметить еще два дисбаланса. Первый, унаследованный от послевоенных оккупационных зон, развертывание в Центрально-европейском командовании NATO, где хорошо оснащенные и сильные американские формирования, дислоцированы на южном участке фронта, в районе, который территориально благоприятен для обороны. В то время как в Северогерманская низменность, на которой расположены столицы союзников, небольшой глубины и малым числом серьезных препятствий, силы менее мощные. Вторая заключается в том, что все итальянские сухопутные войска, которые включены в таблицу по Южной Европе, дислоцированы в Италии и, таким образом, находятся на некотором расстоянии от районов потенциальной конфронтации.
ЛИЧНЫЙ СОСТАВ
Однако сравнение формаций само по себе не является достаточным, поскольку формирования NATO намного крупнее, чем те, что представлены в Варшавском договоре.* Необходимо учитывать эту разницу в численности, а также в составе боевых формирований выше дивизий и тех бойцов, которые непосредственно их поддерживают. Цифры, рассчитанные на этой основе - а расчет может быть только приблизительным и произвольным - дают следующее сравнение для сил в мирное время (цифры в тысячах):
a. Включает, со стороны NATO, командования, за которые несут ответственность командования AFCENT и AFNORTH (см. введение в раздел NATO). Франция не входит и союзнические сухопутные войска в Португалии или Великобритании. Со стороны Варшавского договора включает командование, за которое отвечает Верховный Главнокомандующий пактом, но исключает вооруженные силы Болгарии и Румынии. Советские части, обычно размещенные в западном СССР, и такие войска, которые могли бы быть направлены на Балтийский театр военных действий, были, однако, включены в Варшавский договор.
b. Включает, со стороны NATO, итальянские, греческие и турецкие сухопутные силы (в том числе в азиатской части Турции), и такие американские и британские подразделения, как на Средиземноморском театре операций, и со стороны Варшавского договора сухопутные войска Болгарии, Венгрии и Румынии, и такие советские подразделения, которые расположены в Венгрии и на юге СССР как могли быть брошены на Средиземноморском ТВД.
Если подсчитать французские силы, в том числе во Франции, то численность NATO в Северной и Центральной Европе может быть увеличена, возможно, на 120 000 человек.с
(с. Это два подразделения, дислоцированные в Германии. Во Франции есть еще четыре.)
ПОДКРЕПЛЕНИЯ
Мобилизация резервов первой линии и переброска подкреплений в театр существенно изменили бы вышеуказанные цифры. Непосредственный мобилизационный потенциал Варшавского договора больше, чем у Запада: по оценкам, силы 31 советской дивизии в Центральной Европе могли бы быть увеличены до 70 в течение месяца, если бы мобилизация была беспрепятственной. Советский Союз, европейская держава и работает на внутренних линиях, может привезти подкрепления по суше, с тяжелой техникой, гораздо быстрее, чем Соединенные Штаты через Атлантику. Американская способность быстро возвращать по воздуху бригады двойного базирования, оборудование которых находится в Германии, была продемонстрирована, и самолеты C-5, первый из которых, в настоящее время на вооружении, значительно увеличат воздушные перевозки. Но эта переброска зависит от безопасности воздушной среды, безопасности аэродромов для полетов и готовности усиливаться в кризисной ситуации, рискуя тем самым усилить напряженность. И усиления дивизий потребуется транспорт для перемещения тяжелого оборудования.
В западных оборонных планах имплицитно заложена концепция времени политического предупреждения о том, что будет достаточно предупреждения о возможном нападении, чтобы силы NATO могли быть приведены в более высокую степень готовности, а также для усиления и мобилизации. Преимущество здесь всегда будет у напавшего, который может начать мобилизацию первым, надеясь скрыть свои намерения и добиться тактической внезапности. Место атаки можно выбрать и создать значительное местное превосходство. Обороняющийся, скорее всего, начнет медленнее и должен будет оставаться на страже во всех точках.
Выводом может быть, что Варшавский договор, по сути, способен быстрее создать превосходство на начальных этапах, особенно если местная или общая внезапность будет достигнута; и то, что NATO может только начать наращивать силы, и добиться преимущества, если есть достаточное время предупреждения. В последующем в темпах наращивания он опередить Варшавский договор можно, если кризис будет развиваться достаточно медленно, чтобы позволить полностью вооружиться; в этом последнем случае Запад окажется в положении гораздо более напоминающее равенство. Страны Североатлантического союза имеют больше вооруженных людей, чем Варшавский договор. Для армии/морской пехоты цифры (в тысячах): NATO 3409 (включая Францию 329); Варшавский договор 2778. Конечно, большое количество этих людей находится за пределами Европы, как, например, американские войска в Азии и советские войска на дальневосточной границе.
ВООРУЖЕНИЕ
При сравнении вооружения выделяется один момент: Варшавский договор практически полностью вооружен советским или советской разработки оружием и пользуется гибкостью, простотой обучения и экономичностью, которые приносит стандартизация. Силы NATO имеют широкий спектр всего, от систем вооружения до транспортных средств, с последующим дублированием систем снабжения и некоторыми трудностями оперативной совместимости.
Что касается количества оружия, то есть некоторые заметные различия, из которых танки, пожалуй, являются наиболее значительными. Численность танков выглядит следующим образом:
c. Это танки в формированиях, а не общее число; исключают те, что в резерве или на хранении.
Видно, что NATO имеет чуть более трети действующих танков, от Варшавский договора в Северной и Центральной Европе, хотя в NATO танки, как правило, более современные (кроме Т-62, который сейчас на вооружении сил пакта в том или ином количестве). Эта относительная слабость в танках (и других боевых бронированных машин) отражает по существу оборонительную роль NATO и в некоторой степени компенсируется превосходством в наземных противотанковых вооружениях. NATO, вероятно, также обладает более эффективным воздушным противотанковым оружием, таким как ракеты на истребителях и вертолетах. В обычной артиллерии обе стороны примерно равны по силе: NATO, однако, вероятно, будет иметь превосходящую огневую мощь из-за большей летальности своих боеприпасов и материально-технического потенциала для создания более высоких темпов огня. Этот потенциал обусловлен значительно более высокой транспортной грузоподъемностью, примерно в два раза выше в подразделении NATO по сравнению с подразделением Варшавского договора. В NATO, однако, негибкая система логистики, основана почти исключительно на национальных линиях снабжения с небольшой центральной координацией. В настоящее время оно не может использовать французскую территорию и имеет много линий связи, проходящих с севера на юг, вблизи района передового развертывания. Некоторые страны альянса, кроме того, имеют малое снабжение для непрерывного боя.
АВИАЦИЯ
Для того чтобы наземные формирования NATO могли пользоваться как днем, так и ночью мобильностью, которой они обладают, они должны иметь большую степень прикрытия с воздуха над полем боя, чем сейчас. Такое прикрытие обеспечивается сочетанием быстрого оповещения и связи, зенитного оружия и истребителей. Во многом эта воздушно-наземное обеспечение NATO хорошо подготовлено, но по количеству самолетов оно заметно уступает, как видно из таблицы.
Разделение на указанные категории является лишь приблизительным, поскольку некоторые самолеты могут быть приспособлены для выполнения более чем одной миссии. В целом NATO имеет более высокую долю многоцелевых самолетов, и лучшие самолеты NATO превосходят самолеты Варшавского договора, особенно по дальности и полезной нагрузке. Но у двух военно-воздушных сил разные роли: большая дальность и полезная нагрузка имеют более низкий приоритет для Варшавского договора. NATO, например, сохранила потенциал дальней тактической авиации глубокого удара; Советский Союз решил создать силы БРСД, которые могли бы, при определенных обстоятельствах, выполнять аналогичные миссии.
Варшавский договор также пользуется преимуществами внутренних линий связи, которое облегчают командование, контроль и материально-техническое обеспечение. Они обладают относительно высокой способностью работать с разрозненных полевых аэродромов, обслуживаемых мобильными системами, имеют гораздо больше аэродромов и большое преимущество стандартного наземного вспомогательного оборудования, которое связано с наличием только советских самолетов. Эти факторы обеспечивают гораздо большую гибкость, чем NATO, с ее многочисленными национальными поставщиками самолетов и широким спектром вспомогательного оборудования. NATO, вероятно, имеет некоторое превосходство в совершенности техники, в возможностях своих летных экипажей, которые имеют в целом более высокие стандарты подготовки и летают больше часов, и в универсальности своих самолетов. Страны NATO также располагают во всем мире гораздо большим количеством самолетов, чем в Варшавский договор, и в ситуации, когда может быть произведена полная мобилизация, они будут иметь больший потенциал. С учетом всех этих различных факторов, относительные возможности не поддаются точной оценке, однако численное преимущество Варшавского договора остается весьма реальным.
ЯДЕРНОЕ ОРУЖИЕ
NATO имеет около 7000 ядерных боеголовок, которые могут быть доставлены различными носителями, всего около 2250 единиц авиации, ракет малой дальности и артиллерии.
(Ядерное оружие, предназначенное для применения в зоне боевых действий или непосредственно связано с маневром боевых сил, можно характеризовать как "тактическое". Однако цифра в 7000 боеголовок включает значительное число, несомых, например, самолетами типа F-4 или F-104, которые могут доставляться по целям за пределами района боя или не связанным с маневром боевых сил и, таким образом, использоваться в "стратегических целях". При описании средств доставки, самолетов и ракет, способных доставлять обычные или ядерные боеголовки, как "тактических" или "стратегических" неизбежно возникает определенное дублирование. В общее число 7000 включены также ядерные боеголовки для некоторых ракет ПВО.)
Есть и ядерные мины. Мощность в килотонном и суб-килотонном диапазона. Наземные ракетные установки и орудия органичны для соединений вплоть до дивизий и управляются как американскими, так и союзными войсками, но в последнем случае под двойным ключом. Число советских боеголовок, вероятно, составляет около 3500, доставляемых примерно сопоставимыми самолетами и ракетными системами. Некоторые из средств доставки, но не боеголовки, находятся в руках несоветских сил Варшавского договора.
Это сопоставление ядерных боеголовок не должно рассматриваться в том же свете, что и предшествующие ему обычные сопоставления, поскольку со стороны NATO стратегическая доктрина не основывается и не может основываться на применении такого рода оружия в таких масштабах. Эти запасы были накоплены для осуществления более ранней, преимущественно ядерной, стратегии, и в настоящее время главным достоинством наличие такого числа является предоставление широкого спектра выбора оружия, средств и систем доставки, если необходимо предусмотреть контролируемую эскалацию. Однако из сравнения следует, что Советский Союз имеет возможность начать ядерное наступление на поле боя в массовом масштабе, если он это выберет, или сопоставить эскалацию NATO с подобным вариантом.
ИЗМЕНЕНИЯ СО ВРЕМЕНЕМ
Вышеприведенные сопоставления не сильно отличаются от сопоставлений годичной давности, однако в течение более длительного периода времени можно отметить эффект незначительных и медленных изменений баланса. В 1962 году американские сухопутные, морские и воздушные силы в Европе насчитывали 434 000 человек; сейчас эта цифра составляет 300 000 человек. В 1967 году в Восточной Европе насчитывалось 26 советских дивизий, сейчас - 31. Количество и качество ракет класса "земля-воздух" в войсках Варшавского договора неуклонно росли, представляя сейчас самую грозную оборону, и вместе с ними росло и количество советских тактических самолетов. Общая картина с годами постепенно менялась в пользу Востока.
Военно-Морские Силы Сопоставление морских преимуществ обеих сторон, особенно на региональной основе, сопряжено со многими трудностями. Военно-морская мощь обладает высокой гибкостью; корабли перемещаются между флотами, флоты перемещаются на большие расстояния: стратегические и тактические функции часто быстро взаимозаменяемы. Это далеко не просто и часто неуместно противопоставлять корабли друг против друга численно. Требование к эсминцам, например, связано не с количеством эсминцев противника, а с необходимостью защиты надводных судов от подводной или воздушной угрозы; в противолодочной войне надводные суда, подводные лодки и морские самолеты должны рассматриваться как объединенные команды.
С учетом этих и многих других оговорок, некоторые из которых были затронуты позднее, ниже перечислены относительные количества кораблей основных классов в Североатлантическом, Балтийском и Средиземном/Черном морях. Цифры не должны рассматриваться как указывающие на какое-либо фиксированное или оптимальное расположение флота, а просто как типичная сила; переводы в и из советского или американского Тихоокеанских флотов происходят (хотя размер советского Тихоокеанского флота будет диктоваться не только количеством американских кораблей в этом районе, но и военно-морскими силами Китая и Японии).
Цифры не включают французский флот, который, как будет видно на p. 18, является существенной силой и количественно сильнее, чем советская средиземноморская эскадрилья обычно.
g. Корабли не были разделены между тремя флотами, но типичные сильные стороны для этих флотов были даны в военном балансе 1970-71, С. 96-97.
h. Эти корабли обладают значительным противокорабельным вооружением, в Советском случае дальнобойным КР.
i. Ракеты этих кораблей, предназначены главным образом или исключительно для целей противовоздушной обороны (ЗРК).
Сравнения показывают заметные и хорошо известные асимметрии. ВМС США имеют мощные авианосные ударные силы, с авиацией и ракетами для ПВО и противолодочной обороны и дальней авиации против надводных кораблей и наземных целей, ядерным оружием в случае необходимости.
Советский флот, напротив, не имеет ударных авианосцев и полагается на наземную авиацию как для прикрытия, так и для нанесения ударов, дополняемую корабельным ЗРК и, конечно же, дальним ракетами, который несет большое количество советских кораблей и для которых нет Западного эквивалента. Такое отсутствие авианосных самолетов в условиях войны или в напряженное время фактически ограничило бы радиус действия советских надводных флотов, несмотря на то, что они другими способами становятся все более самодостаточными, а значит, не обладают истинным мировым морским потенциалом.
Советскому Союзу пришлось разработать противодействие стратегической угрозе, создаваемой ударными авианосцами и ракетными подводными лодками в Атлантике и Средиземном море, и для этой цели было построено большое количество подводных лодок. Из-за этого Запад уделял большое внимание противолодочной войне и, наверное, опережает в этой области, но это не компенсирует само количество подводных лодок, которые разворачивает Советский Союз; найти и уничтожить атомные лодки особенно сложно. Этот дисбаланс тем более важен, что Запад зависит от крупных надводных кораблей ВМФ и от перевозки морем основных товаров: он более уязвим для подводного нападения, чем Советский Союз.
Дальнобойные ПКР на советских крейсерах, эсминцах и подводных лодках имеют некоторые ограничения, и современные системы горизонтной дальности, поступающие в эксплуатацию, представляют собой более серьезную проблему.*
(*Эффективность этих ПКР большой дальности против судов ограничена их потребностью в той или иной форме внешних данных о местоположении цели.)
В узких акваториях или в целях самообороны ближние ПКР на патрульных катерах наиболее эффективны и дополняются ракетами военно-морских самолетов и береговых батарей.
Трудно дать какую-либо оценку общему балансу. Необходимо принимать во внимание различия в ролях в военное время: советские флоты будут в значительной степени стратегически оборонительными, отвечающими угрозе, создаваемой западными ударными силами и ракетными подводными лодками (хотя для наступательных целей останется большое количество советских подводных лодок). Необходимо также учитывать характер основных районов развертывания. В Средиземноморье, например, советское снабжение и подкрепление военно-морской эскадры может быть чрезвычайно сложным. Большое значение имела бы степень доступности Советскому Союзу аэродромов в средиземноморских странах. В Северной Атлантике Соединенные Штаты могут с готовностью использовать подкрепления с базы базирования; Советский Союз, напротив, гораздо более ограничен в своем стратегическом движении, а его основная база в районе Кольского полуострова очень уязвима.
Самая большая трудность заключается в характере и продолжительности любого будущего конфликта. Если он расширится, то советские подводные силы будут представлять угрозу для западного судоходства во всем мире, в то время как Советский Союз гораздо более самодостаточен. Если коротко, то военно-морские действия вряд ли будут доминирующими; исход будет решаться на суше. Есть слишком много переменных, чтобы позволить всеобъемлющие суждения, но кажется справедливым сказать, что в то время как море все еще является областью, в которой Запад имеет превосходство, советские флоты теперь могут бросить вызов на каждом уровне военных или военно-политических действий.
НОВОЕ СТРОИТЕЛЬСТВО
Эта проблема возникла в последние годы и является результатом Советского перехода к более передовому развертыванию, а не к более быстрому военно-морскому строительству на Востоке, чем на Западе. Приведенная ниже таблица, в которой перечислены поставки новых кораблей водоизмещением более 1000 тонн, крупных обычных и океанских подводных лодок за последние десять календарных лет в Варшавского договора* и военно-морских сил NATO, за исключением Франции, помогает показать распределение ресурсов обеими сторонами. Безусловно, виден советский акцент на строительство подводных лодок, особенно отмеченный с 1968 года, но что касается надводных военно-морских кораблей, также видно, что страны NATO в целом обгоняли Варшавский договор, количественно и часто качественно. Корабли, которые будут поставлены в ближайшие несколько лет, станут результатом решений, принятых несколько лет назад, и судостроение в отдельных странах NATO, как правило, носит циклический характер.
(*Фактически Советский Союз, так как другие страны Варшавского договора не получили новых кораблей в этот период.)
Картина, показанная в этой таблице, не обязательно сохранится, но нет никаких признаков того, что советское военно-морское строительство падает, и наблюдается некоторый подъем в Западном строительстве.
Взаимные и сбалансированные сокращения сил (MBFR) Характеристики военного баланса, изложенные в предыдущих пунктах, имеют центральное значение для любого обсуждения или переговоров о взаимных (и, возможно, сбалансированных) сокращениях сил в Европе и должны будут учитываться обеими сторонами, если каждая из них не будет поставлена в невыгодное положение в результате изменений. Большинство факторов являются переменными и могут меняться с течением времени, но географическая асимметрия - нет: этот момент является критическим. Хотя существует много неопределенностей, количественных, качественных и методологических, связанных с расчетом относительных силовых возможностей обеих сторон, обсуждение военной желательности или иного сокращения и формы, которую сокращение может принять, должно отражать такие расчеты.
Военные соображения, разумеется, являются лишь частью проблемы; политические вопросы имеют первостепенное значение. К ним относятся: степень, в которой сокращения должны состоять из дислоцированных или местных сил и их оборудования; области применения; меры по контролю за процессом сокращения и проверки того, что он имел место; и последствия для взаимоотношений в рамках союзов любых достигнутых соглашений.
Тем не менее тщательная оценка военных преимуществ и недостатков различного рода сокращений или мер имеет существенно важное значение для разумных переговоров.
ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ
a. В советском флоте нет ударных авианосцев. Тип "Москва" (см. ниже) является противолодочным крейсером.
b. Москва-класс. Один из ракетных крейсеров НАТО имеет аналогичный, но меньший потенциал, но остальные на самом деле не сопоставимы.
С. Kynda, Kresta, Kildin, Kanin и Krivak-классы. В флотах НАТО нет сопоставимых кораблей с ПКР.
d. Эта категория НАТО охватывает широкий спектр эсминцев, самый большой из которых, ядерный DLGN будет классифицироваться некоторыми флотами как легкий крейсер. Вообще корабли Варшавского договора в этой категории значительно меньше.
e. Небольшой размер этих советских сторожевиков ограничивает их ценность. Из кораблей НАТО по сравнению с этим большая доля во многих отношениях подпадает под более тяжелую категорию E.
f. В том числе десантные авианосцы и штурмовые корабли, все крупнее советских судов, которые относятся к категории H.
g. Советская норма постройки сейчас составляет около 7 в год, американская - около 6.
h. Только более 700 тонн. НАТО построили еще 35 между 450-600 тонн. Около 25 советских подводных лодок несут крылатые ракеты, используемые против кораблей или наземных целей.
Я. Советская скорость строительства составляет около 8 лет, возможно, больше, программа Polaris США закончилась в 1967 году, но 10 лодок были преобразованы в Poseidon.
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