THE MILITARY BALANCE 1970

ВОЕННЫЙ БАЛАНС 1970

ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

PREFACE

ВВЕДЕНИЕ

The United States and the Soviet Union

Navy Total strength: 694,000. The total number of ships commissioned and in service is about 780.
   The General Purpose Forces Navy (excluding Polaris submarines) consists of approximately 740 ships.
   The fleets are the 1st in the Eastern Pacific, the 2nd in the Atlantic, the 6th in the Mediterranean and the 7th in the Western Pacific.
   The main components of the active fleets are:
   16 attack carriers: 1 nuclear-powered (USS Enterprise, 76,000 tons),
   8 Forrestal-class (60,000 tons), 3 Midway-class (52,000 tons) and 3 Hancock-class (33,000 tons), and 1 antisubmarine carrier acting as an attack carrier.
   The attack carriers no longer have a primary strategic nuclear mission, although they retain a nuclear strike capability.
   Attack carriers are assigned an air wing of between 70 and 100 aircraft consisting of
   2 fighter squadrons, 2 or 3 light attack squadrons, AEW, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft.
   The larger carriers have a medium attack squadron and their fighter squadrons have the F-4 Phantom, with the F-8 Crusader in the Hancock-class.
   The attack aircraft include the A-4 Skyhawk, the A-6 Intruder and the A-7 Corsair; Corsairs will eventually replace all the Skyhawks.
   The RA-5C Vigilante is used for reconnaissance in the larger carriers, and the RF-8G Crusader is used in this role in the Hancock-class.
   The E-2A Hawkeye is used for AEW, and a few KA-3B Skywarrior aircraft are retained as tankers.
   4 anti-submarine carriers, all Essex-class.
   They are equipped with S-2E Tracker long- range search aircraft, and SH-3 Sea King helicopters, and have A-4C Skyhawks for air defence;
   each carries about 52 aircraft and helicopters.
103 submarines (excluding Polaris vessels): 44 of these are nuclear-powered attack vessels, of which 34 have Subroc ASW missiles.
239 surface ships for anti-submarine warfare, fleet air defence and coastal bombardment. These consist of the following:
   8 guided-missile cruisers (1 nuclear-powered).
   2 gun cruisers.
   30 guided-missile frigates (2 nuclear-powered).
   29 guided-missile destroyers.
   123 gun/ASW destroyers.
   6 guided-missile destroyer escorts.
   36 destroyer escorts.
   5 radar-picket escorts.
   Guided-missile ships are armed with the Tartar, Talos and Terrier surface-to-air missiles and Asroc ASW missiles according to class.
   97 amphibious assault ships, including 7 helicopter landing platforms (LPH).
   42 landing craft.
   54 ocean minesweepers.
   185 logistics, operational support and small patrol ships.
   24 squadrons (about 216 aircraft) of shore- based ASW patrol P-3 Orions.
   5 transport/liaison squadrons with C-118s, C-130s, C-131s, C-1s and C-2s.
   The number of aircraft in the active inventory of the Navy is estimated at 8,000.
RESERVES. The Navy Reserves have an average paid training strength of 129,000 plus paid training tours for a further 3,350.
   Equipment includes:
   2 anti-submarine carriers.
   15 cruisers
   Over 300 escort ships.
   35 squadrons of fixed-wing aircraft and 4 squadrons of helicopters.

Air Force Total strength: 810,000
   (including Air Force personnel serving in
Strategic Air Command and Air Defence Command (for the organization of strategic and air defence forces, see above).
   About 6,500 first-line combat aircraft. The General Purpose Forces of the Air Force consist of the
   Tactical Air Command, United States Air Force in Europe, Pacific Air Forces and the Military Airlift Command. The present strength of
Tactical Air Command is 115,000 men and about 1,000 aircraft normally based in the United States. It includes the following units:
   19 F-4, 3 F-100, 3 F-105 and 3 F-111A tactical fighter squadrons;
   9 tactical reconnaissance squadrons with RF-4C;
   17 assault air-lift squadrons with C-130; two electronic warfare squadrons; and
   6 special operations squadrons including A-37, AC-119, C-123K and AC-130 aircraft.
US Air Force in Europe (USAFE), with a strength of about 50,000 men, controls the
   3rd Air Force in Britain, the
   16th Air Force in Spain, the
   17th Air Force in West Germany and a
   Logistics Group in Turkey, and includes
   21 tactical fighter squadrons and
   6 tactical reconnaissance squadrons.
   4 other tactical fighter squadrons are based in the United States but are `on call' to USAFE.
   The tactical fighters include about 375 F-100s and F-4C/D/Es, and the reconnaissance aircraft about 90 RF-4Cs.
   There are 2 C-130 transport squadrons in the Command.
   4 of the tactical fighter squadrons, equipped with F-4Es, for air defence, are based in Germany and the Netherlands.
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), with a strength of about 155,000 men and about 80 squadrons, with headquarters in Hawaii, control the
   5th Air Force with bases in Japan, Korea and Okinawa; the
   13th Air Force with headquarters in the Philippines; and the
   7th Air Force, which is the air component of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). The
   5th Air Force operates squadrons of F-4, F-102, F-105, RF-4C and C-130 aircraft; the
   13th Air Force, with F-4, F-105, RF-4C and C-130 aircraft, is responsible for the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand, and all joint planning
   responsibilities under SEATO. About 160 F-4 and 80 F-105 fighter-bombers, as well as 40 RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft,
   fly from 13th Air Force bases in Thailand. The
   7th Air Force, with about 59,000 men in South Vietnam, consists of tactical fighter, reconnaissance, assault airlift and special operations squadrons.
   It also co-ordinates the operations of the Vietnamese Air Force. The approximate strength of the 7th Air Force is
   280 F-100, F-4C and A-37 fighter-bombers,
   40 RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft,
   150 A-1E, AC-47, AC-119, AC-130 and C-123 counterinsurgency aircraft,
   90 C-7A assault airlift aircraft and a large number of observation and liaison aircraft and helicopters.
The Military Airlift Command (MAC) numbers 90,000 men and operates
   18 heavy transport squadrons, equipped with about 45 C-133 Cargomasters and 270 C-141 Starlifters, and at least another
   25 squadrons in medical transport, weather reconnaissance and air-sea rescue roles. (The first C-5A Galaxy squadron is forming.)
RESERVES.
The Air National Guard General Purpose Forces have approximately 1,500 aircraft in
   18 fighter-interceptor squadrons,
   24 tactical fighter squadrons,
   12 tactical reconnaissance squadrons,
   3 tactical air support squadrons,
   4 special operations squadrons,
   7 tanker squadrons and
   22 air transport squadrons, mostly with older type transport aircraft.
   The strength of the Guard is 85,000 men.
The Air Force Reserve has an average paid training strength of 47,900 and a further 2,600 undergo paid training tours of active duty.
   The Air Force Reserve has about 400 aircraft in 36 operational squadrons, of which
   7 are equipped with C-119 Boxcar,
   16 have C-124 Globemaster, and
   2 have C-130 Hercules transports. The remainder serve in tactical support, special operations and air-sea rescue roles.

   THE SOVIET UNION
Population: 244,000,000
Military service: Army and Air Force, 2 years; Navy and Border Guards, 3 years.
Estimated GNP 1969: $466 billion.
Defence appropriations 1970:17.9 billion roubles ($39.8 billion). 0.40-0.50 roubles = $1.*
   * See the Annex on pp. 10-12 for an explanation of the calculation of the figures used for the rate of exchange, GNP and defence expenditure.
   The rouble figure represents the declared budget of the Ministry of Defence and does not include certain expenditures such as the cost of nuclear warheads, research and development expenditure on advanced weapons systems, and the military elements of the space programme, which are believed to be included in the budget of other ministries. Total military expenditure could be of the order of about $51.7 billion.*
   Calculated at the median exchange rate of 0.45 roubles = $1.
   Рублевая цифра представляет собой объявленный бюджет Министерства обороны и не включает определенные расходы, такие, как расходы на ядерные боеголовки, расходы на исследования и разработки современных систем вооружений и военные элементы космической программы, которые, как предполагается, включены в бюджет других министерств. Общие военные расходы могут составить порядка 51,7 млрд. долл. dd>   Рассчитано по среднему курсу 0,45 рубля = $1
Total strength of the regular forces is estimated at 3,305,000 men.
   In addition, the para-military forces, including the security and border troops of the Ministry of the Interior, have about 230.000 men.

Strategic Rocket Forces Total strength: 350,000.
ICBMs Operational Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): total about 1,300.
  LIQUID-FUELLED
   240 SS-9 (Scarp) (Р-36 -ЕТ) (further sites are being prepared for deployment of missiles). The operational missiles have one warhead.
   Testing of MRVs (multiple re-entry vehicles) has been in progress for 2 years, and it is thought that these may now be available for deployment.
   The SS-9 launcher has also been used to test another form of payload, for use as a depressed trajectory ICBM/fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).
   800 SS-11 (УР-100 ЕТ), whose deployment is continuing. Tests have recently been reported to have involved a revised re-entry system.
   220 SS-7 (Saddle) and SS-8 (Sasin) (Р-16 и Р-9 -ЕТ).
  SOLID-FUELLED
   40 SS-13 (Savage) (РТ-2 -ЕТ).
IRBMs and MRBMs
   Operational IRBM and MRBM: total about 700.
   The operational Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) force consists of about
   700 liquid-fuelled SS-5 (Skean) and SS-4 (Sandal) (Р-14 и Р-12 -ЕТ).
   Development continues of the solid-fuelled Scamp missile, and the SS-14 (РТ-15) mobile MRBM system, of which it forms part,
   could be used to replace some of the existing force.
   IRBMs and MRBMs are sited near the southern, eastern and western borders of the USSR: 70 cover targets in China and Japan and 630 targets in Western Europe.

   Air Defence
   The Air Defence Command (PVO-Strany) is a separate command of anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air-missile units,
   using an early- warning system based on radar and fighter- interceptor squadrons for identification and, if necessary,
   interception of hostile targets.
Total personnel in the PVO is about 500,000, of which ground elements account for 250,000. Air defence weapons now in service include:
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY: 14.5mm, 23mm, 57mm guns and ZSU-57-2 twin barrelled and ZSU-23-4 four-barrelled SP guns on tank chassis.
SURFASE-TO-AIR MISSILES:
   SA-1 Guild (С-25 -ЕТ) remains in service and is deployed in large numbers for the defence of Moscow.
   SA-2 Guideline (С-75 -ЕТ): A two-stage boosted antiaircraft missile with a slant range of about 25 statute miles, effective at heights of between 3,000 and 80,000 ft.
     About 8,000 are thought to be in service.
   SA-3 Goa (С-125 -ЕТ): A two-stage missile, probably intended for short-range defence against low-flying aircraft, to supplement Guideline.
     It has a slant range (from launch to contact with target),
   SA-4 Ganef (Круг -ЕТ): An air-transportable, mobile anti-aircraft missile with solid-fuel boosters.
     These are twin mounted on tracked carriers and are assigned to ground forces in the field.
   SA-5 Griffon (Даль, не принималась -ЕТ): A two-stage boosted missile which has been developed in a long-range anti- aircraft role.
   SA-6 Gainful (Куб -ЕТ) A new triple-mounted missile on a tracked vehicle. It will soon enter-general service as a defence
     against low-flying aircraft and will supplement Ganef in the field forces.
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES (ABM):
   Galosh (А-35 -ET): 67 launchers for these multi-stage mis- require major reinforcement, siles have been deployed around Moscow.
   The alignment of the associated radars suggests that their function is the, limited defence of the centre of government against
   Minuteman firings from North America or Polaris missiles from the Arctic Ocean.
   They are believed to have a range of over two hundred miles and to carry a nuclear warhead in the megaton range.
   They are therefore only suitable for interception outside the atmosphere and thus for area defence.
   Continuing development and testing have as their objective either an improved version of the present systems or a substantially more effective new missile.
   If the SA-5 were provided with the appropriate radar and data-processing equipment, it might in theory have a limited ABM capacity.
FIGHTERS:
   There are probably about 3,300 operational PVO fighters, the majority of which are the MiG-19 Farmer, MiG-21 Fishbed and Su-9 Fishpot.
   A few Mig-17 Fresco are still in service.
   Other aircraft include the Yak-28P Firebar and Tu-28 Fiddler, the latter of which has a maximum speed of the order of 900 mph and an operational ceiling of about 50,000 ft.
   The Su-11 Flagon-A (Су-15 -ЕТ) is in, and the MiG-23 Foxbat (МиГ-25 -ЕТ) is probably about to come into squadron service:
   they have a maximum speed of the order of Mach. 2-3 and Mach. 3 respectively.
   Many of these aircraft are equipped with air-to-air missiles.
EARLY-WARNING AIRCRAFT: The PVO operates some modified Tu-114 Cleats which, in this role of about 15 miles, have been given the designation Moss (Ту-126 -ЕТ).

Army The total size of the Soviet Army (including the ground elements of the Air Defence Command) is estimated at about 2,000,000 men.
   It is thought to be organized in 157 divisions.
   There are 3 degrees of combat-readiness in the Soviet Army, and probably about 2/3 of their divisions are at or near full combat-strength.
   The remain der could be brought up to strength at short notice, although about a quarter of the total are at the lowest degree of readiness and would
The location of divisional headquarters is roughly as follows:
   31 divisions in Central and Eastern Europe (20 in East Germany, 2 in Poland, 4 in Hungary, 5 in Czechoslovakia);
   60 divisions in European USSR (i.e. west of the Ural Mountains and north of the Caucasus);
   8 divisions in central USSR (i.e. between the Ural Mountains and Lake Baikal);
   28 divisions in southern USSR (Caucasus and West Turkestan); and
   30 divisions in the Sino-Soviet border area, of which three are in Mongolia.
   The 31 divisions in Eastern Europe are maintained at or near combat strength, as are about 15 of those in the Far East.
   The other divisions in the Far East are probably in the second category of readiness: below combat strength,
   but not requiring major reinforcement in the event of war.
   Most of the remaining combat- ready divisions are in European USSR, while the divisions in central USSR would mostly require major
   reinforcement, as would 10 of the divisions in southern USSR.
By types of division, the distribution is roughly as follows:
   Motorized rifle divisions (10,000 men and 175 medium tanks at full strength): about 100.
   Tank divisions (8,250 men and 325 medium tanks at full strength): about 50.
   Airborne divisions (7,000 men and 45 self-propelled guns at full strength): 7.
   10 of the tank divisions are in East Germany, 10 in the Far East, 2 in Hungary, and 2 in Poland.
   It has been estimated that the force of 31 divisions in Central Europe might be increased to 70 within less than a month
   if mobilization and movement were unimpeded.
   The 7 airborne divisions total approximately 50.000 men.
   The transport fleet could lift two of these divisions and supporting elements simultaneously over short or medium ranges.
   There are some numbers of Soviet military personnel stationed outside the Warsaw Pact area, mostly in the capacity of instructors and advisers.
   These include about 1,000 in Cuba, 10.000 in Egypt, 1,000 in Syria, 1,500 in Algeria, and 1,000 in North Vietnam.
   The military doctrines of the Soviet Army envisage a major offensive role for it in future war and accordingly emphasize training for large-scale
   advance at high speed. Infantry formations contain amphibious covered armoured personnel carriers which would enable them to advance
   rapidly across water obstacles and radio-active terrain.
   Tactical nuclear missile units are organic to Soviet formations inside and outside the Soviet Union,
   and the stockpile of warheads is estimated at some 3,500.
   The Soviet Army is well-equipped for offensive and defensive chemical warfare,
   but its long-standing logistic shortcomings for extended operations have been only partly remedied.
Its equipment includes:
TANKS. Tanks in service with armoured formations include the T-62 medium tank with a 115mm gun,
   the T-54/55 medium tank with a 100mm gun,
   the T-10 heavy tank with a 122mm gun, and the PT-76 amphibious reconnaissance tank with a 76 mm gun.
   The T-34 medium tank is no longer operational.
   Most Soviet tanks are equipped for amphibious crossing by deep wading, and many carry infra-red night-fighting equipment.
ARTILLERY. The main types are 100mm, 122mm, 130mm and 152mm.
   Lorry-mounted multi-barrelled rocket-launchers play an important part in Soviet artillery operations.
   The main specialized anti-tank weapons are the 57mm, 85mm and 100mm guns,
   and the Snapper, Swatter and Sagger missiles (Шмель, Малютка и Фаланга -ЕТ), :
   the last is mounted on a tracked combined anti-tank (75mm gun) and armoured personnel carrier.
   Self-propelled assault guns are only used in airborne divisions.
   The Soviet Army also has a considerable air defence capability, including guns and surface- to-air missiles.
MISSILES. Tactical missiles in use by the ground forces include those of the Scud and air-portable Frog series (Р-11/Р-17 и Луна -ЕТ),
   mounted on modified T-10 tank chassis and wheeled launchers.
   These have ranges of up to 150 miles according to the type-high explosive, chemical or nuclear-of warhead fitted.
   The newer Scaleboard (Темп -ЕТ) has a maximum range of 500 miles.
   There are also two cruise missiles: Shaddock, with a range of up to 300 miles, and the shorter range Salish (ФКР-2 и ФКР-1 -ЕТ).

Navy Total strength: 475,000. (Navy 400,000: Naval Air Force 75,000).
   In total tonnage, it is the second biggest navy in the world. Its main strength lies in the submarine fleet.
   A high proportion of the fleet is kept in commission.
SURFACE SHIPSa. They include:
   2 ASW helicopter cruisers with a new surface- to-air missile system (SA-N-3) (пр.1123 Москва с ЗРК М-22 -ЕТ)
   5 Kresta-class and 4 Kynda-class (пр.58 и 1134 -ЕТ) cruisers with Shaddock surface-to-surface cruise and Goa surface-to-air missiles.
   11 Sverdlov-class cruisers (one with Guideline surface-to-air missiles).
   4 other cruisers (used as flagships and for training).
   5 Krupny-class destroyers with surface-to- surface cruise missiles (пр.57 с ПКР КСЩ -ЕТ).
   4 Kildin-class destroyers with surface-to- surface cruise missiles (пр.56М с ПКР КСЩ -ЕТ).
   15 Kashin-class destroyers with Goa surface- to-air missiles. (пр.61 -ЕТ)
   2 Kanin-class destroyers with Goa surface-to- air missiles. (пр.57А -ЕТ)
   27 Kotlin-class destroyers (two with Goa surface-to-air missiles) (пр.56 и 56К).
   45 Skory- and modified Skory-class destroyers (пр.30бис -ЕТ).
   100 other ocean-going escorts.
   275 coastal escorts and submarine chasers.
   100 Osa- and 30 Komar-class patrol boats with Styx short-range cruise missiles (пр.206 и 205Р с ПКР П-15 -ЕТ).
   300 fast patrol boats.
   165 fleet minesweepers.
   130 coastal minesweepers.
   80 landing ships and numerous landing craft.
   Some trawlers have been adapted for electronic intelligence.
   All submarines and the larger surface vessels not fitted with surface-to-surface missiles are capable of minelaying.
   A proportion of the destroyers and smaller vessels may not be fully manned.
SUBMARINES. The fleet has some 290 conventionally-powered and 80 nuclear-powered submarines.
   About 10 of the Y-class nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines (пр.667А -ЕТ), each equipped with 16 SS-N-6 missiles
   for submerged firing, are now in service. Production of Y-class submarines appears to be at the rate of 5-10 a year.
   About 15 other nuclear and 25 of the conventional submarines can fire ballistic missiles and carry 3 missiles each.
   About 33 of the nuclear and 16 of the conventionally-powered submarines are equipped with anti-shipping cruise missiles which
   have ranges of up to 300 miles; they are thought to carry from four to eight missiles each.
   The remainder are attack submarines, or training craft. The submarine force is distributed as follows:
   75 in the Baltic Fleet, 150 in the Arctic, 40 in the Black Sea and about 105 in the Far East.
   The missile-carrying submarines are mostly divided between the Arctic and the Far East fleets.
FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILES. Submarine-launched missiles currently in the Soviet inventory are Sark, Serb and the SS-N-6 (Р-13/-21/-27 -ЕТ).
   The Serb is similar in dimensions to Polaris, but has a much shorter range.
   The SS-N-6 and Serb can be fired from a submerged position but some older submarines can fire Sark only from the surface.
   Testing continues of a new submarine missile, which is thought to have a range of up to 2,000 nautical miles and which may be identical
   with the missile designated Sawfly.
FLEET CRUISE MISSILES. Some surface vessels and submarines are fitted with cruise missiles including the long-range
   Shaddock (П-5/-6/-35 -ЕТ), which are intended primarily for anti-ship use.
NAVAL AIR FORCE. There are no true aircraft carriers in the Soviet Navy,
   although 2 18,000 ton helicopter cruisers are now in service, each operating up to 20 Ka-25A Hormone helicopters.
   The land-based Naval Air Force comprises about 500 bombers, most of which are based near the north-western and Black Sea coasts
   of the Soviet Union, and 500 other aircraft and helicopters. It includes:
   300 Tu-16 Badgers with Kipper or Kelt air-to- surface missiles, and about 100 in the reconnaissance and tanker roles.
   (The partial replacement of this aircraft with a version of the Tu-22 Blinder has begun.)
   50 Tu-20 Bears for long-range naval reconnaissance missions.
   50 Il-28 Beagles, equipped with torpedoes.
   In the ASW role are:
   About 60 Be-6 Madge flying-boats and Be-12 Mail amphibians.
   100 Mi-4 Hound and Ka-25A Hormone helicopters.
   About 200 miscellaneous transport aircraft.
There is a small marine corps (Naval Infantry) numbering about 15,000 men.
   The number of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean varies between 15 and 25.
   The squadron has included tank landing vessels and helicopter cruisers and, in addition to warships, a large number of auxiliaries.
Air Force
Total strength: 480,000: 10,200 combat aircraft. Soviet air forces include the following five main categories;
   (1) the Long Range Air Force (long- and medium-range strategic bombers);
   (2) the Tactical (or front-line) Air Force, which includes fighters and light bombers;
   (3) the air element of the Air Defence Command (fighter-interceptors);
   (4) the Naval Air Force; and
   (5) the Air Transport Force (including an independent force for the airborne divisions).
THE LONG RANGE AIR FORCE.
   About 75 per cent is based in European USSR with most of the remainder in the Far East;
   in addition, it has staging and dispersal points in the Arctic.
   Its numbers of inter-continental bombers - estimated at
   140 aircraft - are under a third of those in the US Strategic Air Command's B-52 force;
   but there is still a very strong force of medium bombers for operations in the Eurasian theatre. Aircraft include:
   About 90 Mya-4 Bison and about 100 Tu-20 Bear turbo-prop long-range bombers.
   Some 50 out of the total are used in the tanker role. It is believed that two-thirds of the Bears carry the Kangaroo stand-off cruise missile.
   About 550 Tu-16 Badger and 175 Tu-22 Blinder twin-jet medium bombers.
   It is estimated that half the Badgers are equipped with the Kelt air-to-surface missile (carried in pairs) while about
   half the Blinders are equipped with the Kitchen air-to-surface missile. (The Blinder has a supersonic capability.)
TACTICAL AIR FORCE. The strength of the Soviet Tactical Air Force has risen slightly during the last year.
   Altogether there are over 4000 aircraft.
   These include light bombers, ground-attack and interceptor-fighters, helicopters, transports and reconnaissance aircraft.
   The aircraft in service still include some obsolescent types such as the MiG-17 Fresco and the MiG-19 Farmer.
   The most notable high performance aircraft in service are the interceptor- fighters MiG-21 Fishbed, and Yak-28P Firebar,
   the ground-attack Su-7 Fitter, the supersonic light bomber Yak-28 Brewer and the new reconnaissance MiG-21 Fishbed.
   Ground-attack aircraft are equipped with a range of tactical air-to-surface missiles.
   Of several fighter and fighter-bomber types, including a variable- geometry aircraft resembling the American F-111,
   displayed at the Moscow Air Show in July 1967, the supersonic strike version of the MiG-23 Foxbat may be operational,
   while the VTOL Freehand could come into service shortly.
FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR UNITS and NAVAL AIR FORCE
   These are dealt with under Air Defence and Navy respectively (see above).
AIR TRANSPORT FORCE. About 1,700 short-, medium- and long-range transport aircraft, including twin-engined Il-14 Crate and An-24 Coke,
   some 800 four-engined An-12 Cub and Il-18 Coot.
   About 5 An-22 Cock heavy transports are also in operational service.
   There are in addition civil airliners belonging to Aeroflot, some of which could be adapted to military use in time of war;
   these include about 280 long- and medium-range aircraft (Tu-104 Camel, Tu-114 Cleat, Tu-124 Cookpot and Tu-134 Crusty).
   Helicopters in use with the ground forces number about 600 and include
   the troop carrying Mi-6 Hook and Mi-8 Hip, and the heavy load-carrier Mi-10 Harke.
   The smaller Mi-1 Hare and Mi-4 Hound are being withdrawn from service.
   The Mi-12 Homer, a very heavy load carrier, may be entering service. The total helicopter inventory is probably around 1,500.
Para-military Forces and Reserves Security and border troops number some 230,000.
   There are also approximately 1.5 million members of the part-time military training organization (DOSAAF),
   who take part in such recreational activities as athletics, shooting and parachuting, but reservist training and refresher courses seem to be
   haphazard and irregular.
   However, DOSAAF assists in premilitary training being given in schools, colleges and workers centres to those of 16 years and over.
   Trained reservists are estimated at about men out of a total of some 6,000,000.

   THE VALUATION OF THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE SOVIET UNION
   I. Gross National Product
   The figure for the GNP of the USSR in 1969 has been obtained by extrapolating a 1955 comparison by Professor Abram Bergson of Soviet and United States GNP in the light of the growth of Soviet and US output from 1955 to 1969. Such extrapolation is not strictly a correct procedure in national income comparisons and can give only a rough idea of the relative size of US and Soviet GNP in 1969. Further, it expresses the average of two different comparisons. One is of the rouble purchasing power parity in terms of dollars assessed in terms of the Soviet pattern of output. The alternative comparison is of the two GNPs in roubles, using outputs assessed with US output weights. In dollars, Soviet GNP is assessed at about 62 per cent of US GNP; in roubles the order of magnitude is 37 per cent. 50 per cent is the average between the two. This method is necessarily crude but is the best that Milton Gilbert at the OEEC in 1958 and the Statistical Division of the Commission of the EEC have been able to achieve for comparisons between Western economies.
   II. Military Expenditure
   The exchange rate of 0-40-0-50 roubles = US $1 for Soviet defence spending is given as a range to take account of the fact that comparisons can only be approximate. There are two problems in evaluating the `defence rouble': lack of information and an ambiguity in methodology and concept.
   Information: The Soviet budget speech every year includes a figure for `defence expenditure' in the forthcoming year. The defence vote for 1969 was 17-7 billion roubles (in recent years the amount actually spent for this purpose, as distinct from the voted estimate, has not been published). However, the defence vote excludes at least two items of military expenditure. The first and most important of these is a significant part of military Research and Development, a large proportion of which is thought to be financed out of the vote for `Science'. The total voted for scientific research of all kinds in 1969 was 9 billion roubles including non-military research. We have no precise figures on the basis of which to judge how much of the above is devoted to military purposes. Very roughly, we believe that 4-5 billion roubles might well be. The second and smaller item covers frontier guards and other security troops not financed out of the defence vote. Taking these two items together, we would be justified in adding roughly 30 per cent of the overt defence vote, which would make the 1969 total 23 billion roubles.
   The next problem is what a `military rouble' is worth. No prices of military goods are published. The approximate manpower of the armed forces is known, and so (to within a reasonable degree of precision) is their pay and subsistence. But the value of the material procurements must be computed indirectly. This can be attempted `by analogy', i.e. by calculating rouble-dollar ratios for civilian equipment. However, these ratios vary a great deal, and some armaments bear no resemblance to any civilian machine, and in any case the arms industry is thought to be more efficient (and therefore lower-cost) than civilian industry. One alternative approach is to estimate the cost in dollars of producing military goods, i.e. the amount it would cost to make them in America. Here we face several uncertainties: we can only roughly estimate the composition of the arms delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Defence; Soviet weapons are different from American weapons; and finally Soviet costs may not be similar to American costs.
   Methodology and concept: The issue here is related to the aim of the comparison which is undertaken. If it is to compare the cost to the Soviet economy of its military effort, Soviet prices are appropriate. If it is to compare the Soviet military establishment with that of the United States, roubles must be converted as far as possible into dollars. This is the comparison most relevant to The Military Balance. From this point of view one can well regard a Soviet private soldier as equal to an American private soldier. One therefore values each Soviet soldier at American rates of pay, which are many times higher than the amount the Soviet soldier receives. Similarly Soviet guns, tanks and missiles should be converted into dollars in terms of the equivalent American prices, making them worth a good deal more than their rouble value at the official exchange rate. It should be added that because the Soviet arms industry is relatively more efficient than other sectors of the Soviet economy, the rouble-dollar ratio applicable to it is higher than for the civilian sector, i.e. a rouble expended on weapons is worth more than a rouble spent on textiles, butter or bicycles.
   In view of all this, the `defence rouble' quoted here must be regarded as very rough and is used only because the official exchange rate is particularly misleading. The
rouble-dollar ratios used are derived from `unclassified' calculations made largely by US official agencies, with the methodology counter checked by reputable scholars.* In the absence of information from Soviet sources, this is the best estimate available.
   * Basic studies, carried out by Professor Morris Bomstein in `A Comparison of Soviet and United States National Product' in 1959 and used by Professor Benoit and Dr. Lubell in their Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) came to broadly similar conclusions (0-42 defence roubles = 1 dollar).

   ОЦЕНКА ВАЛОВОГО НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО ПРОДУКТА (ВНП) И ВОЕННЫХ РАСХОДОВ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА
   I. Валовой Национальный Продукт
   Показатель ВНП СССР в 1969 году был получен путем экстраполяции сравнения ВНП СССР и США в 1955 году профессором Абрамом Бергсоном в свете роста производства в СССР и США в период с 1955 по 1969 год. Такая экстраполяция не является строго правильной процедурой сравнения национальных доходов и может дать лишь приблизительное представление об относительном размере ВНП США и СССР в 1969 году. Кроме того, он выражает среднее значение двух различных сравнений. Один из них - паритет покупательной способности рубля в долларовом выражении, оцениваемый по советской структуре производства. Альтернативное сравнение двух ВНП в рублях, используют результаты сравнения с американским производством. В долларах советский ВНП оценивается примерно в 62% ВНП США, в рублях - порядка 37%. 50% - это среднее между двумя. Этот метод является грубым, но является лучшим из того, что Милтон Гилберт в OEEC в 1958 году и статистический отдел комиссии ЕЭК смогли достичь для сравнения между западными экономиками.
   II. Военные Расходы
   Обменный курс 0.40 - 0.50 рублей = 1 доллар США для расходов на оборону СССР приведен в виде диапазона, учитывающего тот факт, что сравнения могут быть только приблизительными. При оценке "оборонного рубля" существуют две проблемы: недостаток информации и неоднозначность методологии и концепции.
   Информация: в советском бюджете каждый год приводится цифра "оборонных расходов" на предстоящий год. Оборонные расходы за 1969 год составило 17,7 млрд рублей (в последние годы фактически потраченная на эти цели сумма, в отличие от планируемой оценки, не опубликована). Однако из оборонных расходов исключаются по меньшей мере две статьи. Первая и наиболее важная из них - это значительная часть военных исследований и разработок, значительная часть которых, как считается, финансируется за счет затрат на "науку". В 1969 году на все виды научных исследований потрачено 9 млрд рублей, в том числе и невоенные. У нас нет точных цифр, на основе которых можно было бы судить о том, сколько из вышеперечисленного посвящено военным целям. Очень грубо говоря, мы считаем, что 4-5 млрд рублей вполне может быть. Второй и более мелкий пункт касается пограничников и других сил безопасности, которые не финансируются за счет оборонного бюджета. Если взять эти два пункта вместе, то было бы оправданно добавить примерно 30 процентов на оборону, что в 1969 году составило бы 23 миллиарда рублей.
   Следующая проблема в том, сколько стоит "военный рубль". Цены на военные товары не публикуются. Приблизительная численность Вооруженных сил известна, и поэтому (в пределах разумной степени точности) является их оплатой и прожиточным минимумом. Но стоимость материальных закупок должна рассчитываться косвенно. Это может быть предпринято `по аналогии", т. е. путем расчета отношения рубля к гражданскому имуществу. Однако эти соотношения весьма различны, и некоторые виды вооружений не имеют никакого сходства ни с одной гражданской машиной, и в любом случае считается, что оружейная промышленность является более эффективной (и поэтому более дешевой), чем гражданская промышленность. Один из альтернативных подходов заключается в оценке затрат в долларах на производство военных товаров, т. е. той суммы, которую это стоило бы сделать в Америке. Здесь мы сталкиваемся с некоторыми неопределенностями: мы можем лишь приблизительно оценить состав оружия, поставляемого в советское министерство обороны; советское оружие отличается от американского; и, наконец, советские расходы могут быть не похожи на американские.
   Методология и концепция: данный вопрос связан с целью проводимого сопоставления. Если сравнивать затраты советской экономики на ее военные усилия, то советские цены вполне уместны. Если сравнивать советский военный истеблишмент с американским, то рубли нужно по возможности конвертировать в доллары. Это сравнение наиболее актуально для военного баланса. С этой точки зрения Советский рядовой вполне может считаться равным американскому рядовому. Поэтому каждый советский солдат ценится по американским ставкам оплаты, которые во много раз превышают сумму, которую получает советский солдат. Точно так же советские пушки, танки и ракеты должны быть конвертированы в доллары по эквивалентным американским ценам, что делает их намного дороже, чем их рублевая стоимость по официальному обменному курсу. Следует добавить, что поскольку советская оружейная промышленность относительно более эффективна, чем другие отрасли советской экономики, применимое к ней отношение рубля к доллару выше, чем к гражданскому сектору, т. е. рубль, потраченный на оружие, стоит больше, чем рубль, потраченный на текстиль, масло или велосипеды.
   В связи со всем этим "оборонный рубль", который здесь приводится, должен рассматриваться как очень грубый и используется только потому, что официальный обменный курс вводит в заблуждение. Используемые соотношения рубль-доллар являются производными от несекретных расчетов во многом за официальных учреждений США, с методологией проверенной авторитетными учеными.* В отсутствие информации из советских источников это наилучшая оценка.
   * Фундаментальные исследования, проведенные профессором Моррисом Бомштейном в 1959 году в "сравнении советского и американского национального продукта" и использованные профессором Бенуа и доктором Любеллом в исследованиях по разоружению и мировой экономической взаимозависимости (Нью-Йорк: Columbia University Press, 1967), пришли к схожим выводам (0-42 оборонных рубля = 1 доллар).
  

The European Balance

THE WARSAW PACT

ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The Middle East and the Mediterranean

   ДОГОВОРЫ И СОГЛАШЕНИЯ
   CENTO
   Членами Организации Центрального Договора (CENTO) являются Великобритания, Иран, Пакистан и Турция. Соединенные Штаты связаны с CENTO и представлены в военных, экономических и контрразведывательных комитетах, а также в постоянной группе военных депутатов. Договор призван обеспечить взаимное сотрудничество в области безопасности и обороны. CENTO не иметь международные структуры, ни сил, выделенных ему. Авиационная ударная мощь могла быть предоставлена Великобританией с баз на Кипре и Соединенными Штатами с авианосцев 6-го флота в Средиземном море.
   Для местных властей механизмы CENTO могут иметь меньшее значение, чем региональное сотрудничество в целях развития, которое осуществляется параллельно с CENTO, но за его пределами, и в рамках которого действуют несколько программ в экономической, культурной и технической областях.
   Другие договоры
   Турция, помимо членства в НАТО, также имеет двустороннее оборонное соглашение с Соединенными Штатами, как и Ираном и Пакистаном.
   Советский Союз не имеет двусторонних договоров со странами региона, хотя она поставляет оружие ряду из них.
   У Великобритании есть обязательства по оказанию помощи в обороне Мальты, консультированию и сотрудничеству в обороне Кипра, по оказанию помощи Ливии, если она вовлечена в конфликт и несет ответственность за оборону Бахрейна, Катара и государств, соблюдающих перемирие.
   4 ноября 1966 года между Сирией и Объединенной Арабской Республикой (ОАР) было заключено соглашение об обороне, предусматривающее, что нападение на одну страну будет считаться нападением на обе страны. Соглашение предусматривало создание Совета обороны и Объединенного командования. В случае войны египетский начальник штаба был назначен совместным командующим. Аналогичное соглашение было заключено Иорданией и ОАР 30 мая 1967 года, а 4 июня к ним присоединился Ирак. Как представляется, эти соглашения не действуют. Ирак и Сирия заключили договоры об обороне в мае 1968 года и июле 1969 года.
   Ливия, Судан и Объединенная Арабская Республика договорились в конце декабря 1969 года проводить регулярные совещания для координации военных действий против Израиля.
   Алжир, Ирак, Иордания, Ливан, Ливия, Марокко, Саудовская Аравия, Судан, Сирия, Тунис и САР являются членами Лиги арабских государств, а также Йемен, Кувейт и Южный Йемен. В число его вспомогательных органов входят Совет обороны арабских государств, созданный в 1950 году, и Объединенное арабское командование, созданное в 1964 году, которое не функционировало со времени войны в июне 1967 года.
  * Этот договор официально не был прекращен в начале июля 1970 года, однако ливийское правительство заявило, что причины его продолжения исчезли.
  ALGERIA
Population: 13,750,000.
Military service: limited conscription.
Total armed forces: 57,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $3 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1969: 870 million dinars ($174,000,000). 5 dinars = $1.
Army Total strength: 53,000.
   3 motorized infantry brigades (with some armour). .
   3 independent tank battalions.
   About 45 independent infantry battalions.
   5 independent artillery battalions.
   12 companies of desert troops.
   1 paratroop brigade. '
   300 T-34 and T-54 medium tanks.
   350 BTR-152 APCs.
   140mm and 240mm rocket-launchers.
   85mm guns, 122mm and 152mm howitzers. SU-100 SP assault guns.
Navy Total strength: 2,000.
   2 coastal escorts.
   1 coastal minesweeper.
   9 Komar- and Osa-class missile patrol boats (with Styx short-range surface-to-surface missiles).
   10 motor torpedo boats (Soviet P-6 class).
Air Force Total strength: 2,000; 170 combat aircraft.
   140 MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighters.
   30 Il-28 light bombers.
   An-12 and 4 Il-18 transports.
   50 helicopters, mainly Mi-4 Hound; (SA-330 Pumas are being delivered by France).
   About 30 training aircraft.
   1 battalion of SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles. .
   (28 Magister ground-attack/trainer aircraft are on order.)
Para-military forces A Gendarmerie of about 8,000, equipped with about 50 AML armoured cars.
  
  IRAN
Population: 28,400,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 161,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $8.9 billion.
Defence budget 1970-71: 59,000 million rials ($779,000,000). 75.75 rials = $1.
Army Total strength: 135,000.
   2 armoured divisions.
   1 independent armoured brigade.
   5 infantry divisions.
   1 independent infantry brigade.
   M-24, M-47 and M-60A1 tanks.
   M-8 and M-20 armoured cars.
   M-113 and BTR-152 APCs.
   Soviet 57mm and 85mm anti-aircraft guns.
   1 battalion with Hawk surface-to-air missiles.
   An aviation battalion with 17 Huskie helicopters. (Further helicopters are being delivered.)
Navy Total strength: 9,000.
   1 destroyer.
   5 frigates (4 with Seacat surface-to-air missiles). 5 corvettes.
   4 patrol boats.
   4 coastal minesweepers.
   2 inshore minesweepers.
   6 SRN-6 Hovercraft.
   4 landing craft.
   12 patrol vessels (less than 100 tons).
Air Force Total strength: 17,000; 175 combat aircraft.
   4 squadrons (32 aircraft) of F-4D all-weather fighter-bombers, with Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles.
   5 squadrons of F-5 tactical fighter-bombers.
   20 F-86 all-weather interceptors.
   16 RT-33 tactical reconnaissance aircraft (being replaced by 2 squadrons of RF-5).
   Transport aircraft include 8 C-45s, 10 C-47s, 10 C-130Es and 5 Beavers.
   Helicopters include Huskies, Whirlwinds, and 40 AB-205s.
   (100 AB-206 A, 16 Super-Frelon, and 40 UH-1D Iroquois are being delivered.)
   Tigercat surface-to-air missiles.
Para-military forces A Gendarmerie of about 40,000.
  
  IRAQ
Population: 9,000,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 94,500.
Estimated GNP 1969: $2.8 billion.
Defence estimates 1970: 151,700,000 dinars ($424,760,000). 1 dinar = $2.8.
Army Total strength: 85,000 (including about 15,000 in Jordan and 6,000 in Syria).
   2 armoured divisions.
   5 infantry divisions.
   450 T-54/55, 140 T-34 and 55 Centurion Mark 5 medium tanks.
   40 M-24 Chaffee light tanks.
   55 AML-60 armoured cars and 20 Ferret scout cars.
   BTR-152 APCs.
   Artillery includes Soviet 120mm and 130mm guns. .
Navy Total strength: 2,000.
   3 submarine chasers.
   12 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
   10 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
Air Force Total strength: 7,500; 229 combat aircraft.
   8 Tu-16 medium bombers.
   10 Il-28 light bombers.
   50 Su-7 all-weather fighter-bombers.
   36 Hunter Mark 9 ground-attack aircraft.
   20 T-52 Jet Provost light-strike aircraft. .
   60 MiG-21 interceptors.
   45 MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters.
   4 Mi-1, 20 Mi-4 and 11 Wessex helicopters.
   Transport aircraft include 12 An-2, 6 An-12, 10 An-24, 13 Il-14, 2 Herons and 3 Bristol Freighters.
   SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles.
Para-military forces Total strength: 20,000 including:
   A national guard of about 10,000.
   1 mechanized brigade of security troops (about men).
  
   ISRAEL
Population: 2,900,000. *Excluding occupied territories.
Military servicel (Jewish population only): men, 36 months; women, 20 months.
Total armed forces: 75,000 regular cadre and conscripts
   (can be raised to about 300,000 by mobilization of reservists, which is completed within 48-72 hours).
Estimated GNP 1969: $4.5 billion.
Defence budget 1970-71: 3,762.5 million Israeli pounds ($1,075,000,000). 3,5 Israeli pounds = $1.
Army Total strength: 11,500 regular, 50,000 conscripts (275,000 when fully mobilized).
   Active: 2 infantry, two armoured, 1 mechanized and 1 paratroop brigade (some only in cadre form).
   Reserve: about 26 brigades, for one-third of which armour is available on mobilization.
   300 M-48 Patton (with 105mm guns), 450 Centurion, 100 T-54/55s, 200 Super Sherman (with 105mm guns) medium tanks.
   15 AML-90 and some AML-60 and Staghound armoured cars.
   Up to 1500 M-2 and M-3 half-tracks.
   About 300 self-propelled artillery pieces, including mortars and 155mm howitzers on Sherman chassis and 105mm howitzers on AMX chassis.*
   * Further SP artillery is being delivered by the United States.
   Anti-tank weapons include: 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps. 90mm SP guns.
   SS-10/11 missiles mounted on weapons carriers. Cobra missiles.
   20mm, 30mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns.
   (There are reports that the MD-660 surface-to- surface missile is due to become operational during 1970 or 1971.)
   There are separate regional defence units which provide a permanent guard in the border regions. Most of these units are on a militia basis.
Navy Total strength: 3,500 regular, and 1,000 conscripts (8,000 when fully mobilized).
   4 submarines.
   1 destroyer.
   1 anti-aircraft frigate.
   1 coastal escort.
   12 Saar-type fast missile patrol boats (with Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles).
   9 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
   4 seaward defence vessels (less than 100 tons).
   7 landing craft (1 less than 100 tons).
   500 naval commandos.
Air Force Total strength: 8,000 regular, 1,000 conscripts (17,000 when fully mobilized); 330 combat aircraft.
   12 Vautour light bombers.
   36 F-4E Phantom fighter-bomber/interceptors.
   67 A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bombers.
   60 Mirage IIIC fighter-bomber/interceptors (some with R-530 missiles).
   30 Mystere IVA fighter-bombers.
   30 Ouragan fighter-bombers.
   10 Super Mystere interceptors.
   85 Magister jet trainers (can be used in ground- attack role).
   2 squadrons with 15 Noratlas, 6 Stratocruiser and 10 C-47 medium transports.
   Helicopters include 25 AB-205s, 5 Alouettes, 12 Super Frelons, 8 CH-53s and 15 H-34s.
   2 battalions of Hawk surface-to-air missiles.
   (Israel has ordered and paid for fifty Mirage 5s, but their export from France has been blocked.)
   (Delivery of further American aircraft has been under discussion.)
Para-military forces The militia element of the border region defence units is building up to a strength of 10,000.
  
   JORDAN
Population: 2,225,000.
Military service: 2 years.
Total armed forces: 60,250.
Estimated GNP 1969: $0.7 billion.
Defence budget 1970:42 million dinars ($117,600,000). dinar = $2.8.
Army Total strength: 58,000.
   2 armoured brigades.
   1 Royal Guards battalion (armoured).
   9 infantry brigades.
   1 anti-aircraft regiment, for which Tigercat surface-to-air missiles are on order.
   160 M-47 and M-48 Patton, and 150 Centurion medium tanks.
   130 Saladin armoured cars and about 140 Ferret scout cars.
   250 M-113 and 100 Saracen APCs.
   30 105mm and 155mm howitzers, a few 155mm and 203mm guns, and 3 regiments of 25-pounders.
Navy Total strength: 250.
   8 small patrol craft operating from Aqaba.
Air Force Total strength: 2,000; 38 combat aircraft.
   1 squadron of 18 F-104A interceptors. (A second squadron is due to form in 1970.)
   2 squadrons (about 20 aircraft) of Hunter FGA6 and 9.
   4 C-47, 2 Dove and 2 Devon transport aircraft.
   Helicopters include 6 Alouette III and 3 Whirlwinds.
Para-military forces Total strength: 37,500 consisting of:
   7,500 Gendarmerie.
   30.000 National Guard.
  
   LEBANON
Population: 2,700,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 16,250. Estimated GNP 1969: $1.6 billion.
Defence estimates 1970: PndL100 million ($30,300,000). Pnd Lebanese 3.3 = $1.
Army Total strength: 15,000.
   2 tank battalions.
   1 motorized battalion.
   11 infantry battalions.
   40 Charioteer medium tanks.
   40 AMX-13 and 20 M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks.
   M-706 and M-6 Staghound and AEC Mark-3 armoured cars.
   M-113 and M-59 APCs.
   Artillery includes 155mm howitzers.
Navy Total strength: 250.
   1 patrol vessel.
   1 landing craft. ,
   3 small patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
Air Force Total strength: 1,000; 24 combat aircraft.
   1 squadron of Hunter fighter/ground-attack aircraft.
   1 squadron of Mirage III C interceptors with R.530 air-to-air missiles.
   About 6 transport aircraft.
   1 helicopter squadron with 3 Alouette IIs and 6 Alouette IIIs.
   (A Croiale air-defence missile system is on order.)
Para-military forces There is a Gendarmerie of 2,500.
   It is planned to form a National Guard with a strength of up to 5,000.
  
   LIBYA
Population: 1,935,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total armed forces: 15,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $2.4 billion. Defence budget 1969-70: £L16,400,000 ($45,920,000). £L1=$2.8.
Army Total strength: 14,000.
   2 armoured battalions.
   8 infantry battalions.
   2 artillery battalions.
   1 anti-aircraft artillery battalion.
   9 Centurion medium tanks.
   Saladin armoured cars, Ferret scout cars and Saracen APCs.
   Artillery includes 105mm howitzers.
   (An order for 188 Chieftain heavy tanks is under discussion with Britain.
   There were reports in July of deliveries of armour by the Soviet Union.)
Navy Total strength: 600.
   1 corvette.
   3 fast patrol boats, equipped with Nord SS-12(M) surface-to-surface missiles.
   3 minesweepers.
   1 logistic support ship.
   12 small patrol craft.
   (1 fast frigate is on order.)
Air Force Total strength: 400; 7 combat aircraft.
   1 interceptor squadron with 7 F-5s.
   9 C-47 medium transports.
   3 T-33 jet trainers.
   Some helicopters, including 3 Alouette IIs.
   (50 Mirage 5 and 60 Mirage III are on order.)
  
   MOROCCO
Population: 15,525,000.
Military service: 18 months.
Total armed forces: 50,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $3.4 billion.
Defence budget 1969-70: 405 million dirhams ($80,040,000). 5.6 dirhams - $1.
Army Total strength: 45,000.
   1 armoured brigade.
   2 motorized infantry brigades.
   1 light security brigade.
   1 paratroop brigade.
   12 independent infantry battalions.
   3 desert cavalry groups.
   4 artillery groups.
   120 T-54 medium and 120 AMX-13 light tanks.
   Some EBR-75, and 50 AML-245 and M-8 Greyhound armoured cars.
   40 M-3 half-track and 90 Czech APCs.
   25 SU-100 and AMX-105, and 50 M-56 SP guns.
   75mm and 105mm howitzers.
   6 Alouette II/III helicopters.
Navy Total strength: 1,000.
   1 frigate.
   1 corvette.
   1 coastal escort.
   1 landing ship.
   2 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
Air Force Total strength: 4,000; 26 combat aircraft.
   10 F-5A interceptors.
   12 MiG-17 fighter-bombers (in storage).
   4 AT-6 Texan armed trainers.
   About 45 T-6 Texan, . 25 T-28 Trojan and 8 Magister trainers.'
   12 C-47 and 11 C-119 transports.
   About 20 AB-205, H-34, OH-13 Sioux and HH-43 Huskie helicopters.
   (24 Magister are due to be delivered in 1970.)
Para-military forces Total strength: 3,000, plus about 20,000 auxiliaries.
   Their organization includes 2 mobile security battalions. There are also several companies of Royal Guards.
  
   SAUDI ARABIA
Population: 7,300,000
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 36,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $3.9 billion. , Defence budget 1969-70: 1,742 million riyals ($387,000,000). 4.5 riyals = $1.
Army Total strength: 30,000.
   4 infantry brigades.
   55 M-47 Patton medium tanks.
   35 M-41 Walker Bulldog and 30 AMX-13 light tanks.
   About 200 AML-90 and some M-6 Staghound and M-8 Greyhound armoured cars; some Ferret scout cars.
   Vigilant anti-tank missiles.
   10 batteries of Hawk surface-to-air missiles.
Navy Total strength: 1,000.
   1 patrol vessel.
   5 fast patrol boats.
   (About 20 smaller patrol boats are on order.)
Air Force Total strength: 5,000; 75 combat aircraft.
   16 F-86 fighter-bombers.
   24 BAC-167 Strikemaster ground-attack aircraft.
   35 Lightning interceptors.
   8 C-47, 2 C-118, 6 C-123 and 9 C-130E transport aircraft.
   2 Alouette III, 2 AB-204, 24 AB-205 and 10 AB-206 helicopters.
   About 30 Hunter, Lightning, and T-41A trainers.
   37 Thunderbird surface-to-air missiles, some of which are installed around airfields.
Para-military forces Lightly armed tribal levies (the `White Army') number about 24,000.
   They are used chiefly for internal security purposes.
  
   SUDAN
Population: 15,600,000.
Voluntary military service.
Total armed forces: 27,450.
Estimated GNP 1969: $2.1 billion.
Defence budget 1969-70: £S30,300,000 ($87,570,000). £Sudan 1=$2.87.
Army Total strength: 26,500.
   4 infantry brigades (each of four battalions).
   3 independent infantry battalions.
   1 armoured regiment.
   1 parachute regiment.
   3 artillery regiments.
   About 50 T-55 tanks.
   50 Saladin and 45 M-706 Commando armoured cars.
   60 Ferret scout cars.
   Artillery includes about 50 25-pounders, 40 105mm guns and howitzers, 20 120mm mortars,
   80 Bofors 40mm and some Soviet 85mm anti-aircraft guns.
Navy Total strength: 500.
   6 coastal patrol boats.
Air Force Total strength: 450; 32 combat aircraft.
   16 MiG-21 interceptor/fighter-bombers.
   5 BAC-145 T.Mk5.
   8 Jet Provost Mk 52.
   3 Piston Provost Mk 51.
   3 Pembroke, 3 F-27 Troopships and 5 An-24 transports.
Para-military forces Gendarmerie: 1,000. Frontier Police: 2,000.
  
   SYRIA
Population: 6,025,000.
Military service: 30 months. (Jewish population exempted.)
Total armed forces: 86,750.
Estimated GNP 1969: $1.35 billion.
Estimated defence expenditure 1970: pound 840 million Syrian ($221,000,000). pound 3.8 Syrian = $1.
Army Total strength: 75,000 (including 1,200 in Jordan and 2,000 in Iraq).
   4 armoured brigades.
   4 mechanized brigades.
   6 infantry brigades.
   1 parachute battalion.
   3 commando battalions.
   7 artillery regiments (including 1 in Jordan).
   About 30 IS-3 heavy tanks.
   150 T-34 and 700 T-54/55s medium tanks.
   100 SU-100 tank destroyers and 600 BTR-152 APCs.
   Soviet-made artillery includes 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns.
   40 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles.
Navy Total strength: 1,750.
   2 minesweepers.
   3 coastal patrol vessels.
   10 Komar-class missile patrol boats, with Styx short-range surface-to-surface missiles.
   15 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
Air Force Total strength: 10,000 men; 210 combat aircraft.
   80 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers.
   40 Su-7 fighter-bombers.
   90 MiG-21 interceptors.
   8 Il-14, 6 C-47, 4 D-18 and 3 Li-2 transport aircraft.
   4 Mi-1, 8 Mi-4 and some Mi-8 helicopters.
Para-military forces Gendarmerie: 5,000.
   Internal Security Camel Corps: 1,500.
   The People's Militia is stated to be building up to 250,000.
  
   TUNISIA
Population: 4,850,000.
Military service: 1 year (selective).
Total armed forces: 21,050.
Estimated GNP 1969: $1.2 billion.
Defence budget 1969-70: 8,700,000 dinars ($16,704,000). 1 dinar = $1.92.
Army Total strength: 20,000.
   1 armoured battalion.
   5 infantry battalions.
   1 artillery group.
   1 Sahara patrol group.
   About 15 AMX-13 and M-41 light tanks.
   M-8 Greyhound and about 20 Saladin armoured cars.
   Artillery includes 105mm SP and 155mm guns.
Navy Total strength: 450.
   1 corvette.
   10 patrol boats (less than 100 tons).
   (2 French fast patrol boats, to be equipped with SS-12 (M) surface-to-surface missiles, are due to be delivered in 1970.)
Air Force Total strength: 600; 12 combat aircraft.
   12 F-86 fighters.
   9 MB-326 jet trainers.
   12 T-6 Texan basic trainers.
   14 Saab 91-D Sofir primary trainers.
   8 Alouette II helicopters.
   3 Flamant light transports.
Para-military forces Gendarmerie of 5,000, organized in 6 battalions.
  
   UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR)
Population: 33,300,000.
Military service: 3 years.
Total armed forces: 288,000.
Estimated GNP 1969: $6.3 billion.
Defence budget 1970-71: £E553 million ($1,272 million). £El=$2.3.
Army Total strength: 250,000.
   3 armoured divisions.
   4 mechanized infantry divisions.
   5 infantry divisions.
   18 commando battalions.
   2 parachute brigades.
   15 artillery brigades.
   About 30 IS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks.
   Some 950 T-54/T-55, 250 T-34, 10 Centurion Mark 3 and 15 Sherman medium tanks.
   150 PT-76 amphibious and 20 AMX-13 light tanks.
   900 BTR-40, BTR-50, OT-64 and BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers.
   About 150 SU-100 and JSU-152 SP assault and ZSU-57 SP anti-aircraft guns.
   1,500 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns and about 40 lorry-mounted rocket-launchers.
   About 24 FROG-3 and 25 Samlet short-range surface-to-surface missiles.
Navy Total strength: 14,000, including coastguards.
   12 submarines (6 ex-Soviet W-class and 6 ex-Soviet R-class).
   6 destroyers (4 ex-Soviet Skory-class and 1 ex-British Z-type).
   2 escort vessels.
   12 coastal escorts.
   7 fleet minesweepers.
   2 inshore minesweepers.
   12 Osa-class missile patrol boats and 7 Komar- class, both with Styx short-range surface-to- surface missiles.
   27 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons).
   17 small landing craft.
Air Force Total strength: 20,000; 415 combat aircraft.
   15 Tu-16 medium bombers.
   28 Il-28 light bombers.
   150 MiG-21 interceptors.
   105 Su-7 fighter-bombers.
   165 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers.
   About 40 Il-14 and 20 An-12 medium transports.
   70 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.
   150 MiG, Yak and Delfin trainers, some of which can be armed.
Air defence is provided by 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm anti-aircraft guns, and by
   250 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles deployed in 25 batteries of 6 launchers each,
   co-ordinated with a radar network and six squadrons of MiG-21C interceptors.
   There are some 100 Soviet-operated MiG-21J interceptors.
   It is believed that 22 SA-3 sites have been completed, and that construction of another 23 is in progress.
   These missiles are manned by Soviet personnel.
Missile Command This is separate from the Army and the Air Force, and consists of about 4,000 men, including civilian technicians.
   The 100 missiles that have been built include the
   Al Zafir, stated to be able to carry a 900-lb warhead some 200 miles, the
   Al Kahir, stated to be able to carry a rather
larger warhead up to 350 miles, and the
   Al Raid, stated to be able to carry a one-ton scientific probe some 440 miles.
   (All these figures are thought to be over-optimistic.)
   The first two were designed to be launched from mobile platforms, but none of the missiles is thought to have achieved any operational capability.
   It is believed that the programme has been abandoned and that the command may be disbanded.
Para-military forces A National Guard of about 90,000.

Sub-Saharan Africa*

Asia and Australia

CHINA

КИТАЙ

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES AND AUSTRALASIA

ДРУГИЕ АЗИАТСКИЕ СТРАНЫ И АВСТРАЛИЯ

Latin America

Латинская Америка

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

НАТО и ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР

THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

TABLES

  
  

   Footnotes to (A)
   a. China is not included in this table. Her ability to deliver nuclear weapons appears to be limited to some Tu-16 and Tu-4 medium-range bombers and Il-28 short-range bombers.
   b. In addition, there are about 300 Tu-16 Badgers in the Naval Air Force, configured for attacks on shipping, which could deliver nuclear weapons.
   c. There is no evidence that the MiG-23 has been deployed in a strike role, but it would be well suited to adaptation for such use.

  


  


   2. MAJOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES 1970

  


  


  


  


  

   NOTES
   a. ICBM = inter-continental ballistic missile (range 4,000+ miles); IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile (range 1,500-4,000 miles); MRBM = medium- range ballistic missile (range 500-1,500 miles); SRBM = short-range ballistic missile (range under 500 miles); SLBM =-submarine-launched ballistic missile.
   b. L = liquid propellant; SL = storable liquid propellant; S = solid propellant; J = ram- or turbojet.
   c. Operational range depends upon the payload carried; use of maximum payload may reduce range by up to 25 per cent below maximum.
   d. MT = megaton = million tons of TNT equivalent (MT range = 1MT or over); KT = kiloton = thousand tons of TNT equivalent (KT range = less than IMT).
   e. The majority of Polaris A3 missiles have been modified to carry three warheads of about 200 KT each.
   f. Numerical designations for Soviet missiles (e.g. SS-9) are of US origin; names (e.g. Scarp) are of NATO origin.
   g. SS-9 missiles have also been tested (i) with three warheads of 4-5 MT each, (ii) with a modified payload for use as a depressed trajectory ICBM (DICBM) or fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS).
   h. A new mobile IRBM (SS-XZ Scrooge) has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
   i. A new mobile solid-propellant missile (SS-14 Scapegoat), apparently with MRBM range, has been displayed and tested but is not known to be deployed operationally.
   j. The SS-12 may not yet be deployed operationally.
   k. Launched only from the surface in some older submarines.
   l. Long-range bomber = maximum range over 6,000 miles; medium-range bomber = maximum range 3,500-6,000 miles, primarily designed for bombing missions.
   m. Theoretical maximum range, with internal fuel only, at optimum altitude and speed. Ranges for strike aircraft assume no weapon load. Especially in the case of strike aircraft, therefore, range falls sharply for flights at lower altitude, at higher speed or with full weapons load (e.g. combat radius of A-7, at operational height and speed, with typical weapons load, is approximately 620 miles).
   n. Mach 1 (M = 1,0) = speed of sound.
   o. ASM = air-to-surface missile.
   p. F-104s are no longer in active service as strike aircraft with the US Air Force but remain in service with other NATO air forces.
   q. Names of Soviet aircraft (e.g. Bear) are of NATO origin.
   r. Naval Air Force versions of the Tu-16 carry 2 x Kelt or 2 x Kennel ASMs for anti-shipping use.

  


  


  


  


  

  

   GENERAL NOTE. In this table, unless otherwise footnoted, the term 'current international defence production' comprehends those projects in which all participating countries are making a positive technological contribution to production, and are likely to procure the end-product for national use.
   Figures appearing in the column headed 'Years' indicate the date from which practical collaborative work on projects commenced, and do not take account of the timing of political initiatives or agreements, which may have been prior or subsequent to the period stated above, or of previous work by individual companies.
   Details of similar projects which have now finished may be found in Table 13 of C. J. E. Harlow's paper The European Armaments Base: A Survey, Part I: Economic Aspects of Defence Procurement, 'Defence, Technology and the Western Alliance', No. 2 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967).
   * Of the 6 nations making major technological contributions to the programme, 2 - Britain and the United States - will not derive any direct improvements in their national systems, though the British air-defence network will interface with NADGE. Sub-contractors in - other NATO nations are numerous.

   6. MAJOR IDENTIFIED ARMS AGREEMENTS, JULY 1969-JUNE 1970
  


  


  


  


  


  


  

   NOTES
   This table lists major agreements both on a finn-togovernment and on a government-to-government basis, and covers both credit and cash sales. Costs to recipients may include spares, support, etc., and reflect the value of goods taken in part-exchange where applicable. Payees may include sub-contractors in the purchasing country, as well as prime contractors in the supplying country. No licensing agreements are included.
   American, Soviet or Chinese military aid to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Korea, and Soviet deliveries to members of the Warsaw Pact are excluded.

APPENDIX: FISSILE MATERIAL

   BACKGROUND
   Fissile material, the primary raw material of nuclear energy, has many civil uses. In some of its forms, it is also the basis for military programmes. Without it, the production of nuclear weapons is at present impossible, as is the sustenance of propulsion reactors for submarines or naval surface vessels.
   A fusion weapon (`H-bomb') requires a fission weapon (`A-bomb') to trigger its explosive energy. Fission weapons or fission triggers for fusion weapons require a sufficient quantity of either fissile uranium or fissile plutonium. Of the two main uranium isotopes which can be used to initiate fission (U-233, U-235), U-233, which does not exist in nature, has so far attracted little interest for weapon purposes. Of the two main plutonium isotopes (Pu-239, Pu-240), neither of which exists in nature, Pu-240 is unsuitable for the initiation of a fission explosion. Primary attention, for military purposes, therefore focuses upon U-235 and Pu-239. In present circumstances, no country can begin or sustain a nuclear weapons programme without access to one of these isotopes.
   U-235
   Only about seven atoms of every 1,000 in the uranium found in nature consist of U-235. Before uranium can be used in a weapon, this proportion must be increased very considerably, normally to over 90 per cent of U-235, in a specialized enrichment plant.
   Almost all uranium enrichment has so far been carried out by a process known as gaseous diffusion. In this method, refined natural uranium is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF₆) and is then diffused through a series of membranes which transmit the lighter molecules, rich in U-235, more readily than the heavier molecules, rich in U-238. Because of the number of membrane stages they must contain in order to achieve significant enrichment, and because of the quantity of ancillary equipment which they require, gaseous diffusion plants are very big. They also consume extremely large amounts of electric power. Moreover, their construction and operation become painfully uneconomical below a very high level of capacity. For all these reasons, they are the prerogative of wealthy countries with a requirement for a large enrichment capacity. Nevertheless, the only full-scale production plants in the world for the enrichment of uranium are those of the gaseous diffusion type which exist in the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, all of which are nuclear weapon states.Available details of those in the United States, Britain and France are given in the Table on p. 122. No details are available of the plants in the Soviet Union and China.
   The Table on p. 122 also gives figures, in megawatts (MW), for the power levels at which gaseous diffusion plants operate. In terms of electricity consumption, these


  

   Notes:
   a. kgSW/yr = kilograms of separative, work per year (see explanation on p. 123).
   b. Based on (a) electric power costs, (b) capital charges (including amortisation), (c) labour costs and (d) running costs and contingencies.
   c. Theoretical figures, based upon constant application of maximum capacity to production at this enrichment.
   d. At present, US plants are operating at a total power level of only about 2,000 MW and with an output of only about 4,450,000 kgSW/yr (equivalent to a theoretical maximum of about 19,500 kg/yr of 90% U-235).
   e. The high enrichment stages of the Capenhurst plant were shut down in 1962. If they were reactivated, or if the plant were otherwise adapted to the production of 90% U-235, its maximum output would be likely to be 1,500-2,000 kg/yr.
   Примечания:
   a. kgSW / год = килограммы разделительной работы в год (см. пояснение на стр. 123).
   b. На основе а) затрат на электроэнергию, b) капитальных затрат (включая амортизацию), с) затрат на рабочую силу и d) эксплуатационных расходов и непредвиденных расходов.
   c. Теоретические показатели, основанные на постоянном применении максимальной мощности к производству при этом обогащении.
   d. В настоящее время электростанции в США работают на общем уровне мощности всего около 2000 МВт и с мощностью всего около 4 450 000 кгсвт/год (что эквивалентно теоретическому максимуму около 19 500 кг/год 90% U-235).
   e. В 1962 году были закрыты этапы высокого обогащения на заводе в Капенхерсте. Если они были реактивированы, или если завод был в противном случае приспособлен к продукции 90% U-235, то свой максимальный выпуск был бы правоподобн для того чтобы быть 1.500-2.000 кг/год.

   figures are enormous. The three plants in the United States, for example, would consume about 52,500 million kilowatt hours (kWh) a year when operating at full load, which is approximately equal to the total electricity consumption of Australia.
   Any enrichment plant is capable, in theory, of enriching natural uranium to the extent required for weapon purposes. The degree of enrichment needed in the fuel for most current power reactors (1-5 per cent of U-235) is, however, a great deal less than this, and enrichment plants intended only to provide the material for such fuel are likely to require adaptation before they can produce weapons-grade uranium.
   Because the extent to which any particular batch of uranium is enriched is a direct function of the number of plant stages through which the UF" gas has been passed, the total capacity of an enrichment plant cannot be expressed in quantities produced; a great deal more low-enriched uranium than high-enriched uranium can be produced in a given period. The capacity of enrichment plants is therefore stated in terms of `kilograms of separative work', which is not a measure of quantity but a measure of the effort expended in the plant in order to achieve a particular level of enrichment in a particular amount of uranium. A plant can produce in weapons-grade material only between one-fiftieth and one-hundredth of the quantity which it can produce of material suitable for a typical power reactor. In order to give some indication of the military utility of existing gaseous diffusion plants, the figures for their capacity in kilograms of separative work have therefore been accompanied by figures which show the theoretical maximum quantity of 90 per cent enriched uranium which each could produce in a year.
   Pu-239
   Plutonium is an element which does not exist in nature. It comes into being when the most common isotope of uranium, U-238, captures neutrons released during the fission process which takes place in a reactor. Before it can be used for any purpose, plutonium has to be extracted, in a specialised fuel reprocessing plant, from the fuel elements which have been irradiated in a reactor. If it is to be used in weapons, it must thereafter be converted, through a number of stages, into plutonium metal. These processes require elaborate and expensive equipment.
   Details of the principal fuel reprocessing plants in the non-Communist world are given in the Table on p. 124. (Again, no details are available of the plants in Warsaw Pact countries or in China.) All these plants have the ability to separate plutonium from the other materials in irradiated fuel elements. The capacity of each plant is given in terms of the quantity of irradiated fuel material which it can handle in a year, expressed in metric tons (MT).The amount of plutonium which this represents will vary widely with the nature of the fuel which is being reprocessed. In the first place, since plutonium is derived from U-238 but not from the fissile U-235, the maximum amount of plutonium in a given quantity of high-enriched uranium fuel will be less than the maximum amount in the same quantity of low-enriched fuel, and still less than that in natural uranium fuel. In the second place, the proportion of the U-238 converted to plutonium is a function of the period and intensity of the fuel's use (`burn-up') in the reactor. The higher the `bum-up', the greater will be the proportion of plutonium. As a rough guide, the fuel withdrawn from current power reactors operating at full power will yield between five and nine kilograms of plutonium for every metric ton of irradiated uranium reprocessed. For reasons explained below, fuel elements from special plutonium production reactors will yield much lower proportions, probably of the order of 1-l,5 kilograms per metric ton. Lower yields
  

   Notes
   a Only operational plants with a capacity for plutonium extraction have been included.
   b MT U/yr = metric tons of contained uranium, in irradiated fuel elements, per year. Actual throughput
varies widely with different fuel types.
   c Except in the case of pilot plants (Buenos Aires, Moncloa) and purely military plants (Savannah River, Hanford, Marcoule) figures are based on 8 kg. of plutonium per metric ton of uranium processed.
   d The Mol plant (Eurochemic) is owned jointly by 13 member countries of the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA).
   e The Dounreay plant reprocesses fuel from fast breeder reactors; its plutonium production will depend upon the nature of the fuel involved
   Примечания
   a. Включены только действующие установки, способные извлекать плутоний.
   b. МТ U/год = метрических тонн урана, содержащегося в облученных топливных элементах, в год. Фактическая пропускная способность широко варьируется в зависимости от типа топлива.
   c. За исключением экспериментальных установок (Буэнос-Айрес, Монклоа) и чисто военных установок (река Саванна), Hanford, Marcoule) цифры основаны на 8 кг. плутония на метрическую тонну обработанного урана.
   d. Завод Mol (Eurochemic) находится в совместном владении 13 стран-членов европейской ядерной энергетики Агентства (ENEA).
   е. Dounreay добавит растение топлива быстрых реакторов; производство плутония будет зависеть по характеру используемого топлива

   will also be obtained from fuel used in running a commercial reactor up to full power, because such fuel is normally withdrawn more quickly than in the case of subsequent loadings.
   The plutonium isotope which produces explosive power in a fission weapon is u-239. Irradiated reactor fuels also, however, contain other isotopes of plutonium, and especially the Pu-240 isotope. The proportions in which these different isotopes are present will vary, primarily as a function of the degree of 'burn-up' to which the fuel has been subjected. In general, fuel from current power reactors running economically and at full power will yield plutonium which contains up to 20 per cent
of Pu-240, almost all the remainder being Pu-239. Fuel elements withdrawn more quickly, after a lesser degree of 'burn-up', will contain a smaller proportion of Pu-240 (but will also contain smaller total amounts of plutonium). Pu-240, in addition to being intensely toxic, has other undesirable properties. In particular, it is subject to a degree of spontaneous fission. For that reason, the most efficient plutonium for weapon purposes is that which contains the minimum proportion of Pu-240 possible. The natural uranium fuel elements used in special plutoniumproduction reactors within existing nuclear weapon programmes are therefore withdrawn after a very low `burn-up', at which stage the inevitably small quantity of plutonium they contain is almost pure Pu-239.
   Although Pu-240 is an undesirable constituent of plutonium for weapon purposes, the common belief that any significant proportion of Pu-240 makes the material unusable in weapons is mistaken. From the point of view of efficiency, explosive yield and ease and safety of handling, pure Pu-239 is the ideal, and the existing nuclear weapon states, with special production reactors, will always aim for this objective. Provided some compromise on these characteristics is acceptable, however, there is no reason why weapons should not be made from plutonium containing proportions of plutonium as high as the 20 per cent yielded by some current power reactors or the 30 per cent which may be yielded by future reactors. For this reason, the Table on p. 124 shows estimated quantities of plutonium of all grades which might be produced from the reprocessing plants listed. The actual quantity produced will depend, in large part, upon the output of irradiated fuel from reactors. It has been estimated that reactors in the non-Communist world will generate over 5,500 kilograms of plutonium during 1970.
   NUCLEAR WEAPONS .
   Although estimates exist in published literature, there is no simple figure for the minimum quantity of U-235 or Pu-239 which could initiate a fission explosion. A great deal depends upon the quality of the engineering available. The quantity of U-235 necessary is likely to be about 16 kilograms, whereas, using efficient compression and neutron reflection, about 3 kilograms of Pu-239 might be enough. In general, however, lesser skill and experience will make larger quantities necessary.
   Because, with present technology, a U-235 or Pu-239 fission device is needed to trigger a fusion weapon (`H-bomb'), the attention has here been focused on these materials.It must be remembered, however, that fusion itself requires deuterium and either tritium or lithium. Deuterium and lithium are readily available and relatively cheap, but tritium has to be produced, by special techniques, in a reactor or atomic pile.
   INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN FISSILE MATERIAL
   No country can make nuclear weapons without access to the product of either a uranium enrichment plant or a fuel reprocessing plant suitable for the extraction of plutonium. Without such access, a country's natural uranium reserves and the size, number and output of its power reactors are all irrelevant to military purposes.
   Many countries which do not have enrichment plants require enriched uranium for their power or research reactors. In almost all cases, however, the proportion of U-235 present in their fuel is between 1 and 5 percent.The material is thus useless for weapons purposes.
  
Any country which operates a reactor must have its irradiated fuel reprocessed and, if this has to be done outside its own jurisdiction, will normally expect the products of reprocessing, including plutonium, to be returned to it. It must therefore be assumed that any country operating a reactor will have access to some quantity of fissile material, in the form of plutonium, within six months of withdrawing irradiated fuel from it.
   In these circumstances, the primary guarantee against illicit diversion of such material to weapons purposes lies in the safeguards which operators of enrichment and reprocessing plants have applied to their exports. For practical reasons, safeguards may have to be imposed at a number of stages in the handling of fissile material. The critical stages will always, however, be the enrichment and reprocessing plants themselves, from which the primary materials for a weapons programme must originate.

   ДОБАВЛЕНИЕ: РАСЩЕПЛЯЮЩИЕСЯ МАТЕРИАЛЫ
   ФОН
   Расщепляющийся материал, первичное сырье ядерной энергии, имеет много гражданских применений. В некоторых его формах он также является основой военных программ. Без него производство ядерного оружия в настоящее время невозможно, равно как и поддержание двигательных реакторов подводных лодок или надводных кораблей.
   Оружие синтеза ("H-бомба') требует оружия деления ("А-бомба"), чтобы вызвать его взрывную энергию. Оружие деления или пусковые механизмы деления для ядерного оружия требуют достаточного количества либо расщепляющегося урана, либо расщепляющегося плутония. Из двух основных изотопов урана, которые могут быть использованы для инициирования деления (U-233, U-235), U-233, который не существует в природе, до сих пор не вызывает большого интереса в оружейных целях. Из двух основных изотопов плутония (Pu-239, Pu-240), ни один из которых не существует в природе, Pu-240 непригоден для инициирования взрыва деления. Поэтому основное внимание в военных целях уделяется U-235 и Pu-239. В нынешних обстоятельствах ни одна страна не может начать или поддерживать ядерную оружейную программу без доступа к одному из этих изотопов.
   U-235
   Только около семи атомов из каждой тысячи в уране, найденном в природе, являются U-235. Прежде чем уран может быть использован в оружии, эта доля должна быть значительно увеличена, обычно до более чем 90 процентов урана-235, на специализированной обогатительной фабрике.
   Почти все работы по обогащению урана до сих пор осуществляется с помощью процесса, известного как газодиффузионных. В этом методе, рафинированный природный уран преобразуется в газообразный гексафторид урана (UF6) и затем диффундирует через ряд мембран, которые пропускают более легкие молекулы, богатые U-235, легче, чем более тяжелые молекулы, богатые U-238. Из-за числа большого числа этапов мембраны должно быть много чтобы достигнуть значительного обогащения, и из-за количества вспомогательного оборудования которое они требуют, заводы газообразной диффузии очень большие. Они также потребляют очень большое количество электроэнергии. Более того, их строительство и эксплуатация становятся неэкономичными ниже очень высокого уровня мощности. По всем этим причинам они являются прерогативой богатых стран, которые нуждаются в большом обогатительном потенциале. Тем не менее, единственными полномасштабными заводами по обогащению урана в мире являются заводы газодиффузионного типа, существующие в Соединенных Штатах, Советском Союзе, Великобритании, Франции и Китае, и все они являются государствами, обладающими ядерным оружием. Подробная информация об этих странах в Соединенных Штатах, Великобритании и Франции приводится в таблице на стр. 122. Подробности о заводах в Советском Союзе и Китае отсутствуют.
   В таблице на с.122 также приводятся данные в мегаваттах (МВт) об уровнях мощности, на которых работают газодиффузионные установки. С точки зрения потребления электроэнергии, эти цифры огромные. Например, три электростанции в Соединенных Штатах будут потреблять около 52 500 миллионов киловатт-часов в год при полной нагрузке, что примерно равно общему потреблению электроэнергии в Австралии.
   Любая обогатительная фабрика теоретически способна обогащать природный уран в объеме, необходимом для целей оружия. Однако степень обогащения топлива, необходимого для большинства нынешних энергетических реакторов (1-5% урана-235), значительно ниже, и обогатительные установки, предназначенные только для обеспечения такого топливного материала, вероятно, потребуют адаптации, прежде чем они смогут производить оружейный уран.
   Поскольку степень обогащения какой-либо конкретной партии урана напрямую зависит от количества этапов установки, через которые был пройден UF-газ, общая мощность обогатительной фабрики не может быть выражена в произведенном количестве; за данный период может быть произведено гораздо больше низкообогащенного урана, чем высокообогащенного урана. Таким образом, мощность обогатительных фабрик выражается в "килограммах работы по разделению", что является не мерой количества, а мерой усилий, затраченных на заводе для достижения определенного уровня обогащения в определенном количестве урана. Завод может производить оружейный материал только в количестве от одной пятидесятой до одной сотой того количества, которое он может произвести из материала, пригодного для типичного энергетического реактора. Таким образом, для того чтобы дать определенное представление о военной полезности существующих газодиффузионных установок, данные об их мощности в килограммах работы по разделению сопровождаются цифрами, которые показывают теоретически максимальное количество обогащенного урана в 90 процентов, которое каждый из них может производить в год.
   Pu-239
   Плутоний-это элемент, которого нет в природе. Он возникает, когда наиболее распространенный изотоп урана, U-238, захватывает нейтроны, высвобождающиеся в процессе деления, которое происходит в реакторе. Прежде чем его можно будет использовать в каких-либо целях, плутоний должен быть извлечен на специализированной установке по переработке топлива из топливных элементов, облученных в реакторе. Для того чтобы его можно было использовать в оружии, его необходимо впоследствии преобразовать через ряд этапов в металл плутония. Эти процессы требуют сложного и дорогостоящего оборудования.
   Подробная информация об основных заводах по переработке топлива в некоммунистическом мире приведена в таблице на стр. 124. (Опять же, нет подробной информации о заводах в странах Варшавского договора или в Китае.) Все эти установки обладают способностью отделять плутоний от других материалов в облученных топливных элементах. Мощность каждой установки выражается в количестве облученного топливного материала, с которым она может работать в год, выраженном в метрических тоннах (МТ). Количество плутония, которое это представляет, будет сильно варьироваться в зависимости от характера перерабатываемого топлива. Во-первых, поскольку плутоний получают из U-238, а не из расщепляющегося U-235, максимальное количество плутония в данном количестве высокообогащенного уранового топлива будет меньше максимального количества в том же количестве низкообогащенного топлива и все же меньше, чем в природном урановом топливе. Во-вторых, доля U-238, преобразованного в плутоний, зависит от периода и интенсивности использования топлива ("выгорания") в реакторе. Чем выше "выгорание", тем больше будет доля плутония. В качестве приблизительного ориентира, топливо, изъятое из существующих энергетических реакторов, работающих на полной мощности, даст от пяти до девяти килограммов плутония на каждую метрическую тонну переработанного облученного урана. По причинам, изложенным ниже, топливные элементы из специальных реакторов по производству плутония будут давать гораздо меньшую пропорцию, вероятно порядка 1-l,5 килограммов на метрическую тонну. Снижение выхода также будет получено из топлива, используемого в коммерческом реакторе до полной мощности, потому что такое топливо обычно выводится быстрее, чем в случае последующей загрузки.
   Изотоп плутония, который производит взрывную мощность в оружии деления U-239. Однако облученные реакторные топлива также содержат другие изотопы плутония, и особенно изотоп Pu-240. Пропорции, в которых присутствуют эти различные изотопы, будут варьироваться, главным образом, в зависимости от степени "выгорания" топлива. В целом топливо из действующих энергетических реакторов, работающих экономично и на полной мощности, будет давать плутоний, содержащий до 20% Pu-240, остатfkmyjt Pu-239. Топливные элементы, изъятые быстрее, после меньшей степени "выгорания", будут содержать меньшую долю Pu-240 (но также будут содержать меньшее общее количество плутония). Pu-240, кроме того, что сильно токсичен, имеет другие нежелательные свойства. В частности, он подвержен спонтанному делению. По этой причине, наиболее эффективным для оружейных целей, будет та, которая содержит минимальное возможное количество плутония-240. Таким образом, природные урановые топливные элементы, используемые в специальных реакторах производства плутония в рамках существующих программ ядерного оружия, изымаются после очень низкого "выгорания", на котором неизбежно небольшое количество плутония, содержащегося в них, является почти чистым Pu-239.
   Хотя Pu-240 является нежелательным компонентом плутония для оружейных целей, общее мнение о том, что любая значительная доля Pu-240 делает этот материал непригодным для использования в оружии, ошибочно. С точки зрения эффективности, взрывонрй силы, простоты и безопасности обращения, чистый Pu-239 является идеальным, и ядерные державы, имеющие специальные производственные реакторы, всегда будут стремиться к этой нему. Однако при условии приемлемости определенного компромисса по этим характеристикам нет никаких причин, по которым оружие не должно производиться из плутония, содержащего доли плутония, достигающие 20%, производимых некоторыми нынешними энергетическими реакторами, или 30%, которые могут быть получены будущими реакторами. По этой причине таблица на с.124 приведены расчетные количества плутония всех марок, который может быть получен на перечисленных заводах по переработке. Фактическое количество произведенного топлива будет в значительной степени зависеть от выхода облученного топлива из реакторов. Согласно оценкам, реакторы некоммунистического мира в 1970 году произведут более 5500 килограммов плутония.
   ЯДЕРНОЕ ОРУЖИЕ.
   Хотя в опубликованной литературе имеются оценки, нет точныхцифр для минимального количества U-235 или Pu-239, котороее могли бы инициировать взрыв делением. Многое зависит от качества. Необходимое количество U-235, вероятно, составит около 16 килограммов, тогда как при эффективном сжатии и отражении нейтронов может быть достаточно около 3 килограммов Pu-239. В целом, однако, меньшие навыки и опыт сделают большее количество необходимым.
   Поскольку при нынешней технологии для запуска термоядерного оружия ("Н-бомбы") требуется устройство деления U-235 или Pu-239, внимание здесь было сосредоточено на этих материалах. Однако следует помнить, что для самого синтеза необходим дейтерий и либо тритий, либо литий. Дейтерий и литий легко доступны и относительно дешевы, но тритий должен производиться специальными методами в реакторе или атомном котле.
   МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ТОРГОВЛЯ РАСЩЕПЛЯЮЩИМСЯ МАТЕРИАЛОМ
   Ни одна страна не может производить ядерное оружие, не имея доступа к продукции завода по обогащению урана, к заводу по переработке топлива, пригодного для извлечения плутония. Без такого доступа запасы природного урана страны, а также размеры, количество и мощность ее энергетических реакторов не имеют отношения к военным целям.
   Многие страны, не имеющие обогатительных фабрик, нуждаются в обогащенном уране для своих энергетических или исследовательских реакторов. Однако почти во всех случаях доля U-235, присутствующего в их топливе, составляет от 1 до 5 процентов. Материал, таким образом, бесполезен для целей оружия.
   Любая страна, эксплуатирующая реактор, должна перерабатывать облученное топливо и, если это необходимо сделать за пределами ее собственной юрисдикции, обычно ожидает возвращения ей продуктов переработки, включая плутоний. Поэтому следует предположить, что любая страна, эксплуатирующая реактор, будет иметь доступ к некоторому количеству расщепляющегося материала в виде плутония в течение шести месяцев после изъятия из него облученного топлива.
   В этих обстоятельствах главная гарантия против незаконного переключения такого материала на оружейные цели заключается в гарантиях, которые операторы обогатительных и перерабатывающих предприятий применяют к своему экспорту. По практическим соображениям гарантии, возможно, придется вводить на ряде этапов обращения с расщепляющимся материалом. Однако критическими этапами всегда будут сами заводы по обогащению и переработке, из которых должны исходить основные материалы для оружейной программы.
   See the Annex on pp. 10-12 for tin explanation of the calculation of the figures used for the rate of exchange, GNP and defence expenditure.
   t Calculated at the median exchange rate of 0.45 roubles = SI.
   t Code names of Soviet-made aircraft and missiles are of NATO origin. Their characteristics are given on p. 107ff.
   Ether party may now terminate the treaty by giving one year's notice to the other, t As has the Republic of Korea.
   North Vietnamese infantry divisions normally comprise 3 infantry regiments and one support regiment each of some 2,700 men; divisional strength varies between 10,000 and 12,000 men.
   Legally, Cuba is a member of the OAS, but has been excluded - by a decision by OAS Foreign Ministers - since January 1962. Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, signed the Charter in 1967.
   t This agreement was confirmed in 1934. In 1960 the United States stated that it could be modified or abrogated only by agreement between the parties, and that it had no intention of agreeing to modification or abrogation.
   Medium-range bombers are defined as having a maximum theoretical range, without refuelling, of 3,500-6,000 statute miles. ,
   t IRBMs are defined as having a maximum range of 1,500-4,000 miles and MRBMs of 500-1,500 miles.
   t Because most estimates of NDVs come from official American sources, which stress those able to reach the United States, much more information is available about the numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers than about SRBMs and cruise missiles and strike aircraft, for which, as the Table on pp. 105-6 shows, it is often only possible to give tentative figures. This does not necessarily reflect the relevance of the types of NDV to the `strategic balance' as seen by powers other than the United States.
   Alternative methods, which have not yet emerged from research and development, include the use of gas centrifuges and of separation 'nozzles'. There have been rumours that China has used a variety of enrichment methods, including gas centrifugation, but these cannot be substantiated. South Africa claimed in July 1970 to have developed a `unique' enrichment process, but no details of it have been revealed.
   will also be obtained from fuel used in running a commercial reactor up to full power, because such fuel is normally withdrawn more quickly than in the case of subsequent loadings.
   The plutonium isotope which produces explosive power in a fission weapon is Pu-239. Irradiated reactor fuels also, however, contain other isotopes of plutonium, and especially the Pu-240 isotope. The proportions in which these different isotopes are present will vary, primarily as a function of the degree of `bum-up' to which the fuel has been subjected. In general, fuel from current power reactors running economically and at full power will yield plutonium which contains up to 20 per cent of Pu-240, almost all the remainder being Pu-239. Fuel elements withdrawn more quickly, after a lesser degree of `bum-up', will contain a smaller proportion of Pu-240 (but will also contain smaller total amounts of plutonium).
   Pu-240, in addition to being intensely toxic, has other undesirable properties. In particular, it is subject to a degree of spontaneous fission. For that reason, the most efficient plutonium for weapon purposes is that which contains the minimum proportion of Pu-240 possible. The natural uranium fuel elements used in special plutonium-
   For technical reasons, U-23S has normally been used for the fission trigger of fusion weapons.
   Three power reactors in the United States use uranium enriched to over 90 per cent in U-235. Elsewhere, the only power reactor using uranium enriched to such a high level is a pilot reactor at Jtilich in the Federal German Republic, the fuel for which is obtained, under safeguards, from the United States. A number of reactors for research or the testing of materials also use highly enriched uranium fuels, although the quantities involved are small.

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