Аннотация: The paper was written for participation in CFP: 46th International Wittgenstein Symposium 2025 Feminist Philosophy - Language, Knowledge, and Politics
Introduction
This work is devoted to exploring the concept of language in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It centers on the evolution of his perspectives on the nature of language: from his early period, exemplified by the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1921), where language is viewed as a reflection of the logical structure of the world, to his later phase, associated with the concept of "language games" and the analysis of everyday language.
The study examines the practical applications of Wittgenstein"s ideas across various disciplines, including:
Linguistics: For instance, the study of language evolution.
Psychology: Investigating the relationship between language and thought.
Anthropology: Analyzing "forms of life."
Artificial Intelligence: Developing natural language processing (NLP) systems.
Additionally, the work addresses a comparison between Ludwig Wittgenstein"s views and those of Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein"s philosophical quietism, his critique of traditional philosophy, and a critical evaluation of some of his propositions.
The research employs a comparative and conceptual analysis methodology.
Practical Applications. Wittgenstein"s ideas find practical utility in linguistics, psychology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. His notion of "language games" enhances understanding of how language operates within diverse social contexts, aiding intercultural communication and the study of linguistic evolution. In psychology and cognitive sciences, his insights into the interplay of language and thought advance research on perception and categorization. In artificial intelligence, Wittgenstein"s concepts support the creation of NLP systems capable of accounting for context and the practical usage of words.
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Form of Life, Theory of Knowledge, Context.
Section I
Ludwig Josef Johann von Wittgenstein (1889-1951), an Austrian-British philosopher, is widely recognized for his seminal work, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1921). In this text, the author employed logic to challenge the metaphysical framework of speculative thought [Naranovich 2014: 240].
The Austrian philosophical tradition dispersed globally, with many of its most prominent 19th- and 20th-century thinkers integrating into British and American intellectual circles. Consequently, "Austrian philosophy" is a broad term. To delineate its scope, it encompasses key intellectual currents such as anti-Kantianism, anti-idealism, scientism, empiricism, philosophy of life, and a focus on language investigation. Does Ludwig Wittgenstein belong to this tradition? Undoubtedly, yes-he forged a distinctive philosophical approach centered on the critique of language [Seliverstov 2018: 110-114].
Wittgenstein"s Conception of Language
What is language according to Wittgenstein? It is the expression of all that is accessible to collective human thought. A language that fails to encompass the full spectrum of natural laws or phenomena either perishes (becoming a "dead" language) or is absorbed into a more "organized" linguistic system. Wittgenstein adhered to the principle that "the limits of language are the limits of the world." How does novelty emerge in language? He argued it arises through the incorporation (borrowing) of foreign words or the reinterpretation of native meanings. Linguogenesis, the formation of any language, is a gradual, evolutionary process driven by comparisons, contrasts, and the introduction of neologisms.
Can language develop individually? Wittgenstein contended that individual language development is impossible; it is inherently a collective "language game" [Nilogov 2017: 85-90]. He observed that all linguistic forms-context-dependent expressions like commands, questions, or descriptions-can be divided into two elements: Sachverhalte (social circumstances, a simple fact for language) and Tatsache (a fact or existence, always a complex process).
Early and Late Wittgenstein
A positivist, Wittgenstein devoted his life to the theory of knowledge. He constructed an "ideal language" from a pre-existing verbal-logical framework, governed by logical grammar rules. The early Wittgenstein (1911-1936) explored the correspondence between thought forms and reality. In contrast, the later Wittgenstein (1936-1951) engaged in a phenomenological interpretation of language"s immaterial "rules," linking words to events or actions-essentially, naming things appropriately [Nikiforov 2021: 23-25].
As a professor of logic, Wittgenstein championed the contextual use of language, insisting it should be descriptive rather than prescriptive.
Language and Consciousness
The world is always filtered through human consciousness. Wittgenstein noted that some phenomena "slip through," failing to register due to a lack of cognition or un-decoded mental associations (a psychological dimension). Typically, one"s native language is that of the mother, who shapes our initial thinking through her voice"s intonations, expressions, sounds, and words. Thus, the mother is our first teacher of thought. A child, Wittgenstein suggested, is an empty vessel filled with a specific data organization in a particular sequence. For him, religion or faith represents a quest for new meanings within a repetitive operational framework [Falkner 2017: 505-507].
Though language cannot fully depict reality, Wittgenstein asserted it can reveal its own "failure"-the paradox and futility of decoding subjective experiences. This led him to view language as an "organic product" of human emotional and volitional processes.
Section II
For Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophy served as a "guiding star," realized through dialogue. He criticized Socratic conversations as a "sophistic game" that obstructs genuine understanding of reality. Thus, he distanced himself from Socrates, structuring his thoughts into a disciplined sequence of factual exposition [Burbulis & Peters 2011: 6-8]. In his anti-Platonism, Wittgenstein exposed verbal deceit, sidelining naturalism (Philosophical Investigations, ј42-46) [Wittgenstein 1958: 20-21].
The early Wittgenstein claimed contemporary philosophy had peaked, signaling its end. However, the later Wittgenstein reversed this stance, asserting that thinking-humanity"s primary tool-cannot reach a final perfection. He advocated for metaphilosophy, the pursuit of rational thought oriented toward optimizing human activity"s functionality and practicality. Wittgenstein"s metaphilosophy critiques philosophy as a theoretical discipline, proving it to be a critical activity and human practice [Medvedev 2016: 252-257].
Philosophy and Language
For this Austrian scholar, philosophy is a means to comprehend existence and self. Language, a universal gauge, reflects ontological competence through symbolic representation. The "Wittgenstein"s ladder" concept posits that language can only describe facts; anything beyond-such as ethics, aesthetics, or metaphysics-eludes verbal expression. In the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (ј6.54) [Ludwig 1922: 90], Wittgenstein offers a step upward to perceive the world and language anew [Filatov 2022: 66-68]. He elucidated this "new light" as follows:
The world is a totality of facts, not objects.
Language is a "picture" of the world, mirroring its logical structure.
All that language expresses is bound by logic and facts. What transcends these boundaries (e.g., ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, rooted in sensory or emotional origins) cannot be articulated but may be "shown" through silence-via art, architecture, painting, etc. [Rodin 2013: 18].
Section III
Wittgenstein"s ideas, particularly from his later period emphasizing "language games" and contextual language use, profoundly influenced the development of natural language processing (NLP) systems in artificial intelligence:
He stressed that a word"s meaning derives from its use in a specific context.
His "language games" concept-varied language uses based on situations-inspired models that integrate syntax with pragmatics (the speaker"s goals and intentions). Word meanings are not fixed but contingent on usage. For example, "bread" triggers an immediate association with food in AI, yet phrases like "cheerful bread" or "bread of the native land" yield contextually relevant interpretations based on user data (e.g., geolocation, input language, time of day).
Language, a social phenomenon, has rules absorbed through practice. Modern AI systems (e.g., GPT, Deeseek, Grok) train on billions of sentences to grasp word combinations across contexts.
Wittgenstein's concept of "language games" is also reflected in modern machine learning systems such as Transformer models (e.g. BERT or GPT). These systems are trained to recognize the contextual dependencies of words, which echoes Wittgenstein's idea that meaning is determined by use (via the seq2seq system - sequence-to-sequence learning). For example, the phrases "bank of the river" and "bank of money" require artificial intelligence to analyze the environment of the word "bank" in order to correctly interpret its meaning. In this way, the later Wittgenstein anticipated the need to take into account pragmatic factors such as speaker intentions or social context, which is realized today through big data processing and discourse analysis.
The later Wittgenstein shifted NLP"s focus from purely formal analysis (syntax, grammar) to a deeper grasp of context, practical application, and ambiguity.
Section IV
Ludwig Wittgenstein was a disciple of British philosopher Bertrand Russell Jr. (1872-1970). The "early" Wittgenstein aligned with neopositivism, but the "later" Wittgenstein reevaluated many neopositivist tenets. His logical atomism proposed that propositions are "logical pictures" of facts, demanding empirical verification for meaning. In his later work, "Philosophical Investigations" (1953), he rejected a rigid, biologizing approach to language, denying its reduction to a logical structure [Loreti 2016: 36-38].
Bertrand Russell also employed logical atomism but prioritized formal logic in language analysis. His theory of descriptions, introduced in "On Denoting" (1905), treats certain verbal constructs as complex logical models rather than mere names. Russell argued that everyday language distorts human thought from its ultimate rationality, necessitating its "purification" into an ideal, logic-based language [Russell 1993: 11-27].
A key divergence emerged between the later Wittgenstein and Russell: Wittgenstein abandoned his British mentor"s framework, asserting that language is a dynamic, living tool irreducible to logical constructs.
Bertrand Russell, in contrast to Ludwig Wittgenstein, sought a universal logical system that could eliminate the ambiguity of natural language. The theory of descriptions Wittgenstein, for example, proposes to replace the phrase "the present king of France" with a logical construction that excludes false assumptions of existence. Wittgenstein argued in Philosophical Investigations that such attempts simplify reality: language is multifaceted, like "an old town with its alleys," and not a sterile logical model. This divergence illustrates their approaches to philosophy: the British scholar sought absolute clarity, while the Austrian thinker sought to describe the diversity of linguistic practice.
Section V
Wittgenstein"s anthropological and psychological outlook aligns with the quietist tradition, which eschews philosophical theses and theories-a hallmark of his early phase. He acknowledged that some phenomena (e.g., life"s meaning, ethical values, faith) defy verbalization, labeling them "mystical" and advocating silence about them (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Point VII).
This quietist approach of the Austrian philosopher was reflected in anthropological studies of "forms of life." For example, Wittgenstein argued that the rituals of primitive societies, such as rain rites, cannot be assessed in terms of scientific truth - their meaning lies in social practice, not in accordance with facts. This has inspired modern anthropologists, such as the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926-2006), to study symbolic systems as an integral part of culture, where language plays a role not only in communication but also in creating collective identity.
The later Wittgenstein proposed a "therapy" for language and philosophy, entailing the rejection of obscure rituals and traditions. He urged individuals to name things accurately or, failing that, to seek their realization through prayer [Rogonyan 2021: 128-133].
Section VI
Wittgenstein erred in asserting that language lacks universal rules and depends solely on context, undermining the feasibility of universal language models applicable across all scenarios.
He viewed language as inherently social, deeming a "private language" (e.g., internal experience) impossible. Yet, as societal members, this stance questions modeling subjective or individual language use. Wittgenstein himself recognized society"s heterogeneity, noting distinct linguistic strata (e.g., academic vs. agrarian language, political vs. everyday speech).
One can also criticize the practical applicability of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas in the formal sciences such as mathematics. If the meaning of words depends on context, how do we explain the universality of a mathematical language where "2 + 2 = 4" is true regardless of the "language game"? Wittgenstein, in Remarks on Mathematics (1956), argued that even mathematical truths are the result of agreements within a particular practice, which led to protests from logicians who insisted on the objectivity of formal systems. Thus, the approach of the Austrian scientist risks undermining the foundations of the exact sciences.
As an Austrian positivist, he rejected rigid linguistic rules and structural confinement, complicating the integration of his ideas into formal systems. His skepticism toward objective meanings-where "language games" tie word significance to specific usage-sparked criticism, with contemporaries and students accusing him of philosophical relativism.
Another controversial point in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein is his denial of the possibility of a "private language". Criticism by the American philosopher Norman Malcolm (1911-1990) demonstrated that if the meaning of a word depends solely on public usage, then how do we explain internal states, such as pain, that are subjective in nature? Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations (ј243-258), argued that even such experiences gain meaning through social interactions, but this position faces a problem: if language is an exclusively collective phenomenon, how to model the unique experience of the individual? Modern cognitive research, such as work in neurolinguistics, shows that subjective associations play a key role in the perception of language, which calls into question the radicalism of Wittgenstein's position [Malcolm 1954: 530-531].
Conclusions
1. Wittgenstein"s ideas, despite their critics, remain relevant in the 21st century. His emphasis on the contextuality of language inspires the development of adaptive technologies, such as personalized voice assistants that can take into account the individual characteristics of the user. But his philosophy also reminds us of limits: language can clarify but not exhaust reality, leaving room for silence where words fail.
2. Language is a system shaped by social contexts and "forms of life." Word meanings arise from their situational use, not a fixed logical framework.
3. Language does not exist in isolation within an individual"s mind but evolves through social interactions-"language games." A society rich in contextual and subtextual "games" fosters a more vibrant language.
4. Per Wittgenstein, philosophy"s aim is to clarify language use and dispel confusion (ambiguity or metaphor) stemming from its misuse.